KNPR 8715.3 Rev: G

Revision G changes this document as follows:

- 1. Adds documents to P4, Applicable Documents
- 2. Updates section 1.6
- 3. Rewrites Chapter 4 to update referenced documents and update manloading requirements
- 4. Updates form number in 5.5 and adds 5.5.3, Roofing Operations
- 5. Updates Chapter 8 to delete 8.1.1 and add 8.9, KSC Fall Protection Policy
- 6. Revises 12.1.4.e to clarify requirement

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KSC Safety Practices

Procedural Requirements

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PREFACE

P.1 PURPOSE

This document establishes consolidated safety procedural requirements that serve as a framework to define the parameters and boundaries required during design, operations, and maintenance activities at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and other areas where KSC has jurisdiction. These requirements represent combined efforts to identify and minimize the unique hazards associated with daily industrial operations, space vehicle and payload ground processing, and integrated operations. It is a living document subject to change. It should be emphasized, however, that each employee has a responsibility for safety, both his/her own and that of others who may be impacted by the employee's actions.

P.2 APPLICABILITY

The provisions of these procedural requirements apply to all organizational elements at KSC, to their associated contractors and subcontractors, to service providers to the extent of their contracts, to other Government agencies and their contractors operating at KSC, and to all persons performing official NASA business on NASA property. These provisions are also applicable at offsite facility areas such as the SLC-2 area at VAFB where KSC has operational responsibility. In joint-use facilities (e.g., a facility used both by NASA and the Air Force), when there is a difference in safety requirements, the more stringent requirement shall apply.

P.3 AUTHORITY

- a. Executive Order 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Program for Federal Employees
- b. Title 29 CFR, Part 1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees Occupational Safety and Health Program http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owastand.display_standard group?p toc level=1&p part number=1960
- c. Title 29 CFR, Parts 1910 to 1990, Occupational Safety and Health Administration d. http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owastand.display_standard_group?p_toc_level=1&p_part_number= 1910
- d. Title 40 CFR, Protection of the Environment, Environmental Protection Agency http://www.epa.gov/epahome/cfr40.htm
- e. Title 49 CFR, Parts 171 to 178, Transportation, Department of Transportation http://www.myregs.com/dotrspa/
- f. NPD 8710.2, NASA Safety and Health Policy http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?t=NPD&c=8710&s=2D
- g. NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?Internal ID=N PR 8715 003B &page name=Pr eface

P.4 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

NPD 8710.5	NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems
NPR 8621.1	NASA Procedures and Guidelines for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping
NASA-STD-8719.9	NASA Safety Standard for Lifting Devices and Equipment
NASA-STD-8719.17	NASA Requirements for Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems (PV/S)
NSS 1740.12	NASA Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics
<u>AFSPCMAN 91-710</u>	AFSPC Manual
JSC 08934	Shuttle Operational Data Book, Volume I, Shuttle Systems Performance and Constraints Data
GP-14-2	Facility Utilization Charts
GP-435, Vol. 1	Engineering Drawing Practices, Ground Support Equipment
JHB 2000	KSC & CCAFS Consolidated Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
KNPD 8700.1	Safety and Mission Assurance Policy Directive
KNPD 1800.2	KSC Hazard Communication Program
KNPR 8720.1	Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Procedural Requirements
KNPR 1820.3	KSC Hearing Loss Prevention Program
KNPR 1820.4	KSC Respiratory Protection Program
KN PR 8740.19	KSC Industrial Hygiene Program
KNPR 1860.1	KSC Ionizing Radiation Protection Program
KNPR 1860.2	KSC Nonionizing Radiation Protection Program
KNPR 8715.4	KSC Lockout/Tagout Program Procedural Requirements
KNPR 8715.5	KSC Personal Protective Equipment Program Procedural Requirements

KNPR 4000.1 Supply and Equipment System Manual

KSC Materials and Processes Control Procedural Requirements KNPR 8072.1

KSC-DF-502 SRM/VAB Inadvertent Ignition Effects Study

KSC Drawing 81K04331 Specification for Marking of Propellant Portable Containers

KSC Drawing 81K00643 Specification for Marking of Mobile GSE

KSC Shuttle Program Contingency Plan KSC-PLN-1705

KSC-PLN-2001 ISS/Payload Processing Contingency Action Plan

Pneumatic Ground Support Equipment, Design of KSC-STD-Z-0005

Cryogenic Ground Support Equipment, Design of KSC-STD-Z-0009

LSP-PLN-365.01 LSP-PLN-365.01

NASA-STD-6001 Flammability, Odor, Off-gassing and Compatibility Requirements

and Test Procedures for Materials in Environments that Support

Combustion

ACGIH Threshold Limit Value and Biological Exposure Indices

ASME Section VIII, Div 1&2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

ANSI/NB-23 National Board Inspection Code

National Fire Codes National Fire Protection Association

29 CFR 1910 General Industry

29 CFR 1926 Construction Industry

ANSI Z359.1 Safety Requirements for Personal Fall Arrest Systems

P.5 CANCELLATION/SUPERSESSION

This document supersedes KNPR 8715.3, Rev. F, KSC Safety Practices Procedural Requirements.

Shannon D. Bartell

Director, Safety and Mission Assurance

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

1.1 GOAL

It is the goal of NASA and KSC to provide safe and reliable systems to avoid loss of life or injury to personnel and to avoid loss or damage to program hardware and KSC facilities. To achieve this goal, KSC shall strive to provide and maintain safe reliable Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and facility systems and to perform operations in a manner that minimizes risk.

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is the organization which ensures that all KSC Safety activities are planned, implemented, managed, and coordinated with all other KSC program/project and directorate organizations for an effective and integrated safety effort.

1.2 OBJECTIVE

The objective of this KNPR is to document Center safety policy and implement procedural requirements unique to KSC; and to effectively and efficiently convey safety policy and requirements to employees, customers, and the public.

1.3 RESPONSIBILITY

Final authority and responsibility for implementing the NASA Safety Program at KSC rests with the Center Director. KSC program/project and directorate organizations have responsibilities for developing Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) programs at the Center. The Center Director has delegated the responsibility for assessing and ensuring compliance with SRM&QA programs at the Center to the Director of Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). These responsibilities, and those assigned to other Center organizational elements, are set forth in detail in KSC-NASA Policy Directive (KNPD) 8700.1, KSC Safety and Mission Assurance Policy Directive.

The interpretation of the requirements in these procedural requirements is the responsibility of the appropriate program/project and directorate S&MA organizations. The Director of S&MA (SA) is the final authority for interpretation of these requirements.

1.4 COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL, CONSENSUS, AND NASA STANDARDS

Federal Agencies are mandated to provide a safe workplace for their employees in accordance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1970, per Executive Order 12196, "Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees," dated February 26, 1980, and with 29 CFR 1960 "Basic Program Elements for Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health Programs and Related Matters."

Applicable Industry Standards shall be used to the extent practical to meet NASA and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) design and operational needs.

Unique NASA operations, materials, facilities, equipment, procedures, and practices have or may require the establishment of NASA safety standards. Compliance with NASA safety standards shall be used to the greatest extent practical to meet NASA's design and operational needs.

A listing of mandatory and reference documents is provided in paragraph P.3 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS of this KNPR.

1.5 CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended changes to KNPR shall be in accordance with the <u>KSC Directives Process</u>, <u>KDP-KSC-P-1058</u>. Changes shall be submitted on KSC Form 4-348, "Document Change Recommendation" (DCR), to the Director of S&MA. The form shall identify the exact language of the proposed change and the rationale for the change. The DCR shall be reviewed by all affected organizations and all comments shall be dispositioned.

1.6 SAFETY VARIANCE PROCESSING

1.6.1 OVERVIEW

The primary objective of the safety variance processing procedural requirements is to define the roles and requirements of Center management, KSC program/project, and Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate personnel in such a way that KSC will maintain control over:

- a. Agency S&MA policy and requirements that it administers, and
- b. Center S&MA policy and requirements that it sets.

Whenever it is deemed necessary to vary from established safety requirements in order to accomplish a task, risk management techniques shall be used and documented so that informed decisions can be made regarding the approval or disapproval of the safety variance.

1.6.2 APPLICABILITY

At KSC, it is expected that all safety requirements be met and that all employees report unsafe conditions or acts, work with management to resolve them, and stop imminently dangerous activities. Proposed safety variances may be granted after completing an assessment of the risk associated with the request so that management can make an informed decision regarding its acceptability. In addition, safety variances shall be processed in advance except as noted in paragraph 1.6.6, Real-Time Operational Considerations. Failure to adhere to safety requirements without an approved safety variance is considered a violation and may be subject to disciplinary action.

The safety variance processing procedural requirements documented herein implement the requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements. These procedural requirements apply when requirements of Center safety documentation cannot be met as specified in Kennedy NASA Policy Directives (KNPDs) and Kennedy NASA Procedural Requirements (KNPRs); higher-level Agency requirements such as NASA Policy Directives [NPDs], NASA Procedural Requirements [NPRs], NASA Standards (NASA-STD), and NASA Safety Standards [NSSs]); or other Federal regulations.

If the requirement that cannot be met is within one of the requirements documents listed below, and there is a specific safety variance process defined within that same requirements document, those requirements shall supersede the safety variance requirements herein. The applicable requirements documents are:

- a. Safety variances affecting the safety of Space Shuttle & ISS payloads, experiments, and cargo requirements shall be processed through the Ground Safety Review Panel (GSRP) in accordance with KHB 1700.7, Space Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Handbook.
- b. Variances against Range Safety requirements shall be processed in accordance with NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program.
- c. Safety variances against Range requirements shall be processed in accordance with the appropriate Range requirements document (e.g., EWR 127-1 or AFSPCMAN 91-710 for CCAFS or VAFB).
- d. Safety variances against ELV Payload Safety requirements shall be processed in accordance with NPR 8715.7, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program.

1.6.3 DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply to the KSC safety variance processing procedural requirements established herein and are in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

<u>Acceptance</u>: Formal documentation of accepting an increased level of risk.

Accepted Risk: A hazard whose risk is not completely mitigated and that has been accepted by top program and safety management

<u>Approval</u>: Formal documentation of agreement and authority to proceed as documented, as long as the appropriate authority accepts any increase in risk.

<u>Concurrence</u>: Formal documentation of agreement, but with no authority to approve or accept risk.

<u>Consequence (Severity)</u>: An assessment of the worst-case credible potential result(s) of a risk, without any controls in place. The following is an example of consequence classifications definitions.

Consequence Risk Attribute Definitions							
Le	vel	1	2	3	4	5	
Conse	quence	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	
	Personnel Safety	A condition that could cause the need for minor first aid	A condition that may cause short-term, minor injury, impairment, or incapacitation	A condition that may cause long-term, severe injury, impairment, or incapacitation	A condition that may cause permanent severe injury, impairment, or incapacitation	A condition that may cause loss of life	
Safety	Facilities/Equipment	A condition that subjects facilities, equipment, or flight hardware to more than normal wear and tear	A condition that may cause minor property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware	A condition that may cause moderate property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware	A condition that may cause major property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware	A condition that may cause destruction of critical facilities on the ground, major systems, or vehicle during ground operations	
	Environmental	Negligible environmental Impact; negligible OSHA/EPA violation – non-reportable	Minor environmental Impact; minor reportable OSHA/EPA violation Which requires Immediate remediation Major environmental Impact; major OSHA/EI Impact; major OSHA/EI violation causing temporary stoppage		Impact; major OSHA/EPA violation causing	Catastrophic environmental Impact; serious or repeat OSHA/EPA violations resulting in termination	
Mission Success	Meeting requirements, program/project and institutional services support	Negligible Impact to requirements and program/institutional services goals and objectives	Minor Impact to requirements and program/Institutional services goals and objectives	Moderate Impact to requirements and program/Institutional services goals and objectives	Major Impact to requirements and program/Institutional services goals and objectives	Failure to meet requirements and program/Institutional services goals and objectives Impact	
Supportability	Capabilities flexibility for workforce, facilities, infrastructure	Negligible Impact to capability/flexibility of workforce, facilities, or Infrastructure	Minor Impact to capability/flexibility of workforce, facilities, or Infrastructure	Moderate Impact to capability/flexibility of workforce, facilities, or Infrastructure	Major Impact to capability/flexibility of workforce, facilities, or Infrastructure	Failure of workforce, facilities, Infrastructure to meet activity goals or objectives Impact	
Cost	Based on allocated yearly budget for project/element/item	≤ 2% (Negligible Impact to budget)	> 2% but ≤ 5% (Minor Impact to budget)	> 5% but ≤ 10% (Moderate Impact to budget)	> 10% but ≤ 15% (Major Impact to budget)	> 15% (Catastrophic program Impact or potential activity cancellation	
Schedule	Ability to support activity milestones	Negligible schedule Impact	Minor overall schedule Impact (Accommodate with reserve, no Impact to critical path)	≤ 1 month Impact to critical path/milestones	>1 and ≤ 6 month Impact to critical path/milestones	> 6 month Impact to critical path/milestones or possible program/activity cancellation	

<u>Controlled (Risk) Hazard</u>: The likelihood of occurrence or severity of the associated undesirable event has been reduced to an acceptable level through the imposition of appropriate, readily implementable, verifiable controls resulting in minimal residual risk.

<u>Deviation:</u> A variance that authorizes temporary relief in advance from a specific requirement and is requested during the formulation/planning/design stages of a program/project operation to address expected situations.

<u>Exception</u>: A variance that authorizes permanent relief from a specific requirement and may be requested at any time during the life cycle of a program/project.

<u>Hazard</u>: Existing or potential condition that can result in or contribute to a mishap.

<u>Hazard Analysis</u>: Identification and evaluation of existing and potential hazards, and the recommended mitigation for the hazard sources found.

<u>Likelihood (Probability)</u>: The likelihood that an identified hazard will result in a mishap based on an assessment of such factors as location, exposure in terms of cycles or hours of operation, and affected population. Likelihood (probability) takes into account that the hazard controls are in-place and effective. The following is an example of probability classification definitions.

Likelihood (probability) Classification Definitions						
Level	Likelihood	Definition				
Level 1 (Very Low)	Highly unlikely	Existing controls are strong and very likely to prevent this risk scenario.				
Level 2 (Low)	Unlikely	Existing controls have minor limitations and/or uncertainties and usually are sufficient to prevent this risk scenario; some additional actions may be required.				
Level 3 (Moderate)	Could happen	Existing controls have some limitations and/or uncertainties and may prevent this risk scenario; additional actions may be required.				
Level 4 (High)	Likely	Existing controls have significant limitations and/or uncertainties and cannot prevent this risk scenario; additional actions will be required.				
Level 5 (Very High)	Highly likely	Existing controls have little or no effect and cannot prevent this risk scenario; no alternative controls are available.				


<u>Residual Risk</u>: Risk that remains from a hazard after all mitigation and controls have been applied.

<u>Risk</u>: A future event characterized by the combination of the probability (qualitative or quantitative) that an activity will experience an undesired event (e.g., safety mishap, cost overrun, schedule slippage, inability to achieve goal or objective) and the consequence, impact, or severity of the undesired event, were it to occur. All risks must be actionable.

<u>Risk (Safety) Assessment</u>: Process of qualitative risk categorization or quantitative risk (safety) estimation, followed by the evaluation of risk significance. The standardized KSC 5 x 5 risk matrix is shown below.

NOTE: Program-accepted 5 x 5 risk matrices whose definitions of likelihood (probability) and consequences (severity) differ from the example KSC definitions contained herein may be used, if the program definitions of likelihood and consequence categories are provided within their risk assessment.

Standardized KSC 5 X 5 Risk Matrix



<u>Variance</u>: Documented and approved permission to perform some act or operation contrary to established requirements. The three types of safety variances are exceptions, deviations, and waivers. A variance may involve the approval of alternative means that provide an equivalent or lower level of risk or formal acceptance of increased risk due to the fact that the requirement is not satisfied.

<u>Waiver</u>: A variance that authorizes temporary relief from a specific requirement after the fact. Requested during the implementation of a project or operation to address situations that were unforeseen during design or advanced planning.

1.6.4 SAFETY VARIANCE GENERATION

- a. When Center or higher-level Agency or Federal safety requirement(s) cannot be met, the initiating organization (contractor or NASA) shall process a safety variance request. When the unmet requirement(s) resides in both a Center and a higher-level safety document, the safety variance will be generated against the requirement in the higher-level document.
- b. To generate and submit a safety variance request (reference KDP-KSC-P-3614):
- 1. Acquire a KSC safety variance number

A safety variance number may be obtained by contacting the S&MA Launch Vehicle Processing Division or the S&MA Integration Office. The S&MA Integration Office is also responsible for managing safety variance processing and for maintaining a KSC safety variance database/depository.

2. Fill out the request form KSC Safety Variance Form (KDP-KSC-F-3614) and perform risk assessment

The appropriate S&MA Division, in conjunction with the initiating organization, shall assess the need for a variance, coordinate the review and risk assessment, establish the appropriate duration of the variance and the corresponding rationale.

- (a) System safety is an integral part of the overall program risk management decision process. The risk assessment process is a principal factor in the understanding and management of technical risk. Hazards are identified and resultant risks are assessed by considering probability of occurrence and severity of consequence. The safety variance shall include a 5 x 5 risk matrix with defined probability (likelihood) and consequence (severity) categories.
- (b) The approval duration for safety variances shall be based on the operational event and circumstances involved. The duration must be pre-coordinated with the appropriate S&MA Division. At the end of this time period, the variance expires. In situations where it is necessary to renew the variance for an additional time period, the safety variance must be resubmitted in accordance with these procedural requirements. In addition, progress made toward future compliance with the unmet requirement(s) will also be considered during the safety variance review process. Requests of this nature shall be accompanied by detailed rationale describing why the specific unmet requirement(s) should remain intact.
- (c) All safety variance requests shall be accompanied by documentation (provided by the initiating organization), including comments from any affected employees or their representatives. Utilizing the KSC Safety Variance Form (KDP-KSC-F-3614), document the variance data elements. This form is available in KSC Business World, from the appropriate S&MA Division or from the S&MA Integration Office (see KDP-KSC-P-3614).
- (d) The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) shall be involved early in the writing of the variance to determine if the safety variance involves NASA employees from an operational or risk exposure perspective.

1.6.5 SAFETY VARIANCE COORDINATION/APPROVAL

a. Safety variances shall be approved prior to execution of operations except as noted in paragraph 1.6.6 below. Coordination, approvals, final risk acceptance, and required timelines for safety variances are based on the level of the requirement document being considered, and they are all documented below.

When the review of the associated risk assessment results in a non-concurrence, the reviewer shall provide detailed rationale for the non-concurrence recommendation. The safety variance can continue through the process even if there are non-concurrences. It is the responsibility of the approval authority and the risk acceptance authority to decide if they will approve/accept the variance with the documented non-concurrences.

- 1. For safety variances against contractor-imposed safety requirements, the contractor management is the approval and final risk acceptance authority.
- 2. For safety variances against NASA/KSC safety requirements:
- (a) The initiating organization shall provide the safety variance or request for extension to the Ground Risk Review Panel (GRRP) chair as soon as practical but no later than two weeks prior to the operation or expiration date (except as stated in paragraph 1.6.6). In addition, all signatures (or non-concurrence rationale) except the GRRP chair, the Director(s) of the affected

NASA Directorate(s), the S&MA Director, and the Center Director shall be obtained prior to attending the GRRP meeting scheduled by the GRRP chair (usually scheduled for one week after receiving the safety variance). This will allow adequate time for the GRRP, S&MA Director, and Center Director to review the safety variance. If there are circumstances that do not allow the safety variance to be sent to the GRRP chair two full weeks prior to the operation, there may not be adequate time to obtain all the required signatures, although every attempt will be made. For real time variances, reference section 1.6.6.

- (b) The Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s) and the Center Director are the approval and final risk acceptance authorities. In the case of a safety variance affecting more than one NASA/KSC program, project, or organization, all involved Directors shall provide approval and final risk acceptance via signature.
- (c) If the initiating organization is non-NASA, the Director of the initiating organization (KSC Center Director equivalent) shall also approve/non-concur the safety variance.
- (d) The following shall review and concur/non-concur:
- (1) The appropriate S&MA Division Chief
- (2) The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 c)
- (3) The Safety Program Manager (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 b)
- (4) The GRRP Chair
- (5) The KSC S&MA Director
- 3. For safety variances against NASA Headquarters policy documents (NPDs):
- (a) The initiating organization shall provide the safety variance or request for extension to the GRRP chair as soon as practical but no later than three weeks prior to the operation or expiration date (except as stated in paragraph 1.6.6). In addition, all signatures (or non-concurrence rationale) except the GRRP chair, the Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s), the S&MA Director, the Center Director, and NASA Headquarters (HQ) shall be obtained prior to attending the GRRP meeting scheduled by the GRRP chair (usually scheduled for one week after receiving the safety variance). This will allow adequate time for the GRRP, S&MA Director, Center Director, and NASA HQ to review the safety variance. If there are circumstances that do not allow the safety variance to be sent to the GRRP chair three full weeks prior to the operation, there may not be adequate time to obtain all the required signatures, although every attempt will be made. For real time variances, reference section 1.6.6.
- (b) The Enterprise Associate Administrator (AA) or the NASA HQ Institutional Program Officer (IPO) is the approval authority.
- (c) The Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s) and the Center Director are the approval and final risk acceptance authorities. In the case of a safety variance affecting more than one NASA/KSC program, project, or organization, all involved Directors shall provide approval and final risk acceptance via signature.

- (d) If the initiating organization is non-NASA, the Director of the initiating organization (KSC Center Director equivalent) shall also approve/non-concur the safety variance.
- (e) The following shall review and concur/non-concur:
- (1) The appropriate S&MA Division Chief
- (2) The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 c)
- (3) The Safety Program Manager (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 b)
- (4) The GRRP Chair
- (5) The KSC S&MA Director
- 4. For NASA Headquarters procedural requirements documents (NPRs, NSSs, NASA-STDs):
- (a) The initiating organization shall provide the safety variance or request for extension to the GRRP chair as soon as practical but no later than two weeks prior to the operation or expiration date (except as stated in paragraph 1.6.6). In addition, all signatures (or non-concurrence rationale) except the GRRP chair, the Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s), the S&MA Director, and the Center Director shall be obtained prior to attending the GRRP meeting scheduled by the GRRP chair (usually scheduled for one week after receiving the safety variance). This will allow adequate time for the GRRP, S&MA Director, and Center Director to review the safety variance. If there are circumstances that do not allow the safety variance to be sent to the GRRP chair two full weeks prior to the operation, there may not be adequate time to obtain all the required signatures, although every attempt will be made. For real time variances, reference section 1.6.6.
- (b) The Center Director is the approval authority (as delegated from NASA OSMA).
- (c) The Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s) and the Center Director are the approval and final risk acceptance authorities. In the case of a safety variance affecting more than one NASA/KSC program, project, or organization, all involved Directors shall provide approval and final risk acceptance via signature.
- (d) If the initiating organization is non-NASA, the Director of the initiating organization (KSC Center Director equivalent) shall also approve/non-concur the safety variance.
- (e) The following shall review and concur/non-concur:
- (1) The appropriate S&MA Division Chief
- (2) The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 c)
- (3) The Safety Program Manager (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 b)
- (4) The GRRP Chair

- (5) The KSC S&MA Director
- 5. For safety variances against other Federal Agency documents:
- (a) The issuing Federal Agency is the approval authority
- (b) The Director(s) of the affected NASA Directorate(s) and the Center Director are the approval and final risk acceptance authorities. In the case of a safety variance affecting more than one NASA/KSC program, project, or organization, all involved Directors shall provide approval and final risk acceptance via signature.
- (c) If the initiating organization is non-NASA, the Director of the initiating organization (KSC Center Director equivalent) shall also approve/non-concur the safety variance.
- (d) The following shall review and concur/non-concur:
- (1) The appropriate S&MA Division Chief
- (2) The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 c)
- (3) The Safety Program Manager (as applicable, see section 1.6.5 b)
- (4) The GRRP Chair
- (5) The KSC S&MA Director
- (6) The appropriate NASA Headquarters office of record.
- b. Proposed safety variance submittals involving Cranes/Lifting Devices; Explosives, Pyrotechnics, and Propellants; Pressure Vessels (ground fixed and mobile); Fire Protection; and Lightning/Grounding shall be routed for review and concurrence (via signature) to the appropriate safety program manager. Safety program managers at KSC include the KSC Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager (S&MA Launch Vehicle Processing Division); the KSC Explosives Safety Manager (Institutional S&MA Division); the KSC Pressure Systems Manager (Spaceport Services Propellants and Life Support Branch); the KSC Authority Having Jurisdiction (Spaceport Services Protective Services Office); and the KSC Lightning Safety Assessment Committee Chairman (S&MA Launch Vehicle Processing Division).
- c. If the safety variance involves NASA employees from an operational or risk exposure perspective, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Union will be notified and shall provide concurrence via signature (or non-concurrence with appropriate rationale).

1.6.6 REAL TIME OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

a. In the case of off-shift/real-time safety variances against KSC or NASA level requirements, it is the responsibility of the initiating organization (contractor or NASA) to obtain, as a minimum, required risk assessments, concurrence from the appropriate KSC S&MA Division representative, and review and final risk acceptance (may be verbal) from the appropriate NASA/KSC program/project or organizational Director. The initiating organization shall

complete the safety variance process outlined herein by the end of the next regular business day. For safety variances against requirements of other Federal Agency documents, the NASA Headquarters Office of S&MA (OSMA) shall additionally concur.

b. During terminal launch countdown, safety variances may be approved on a recorded net. This approval will include a discussion of the risk assessment. Completion of the approved safety variance application shall follow within 24 hours or by the close of business on the next regular business day.

1.6.7 SAFETY VARIANCE RECORDKEEPING/FOLLOW-UP

- a. After safety variance processing has been completed (final risk disposition obtained), the S&MA Integration Office shall ensure that all safety variance data (and accompanying risk assessment) is entered into the KSC Safety Variance Database/Depository (enter the data if the initiating organization or the appropriate S&MA Division has not already entered the data). The S&MA Integration Office will send a copy of the safety variance to the appropriate S&MA Division for distribution and filing. The S&MA Integration office will also send a copy to NASA HQ OSMA. The S&MA Integration Office will file the electronic original.
- b. The safety variance initiating organization is responsible for implementation and maintenance of procedural and/or operational controls specified as requirements by the safety variance, and for their own closed loop tracking and timely safety variance renewal, when required. The appropriate S&MA Division will track the implementation through normal surveillance activities.
- c. The initiating organization shall provide a status to the GRRP on the implementation and maintenance of procedural and/or operations controls specified in the safety variance, when requested.

1.7 SAFETY JURISDICTION

- 1.7.1 KSC civil service or contractor employees, and visitors (e.g., other Centers employees, payload customers, students, international partners, etc.) are expected to comply with KSC safety and health policies/requirements/procedures, and to perform all work in a safe and healthful manner. When unsafe and/or unhealthful conditions/acts pose a danger to personnel or property, all employees have the right and obligation to stop work and/or refuse to perform work they feel is unsafe and/or unhealthful, and work with their management to determine how the work can be performed in a safe and healthful manner.
- 1.7.2 All violations of KSC safety and health policies/requirements/procedures shall be taken seriously. Violations by civil service personnel may result in disciplinary actions, up to removal from Government service, while violations by contractor employees or visitors could result in being barred from the Center. Open, non retaliatory communications are essential to improving and maintaining KSC's safety and health program. Employees shall notify their supervision of unsafe and/or unhealthful conditions or acts. Reprisal or disciplinary action against an employee who initiates a safety concern will not be tolerated.
- 1.7.3 Safety personnel shall have the right to enter any facility and to monitor any operation(s).

CHAPTER 2: WEATHER

2.1 GENERAL

- 2.1.1 Real-time warnings shall be issued for the purpose of protecting personnel and property from the hazards associated with adverse weather.
- 2.1.2 Advisories shall be provided to personnel conducting hazardous operations with sufficient lead-time to secure the operation before the forecasted weather system arrives.
- 2.1.3 Detailed weather requirements are identified in Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI) S0018 "Adverse Environment and Lightning Monitoring at LC-39."

2.2 ADVERSE WEATHER NOTIFICATION

- 2.2.1 The Shuttle Processing Operations Contractor (SPOC) shall notify the Joint Base Operations Support Contractor (JBOSC) and the Checkout Assembly & Payload Processing Services (CAPPS) of adverse weather conditions affecting KSC operating areas.
- 2.2.2 The SPOC shall make an all-area page, preceded by a special tone, announcing the following adverse weather affecting KSC operating areas:
- a. Phase I and Phase 2 Lightning Advisory, and
- b. Severe Weather Warnings.
- 2.2.3 Phase 2 Lightning Warning notifications and Severe Weather Warnings shall be repeated every hour until the advisory is terminated.
- 2.2.4 Adverse weather shall be announced on applicable KSC radio nets by the respective Duty Officer (DO)/Monitor. Phase 2 Lightning Warning notifications and Severe Weather Warnings shall be repeated every hour until the advisory is terminated.
- 2.2.5 Termination and change of state of adverse conditions shall be announced in a similar manner.

2.3 ADVERSE WEATHER

- 2.3.1 Lightning
- a. Lightning activity detected at or near KSC shall be defined as a two-phase process:
- 1. Phase 1 lightning notification shall be the "Lightning Advisory."
- 2. Phase 2 lightning notification shall be the "Lightning Warning."
- b. To avoid damage or injury from lightning strikes:
- 1. Personnel working outside a lightning protected area shall be notified of Phase 2.

- 2. Personnel working inside a facility shall not be exposed to wiring that may conduct electricity from a lightning strike.
- 3. All facility doors shall be closed when a Phase 2 notification is made.
- 4. Flight hardware shall be protected from lightning strikes.
- c. The program/project or directorate organization shall establish lightning strike protection controls based upon a safety engineering assessment of the following criteria:
- 1. Personnel exposure outside a lightning protected facility or area.
- 2. Flight hardware exposure, area exposed.
- 3. Move of flight hardware, hazardous chemicals, and explosives outside a lightning protected facility or area.
- 4. Protection of personnel performing hazardous operations inside or outside a lightning protected facility or area.
- 2.3.2 Wind
- a. The program/project or directorate organization shall establish wind restrictions based upon a safety engineering assessment of the following criteria:
- 1. Personnel exposure.
- 2. Sail areas.
- 3. Mass.
- 4. Wind speed.

CHAPTER 3: PERSONNEL

3.1 GENERAL

The number and functions of personnel required to perform a hazardous operation shall be defined in the applicable Technical Operating Procedure (TOP).

3.2 PERSONNEL CONTROLS

- 3.2.1 Personnel controls shall be implemented as follows:
- a. Access shall be limited for hazardous areas and/or operations.
- b. Safety control areas shall be clearly marked to indicate the control boundary. Personnel shall not enter a safety-controlled area unless authorized to do so by the controlling authority. Personnel shall not remove or alter posted safety signs or ropes. Only the organization installing the safety sign or rope shall be authorized to remove or alter it.
- c. Personnel shall not enter an area that is posted with a radiation warning sign or barrier unless specifically authorized to do so by the radiographer responsible for the area.
- d. All hazardous operations shall require the buddy system as defined in the Glossary.
- e. Personnel working in or visiting processing areas and support testing facilities shall adhere to the following clothing requirements:
- 1. On structures and areas with grate flooring/ exposed cables, shoes shall cover the entire foot, be low- and wide-heeled, and have soles heavy enough to provide adequate protection.
- 2. In areas/facilities where hazardous liquids or fuels are handled/processed, canvas or cloth sneakers, porous shoes, "tank tops," mesh shirts and/or shorts shall be prohibited.
- f. While hazardous operations are on-going or hazardous conditions are present, persons incapable, without the assistance and/or resistance of others, of ascending and/or descending ladders or stairs within both the direct and/or alternate evacuation routes from the hazardous facility shall not be permitted access requiring such ascent or descent. An individual may not be permitted access to work in any facility conducting hazardous operations if the individual is not capable of performing the essential functions of a position in question, either with or without reasonable accommodation, without endangering the health and safety of that individual or others.
- g. VAB High Bay Roof Access for Non-operational Personnel

Only certain non-operational personnel considered "high level KSC stakeholders" shall be allowed VAB roof access as approved by senior management on a case-by-case basis. The following requirements and restrictions apply.

1. Approvals

- (a) Access to the VAB roof shall be coordinated by the sponsoring organization and approved in advance and in writing by the Director of Shuttle Processing <u>OR</u> the Director of External Relations; <u>AND the Chief</u>, Institutional Safety and Quality Division, or designee.
- (b) The approval letter shall include the date, anticipated time of the visit, the size of the group and any other pertinent information, and be distributed to the Chief Test Conductor (CTC) Office, NASA Test Director (NTD) Office, the VAB Site Manager, VAB Safety, and USA Operations Security. Any last minute changes to group size (increases) shall strictly adhere to the requirements stated herein.

2. Escort Requirements

- (a) Visitors shall be accompanied by a KSC sponsoring organization escort, and the VAB Site Manager or VAB Site Safety appointed designee.
- (b) Escorts shall be trained in VAB emergency evacuation procedures, including locations of the Marshalling Areas.
- (c) Escorts shall possess a means of communication such as a 2-way radio.
- (d) Escorts shall provide a safety briefing including requirements, restrictions and emergency egress procedures.
- 3. Personnel Limits.

A group granted VAB roof access shall be limited to 8 or less, exclusive of the escorts.

4. Hazardous Operations.

VAB roof access for these non-operational personnel will be allowed only when there are no hazardous operations being conducted in or around the VAB area including launch countdown and landing. The VAB Site Manager or VAB Site Safety appointed designee shall coordinate with the Chief Test Conductor to ensure that no hazardous operations are occurring during the visit.

5. Personnel Requirements

The following requirements shall be discussed with the tour participants prior to the tour as part of the safety briefing mentioned above and will be the responsibility of the tour sponsor to assure they are included in that briefing.

- (a) Visitors must comply with NASA, KSC and other applicable safety and health policy directives, guidelines and procedures.
- (b) Personnel shall be attired in long slacks, and completely closed flat-heeled shoes. Porous or open-toed shoes are not allowed.

- (c) Adults only are allowed, although mature young adults that are part of the group may be allowed at the discretion of escorts and, as approved by the Director of Shuttle Processing or External Relations.
- (d) Personnel shall be physically able to exit by staircase in the event of an emergency. The VAB is equivalent to a 52-storied building. Elevators shall not be used during emergency evacuation or drill.
- (e) No sharp objects, backpacks, coolers, cell phones or talk-back pagers are allowed.
- (f) Loose items at risk of falling shall be removed and stored or tethered or otherwise secured.
- (g) Due to the brightness and reflection on the VAB roof, UV protective sunglasses are recommended.
- 6. Access limitations
- (a) VAB roof access shall be limited to the large flat area within the railings.
- (b) VAB roof access shall be allowed only during times when the weather is acceptable (e.g. no weather advisories for high wind, rain, lightning, etc).
- (c) VAB roof access may be denied as circumstances may warrant, such as roof construction, and is at the discretion of the CTC, NASA NTD, VAB Site Manager, VAB Site Safety appointed designees or their NASA counterparts or the official escorts.

7. Emergency scenarios

In the event of any type of emergency, the VAB Site Manager or VAB Site Safety appointed designee shall have full authority regarding egress from the building. The emergency egress route is marked by arrows on the roof leading to the west stairwell.

3.3 PERSONNEL ACCESS TRAINING

Personnel requiring access to operations areas shall complete required area access training or be escorted by trained personnel. The operational area training course requirement listing is available from computers having connection to the internal KSC Intranet (http://kscsafety.ksc.nasa.gov/dratepage.htm) or from hard copies available from the KSC S&MA Directorate Integration Office. The Protective Services Office shall not issue permanent access badges until certification of training has been completed. Supervisors shall ensure that employees are familiar with designated facilities where they work or routinely visit. KSC Form 13-195, "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Records System Attendance Roster," shall be completed by both trainer and trainee and then forwarded to the appropriate authorized training organization for input to the "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Record System."

3.3.1 ORBITER ACCESS REQUIREMENTS

- a. Access to the Orbiter requires specific training, justification, certification and badging.
- b. The following training requirements are mandatory for Certification # 800, "Orbiter Mid Body and Forward Access"

OV283USA, Orbiter Wiring Awareness (24 month recert)
OV289LSC, Crew Module/Payload Bay Access (24 month recert)
QS205LSK, How Clean Is Clean Enough (One time – no recert)

c. The following training requirements are mandatory for Certification # 801, "Orbiter AFT Access"

OV21ILSC, AFT Area Access (24 month recert)
OV283USA, Orbiter Wiring Awareness (24 month recert)
QS205LSK, How Clean Is Clean Enough (One time – no recert)

- d. Upon completion of all mandatory training requirements, KSC form 29-890, "Orbiter Access Justification," is completed and processed to obtain the necessary certification(s). Supervisory/managerial signature is required.
- e. If access to the Orbiter is required less than once per month, Certification 800/801 is not authorized. A "KSC Form 4-536, "One Time/One Day Entry Permit" will be utilized.
- f. KSC Area Permit Numbers 70-73, as well as other numbers (dependent upon Orbiter location, i.e., Pad, OPF, VAB) are required for unescorted access to the Orbiter.

3.3.2 SPECIAL CREW TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The matrix that follows provides a list of special crew training requirements in addition to the area access requirements.

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MINIMUM KSC SAFETY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL CREWS (IN ADDITION TO AREA ACCESS SAFETY TRAINING)

COURSE NUMBER	COURSE TITLE	FLIGHT CREW	* CLOSE OUT CREW	FIRE RESCUE TEAM	FINAL INSPECTION TEAM	RED CREW	RECERT PERIOD	TYPE/LOCATION
OV 211 LSC	AFT Area Access	Х					24 Mo.	Video
OV 281 LSK	Flight Crew Emergency Egress (Orbiter)		Х				18 Mo.	Live/JSC
OV 282 LSK**	Flight Crew Emergency Egress (Pad)		Х				18 Mo.	Live/KSC
OV289LSC	Crew Module/Payload Bay Access	Х	X				24 Mo.	Video
QG 218 KSC**	Closeout Crew Fire Suppression		X				12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QG 221 KSC	Flight Crew Fire Suppression	Х					12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QG 310 KSC-REV	Basic CPR And First Aid	Х	Х	X	Х		None	Live/KSC-JSC
QG 313 KSC-REV	CPR/Basic First Aid Recertification	Х	Х	Х	Х		24 Mo.	Live/KSC-JSC
QG 316 KSC	Red Crew Fire Supp/Emergency Egress				Х	Х	12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QS 200 LSK	Red Crew Familiarization					Х	None	Live/KSC
QG 325 KSC**	Robert Shaw Mini Resuscitator	Х	Х				12 Mo.	Live/KSC-JSC
QG 333 KSC	Flt Crew Rescue-Launch Pad Vertical			X			None	Live/KSC
QG 340 KSC**	Liquid Air Pack Operation		Х	Х			12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QG 250 KSC	Hypergolic Fire Suppression	Х	Х	Х			12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QG 389 KSC	Driver Operation, M-113 Tank	Х		X			12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QS 22A LSK**	Crew Emergency Egress (Part A – Classroom)		Х		Х		18 Mo.	Live/KSC
QS 22B LSK	Crew Emergency Egress (Part B – Pad Walkdown)	Х	Х		Х		12 Mo.	Live/KSC
QG 381 JBO or QS 505 USA	Supplied Air Respirator Fit Test		Х	Х		Х	12 Mo.	Live/KSC

^{*} Includes Training Requirements for JSC Suit Techs, Support Astronauts

NOTES:

- 1. All special crews require Orbiter Access Certification Numbers 800/801. Current qualifications include the following video training: OV211LSC, OV283USA, OV 289LSC, QS205LSK, and QS210LSK-REV
- 2. A current respirator (RE3) physical is required for all personnel attending QG218KSC, QG221KSC, QG316KSC, or QG340KSC
- 3. Current respirator (RE3), SCAPE (SS), and Primary Crew Contact (PCC) physicals are required for all personnel assigned to the Closeout Crew.
- 4. A Fireman Paramedic KSC (FR) physical is required for all personnel assigned to the Fire Rescue Team.

^{**} Courses are taught in block form sequence

3.4 REFRESHER TRAINING

- 3.4.1 Employees working on an assigned basis in and around the areas for which access has been granted shall not be required to attend formalized classroom or videotaped area access safety training for maintaining currency. The supervisor shall ensure that emergency procedures are covered during periodic safety meetings.
- 3.4.2 Employees not working on an assigned basis in and around the areas for which access has been granted shall comply with the 3-year refresher training requirements. However, Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA) training is required each year.
- 3.4.3 Supervisors shall update the employee record by completing and signing the KSC Form 13-195, "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Record System Attendance Roster". The appropriate course number and date shall be recorded on the roster and forwarded to the appropriate authorized training organization for input to the PM50.

3.5 MAXIMUM WORK TIME

3.5.1 GENERAL

- a. The KSC Maximum Work Time (MWT) requirements are in place to ensure that people do not work excessive hours. Work for prolonged hours or for extended periods without adequate time off can contribute to fatigue, which can lead to an unsafe act or condition. Long work hours can negatively impact a person's life away from work, as well as compromise safety and mission success at KSC. Therefore it is necessary to mitigate the risks associated with excessive work by imposing work hour limits.
- b. Civil Service and Contractor supervisors are responsible for ensuring employee knowledge and enforcement of KSC MWT requirements. Supervisors are also encouraged to ensure that workers are educated on the causes and effects of fatigue. All on-duty periods for employees shall be recorded and counted towards their total work time hours. For situations involving unpaid duty time (e.g., NASA travel to required duty stations), supervisors are responsible for ensuring persons in critical positions receive adequate rest periods prior to performing critical tasks.
- c. NASA supervisors shall ensure that all work performed by individuals in their organizations beyond normal duty hours, is processed in accordance with KSC KNPR 9620.4, "KSC Approval and Control of Overtime, Compensatory Time, and Holiday Work Procedural Requirements." Contractor organizations shall abide by the applicable documents addressing such compensation issues for them.

3.5.2 APPLICABILITY

The KSC MWT limits apply to persons in critical and noncritical positions as described in Table 3-1. Visiting employees (i.e., NASA and contractor) from other NASA Centers shall adhere to their Center's MWT policies and requirements. Host KSC organizations shall familiarize other visitors (e.g., Launch Service Providers, Payload Customers, International Partners, Academia) with the KSC MWT requirements herein to the maximum extent possible. Visitors shall not work in excess of 16 consecutive hours. No MWT records are required for visitors.

To Whom MWT Applies	1) When MWT Applies 2) Which MWT Provisions Apply 3) Approval Reporting and Recording Requirements for Deviations and Violations	Where MWT Applies
KSC Civil Service Employees and	1) Always	Any duty
KSC Contractors Working in	2) All MWT provisions	station
Positions Designated as Critical	3) Yes (per this document)	
KSC Civil Service Employees and	1) Always	Any duty
KSC Contractors Working in	2) All MWT provisions	station
Noncritical Positions	3) No	

TABLE 3-1, MAXIMUM WORK TIME (MWT) APPLICABILITY TABLE

3.5.3 CRITICAL POSITIONS

- a. A critical position is one in which the worker's job performance can directly impact ground safety, flight safety or mission success. In the types of positions delineated herein, there is not more than one level of check and balance regarding the employee's decisions or actions. This includes but is not limited to:
- 1. Workers dealing directly with flight hardware, software, or ground support equipment, or
- 2. Employees having authority to make decisions on flight hardware or software processing, or
- 3. Workers involved in launch or landing activities, or
- 4. Personnel who work in ground systems that have a functional or physical interface with flight systems, or
- 5. Employees working hazardous sequences of hazardous procedures.

NOTE: The phrase "not more than 1 level of check and balance" is clarified as follows for the types of positions delineated above. A technician performing and directly checking a task alone is considered to be a "0 level of check and balance". Examples of "1 level of check and balance" includes, but is not limited to: Technicians performing tasks that are directly checked by a quality control specialist; technicians performing tasks that are directly checked by an engineer; technicians performing tasks that are directly checked by a supervisor; and engineers performing tasks that are directly checked by a supervisor. [For these instances, both the individual performing the task and the individual directly checking the task are incumbents of a critical position.]

b. Examples of positions that can be designated as critical include, but are not limited to: NASA Test Directors, Systems Engineers, and Quality Assurance personnel. KSC Civil Service and KSC Contractor employees whose duties require that they be in a critical position only occasionally are considered to be in a critical position for the entire fiscal year.

3.5.4 MAXIMUM WORK TIME PROVISIONS

- a. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring and maintaining accurate records of employees work hours, and forecasting their work schedules to assure MWT requirements conformance.
- b. Employees shall not work in excess of:
- 1. consecutive hours (16-hours in an emergency situation),
- 2. 60 hours during a workweek (7-day period),
- 3. 7 consecutive days without at least 1 full day off,
- 4. 240 hours during a 4-week period, or
- 5. 2500 hours during a rolling 12-month period.

3.5.5 EXCEEDING MWT LIMITS FOR PERSONS IN CRITICAL POSITIONS

- a. It is the responsibility of the program/project or organizational Director to ensure that persons in critical positions adhere to the MWT provisions herein. It is recognized that there are situations when the MWT limits must be exceeded. However, when possible, these situations shall be preapproved in the form of a deviation.
- b. For persons in critical positions, the program/project or organizational directorate will document MWT deviations, including the date, rationale, required approvals, and mode (verbal or written) of approval. Verbal and electronic approvals are permitted if a written one is not possible. All such approvals shall be documented within 24-hours of the event or by close of business the next regular work day. Deviations shall be maintained by the approving organization, and shall be available for review. Program/project or directorate organizations shall report deviations from these MWT requirements to their organizational Director on an ongoing basis.
- c. Events that result in the maximum work time requirements being exceeded without preapproval are classified as MWT violations. Program/project or directorate organizations shall immediately report MWT violations by persons in critical positions to their organizational Director.
- d. MWT requirements for persons in critical positions are:
- 1. Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 12 consecutive hours, except when no other alternatives are available, and only with an approved deviation from the employee's immediate supervisor or higher. The deviation authorizes the employee to work up to an additional 4-hours, for a total of 16 consecutive hours. Only during a Centerwide Declared Emergency (CDE) or Program Declared Emergency (PDE) [PDE and CDE are described in Section 3.4f] can 16-hours be exceeded. Under those circumstances, the immediate supervisor and organizational Director or designee must approve the deviation for additional hours before the employee is to work them.
- 2. Under no circumstances shall employees be required to work so that they do not have a minimum of 8-hours off duty between shifts.
- 3. Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 60 hours during a workweek (7-day period). Preapproval from the immediate supervisor (or higher) shall be required for deviating from this limit. For example, if an employee has an approved deviation to work more than 60

hours, the deviation is good only for the day on which 60 hours within a 7-day period is exceeded. Another deviation will be required for each additional day that the employee needs to work during the 7-day period.

- 4. Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 7 consecutive days without at least 1 full day off. Preapproval shall be required to deviate from this limit.
- (a) Program/project or organizational directorate (NASA Division Chief; Contractor Director direct report level [or higher]) approval of an additional deviation is required to extend the employee to work up to a total of 14 consecutive days. This requires that the requesting program/project or organizational directorate specify the additional day(s) requested (not to exceed seven additional days), as well as provide justification detailing how the additional days requested matches the work profile of the operational/processing scenario.
- (b) At the end of the extension period (i.e., for 8 through 13 consecutive days worked), the employee must be given a minimum of 1 full day off.
- (c) It is recognized that certain, limited operational/processing scenarios prohibit full compliance with the 14 consecutive day limit.
- (1) In these situations, the contractor program/project or organizational Director (with government counterpart Director [or designee] signature) may preapprove an additional deviation to extend the employee to work up to a total of 18 consecutive days.
- (2) For NASA civil servants, the preapproval of an additional deviation to extend the employee to work up to a total of 18 consecutive days requires approval of the program/project or organizational Director (or designee) and the Director of S&MA (SA).
- (3) This requires that the requesting program/project or organizational directorate specify the additional day(s) requested (not to exceed four additional days), as well as provide justification detailing how the additional days requested matches the work profile of the operational/processing scenario.
- (d) At the end of the extension period (i.e., for 14 through 18 consecutive days worked), the employee must be given a minimum of 2 full days off. Employees shall not work more than 18 consecutive days unless a PDE or CDE [PDE and CDE are described in Section 3.5.6.a is in effect.
- (e) Specific operational/processing scenarios (i.e., Shuttle TAL Support, Shuttle CONUS Predeployment Landing Support, Shuttle/SCA Ferry Operations, SRB Retrieval Operations, External Tank Transport Barge Operations) are exempted from the consecutive day deviation requirements, since the work profile is such that exceeding the limits is a reasonably expected condition, and the nature of the work is such that the limits can be exceeded without causing excessive employee fatigue."
- 5. Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 240 hours during any 4 consecutive work weeks (e.g., Sunday through Saturday). A deviation from this limit requires preapproval from the immediate supervisor (or higher).

6. Persons in critical positions shall not exceed 2,500 hours during a rolling 12-month period. Approval from the immediate supervisor, program/project or organizational Director or designee, and the Director of S&MA (SA) or a designee shall be required for deviations from this limit.

3.5.6 PLANNING FOR DEVIATION SURGES AMONG CRITICAL POSITIONS

- a. A process called a Program Declared Emergency (PDE) provides program/project or organizational Directors a planning tool to account for a large number of deviations in advance of an event or circumstance. A PDE may be issued by a program/project or organizational Director or a designee during a phase of their planning when they determine that the task ahead exceeds their available resources for addressing the task within the MWT requirements. The normal MWT approval and recording process is required for deviations during such a period. After declaring the PDE, the program/project or organizational Director must provide the rationale to the Director of S&MA (SA).
- b. MWT limits may also be exceeded when a Centerwide Declared Emergency (CDE) is issued. A CDE goes into effect by the authority of the Center Director or designee, in the event of an emergency or a threat to the Center (e.g., natural disaster or terrorism).

3.5.7 RECORDKEEPING FOR CRITICAL POSITIONS

- a. The approving program/project or organizational directorate shall maintain work time data. Individual program/project or directorate organizations may utilize MWT deviation/violation documentation approached (e.g., forms, logs, summary lists) as deemed appropriate for their organization. With the exception of the 2500-hour MWT limit, the fiscal year (Oct. 1 Sept. 30) and the fiscal day, which changes at midnight, shall be used for data evaluation and maintenance of records. Approving organizations shall ensure that work time data is available for review.
- b. Program/project or organizational Directors are responsible for assuring the development and maintenance of a list that identifies and documents critical jobs and individuals assigned to critical positions. Updates must be accomplished when changes occur. A copy of this listing shall be provided to the S&MA Technical Management Office at the beginning of each fiscal year (no later than Oct. 15th).
- c. Program/project or organizational Directors are responsible for assuring records preparation, retention and periodic review of the monthly MWT deviations. Records are to be retained for a minimum 3-year period. Program/project or organizational Directors are responsible for preventing deviations from becoming the norm, and shall analyze MWT data for trends to prevent system abuse. Organizations shall implement corrective actions, which may result in actions such as schedule changes, staffing adjustments and employee counseling.
- d. Program/project or directorate organizations Directors shall submit a monthly maximum work time report no later than the 15th day of the following month, to the S&MA Technical Management Office. In addition to the preceding requirement, KSC Contractors shall also send work time data to their corresponding NASA contract oversight organization by the 15th day of the following month. The reports from NASA and contractors shall include all work time deviations in each of the categories (e.g., 12-hours worked in one day), the number of maximum work time violations that have occurred in each category, and action(s) being taken to minimize the number of deviations. In the event that an employee has multiple deviations at the same time (e.g., in order for employee to perform the required work, he must exceed 12-hours for one

day and that will result in more than 60-hours work in a 7-day period), then the employee requires two separate deviations to perform the work, and each deviation must be documented in the report.

CHAPTER 4: CONTROL AREAS

4.1 GENERAL

- 4.1.1 Impact limit lines shall be as established by the 45th Space Wing at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS).
- 4.1.2 Tours of facilities or buildings are prohibited during hazardous operations.
- 4.1.3 Control areas for radiation hazards are addressed in <u>KNPR1860.1</u>, "<u>KSC Ionizing Radiation Protection Program</u>", <u>KNPR 1860.2</u>, "<u>KSC Nonionizing Radiation Protection Program</u>," and as specified in the user organization's Radiation Use Authorization.
- 4.1.4 There shall be a control area of 100-feet radius from the centerline for all Orbiter moves and Mobile Launch Platform moves, stacked or partially stacked.

4.2 FACILITY CONTROLS

- 4.2.1 Controls shall be established for use of, and entry into, controlled access facilities by equipment utilizing internal combustion engines.
- 4.2.2 Access to building roofs, elevated structures, and motor vehicle roofs shall be limited to personnel performing authorized work or as designated for the performance of launch and landing requirements. Where building rooftops or elevated structures are designated for personnel traffic, controls and safeguards shall be established for personnel protection.
- 4.2.3 An Emergency Procedure Document (EPD) shall be produced for work areas where hazardous operations are performed in order to provide the processing team with procedures to be followed if an emergency occurs at anytime in the facility. Reference JHB 2000, Consolidated Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, for specific details.

4.3 CONTROL AREA ANALYSIS

- 4.3.1 A control area shall be established by the program/project or directorate organization for each hazardous operation.
- 4.3.2 A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the program/project or directorate organization to establish a control area for a new operation or to change an existing control area. The assessment shall identify the reason for the change, the impact if the proposed change is not approved, and address, as a minimum, the areas listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations, including affected contractors.
- a. Operation Description

Describe the task to be performed.

b. Operation Location

State the location of the operation. Describe how the immediate environment and atmospheric conditions affect the operation. Also state the possible impacts on the location and surrounding environment in the event of an accident during the operation.

c. Hazard Potential

Identify all credible hazards associated with this operation, including the worst case scenario.

d. Proximity of People

Describe how the operation, or an accident during the operation, will affect personnel who were not involved in the operation and were outside of the control area.

e. Proximity of Other Hardware

Describe how the operation, or an accident during the operation, will affect hardware that was not involved in the operation.

f. System Design

Describe elements of the system design that could have an impact on the safety or accident potential of the operation.

4.4 MANLOADING LIMITATIONS OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS CONTROL AREAS

- 4.4.1 Manloading shall be determined and implemented for each hazardous control area.
- 4.4.2 Hazardous manloading controls for KSC locations shall reduce the exposure to the minimum number of people, the smallest quantity of hazard, and the minimum period of time.
- 4.4.3 A safety assessment shall be performed by the program/project or directorate organization to establish new manloading requirements or to change existing manloading requirements. The assessment shall identify the reason for the change, the impact if the proposed change is not approved, and address, as a minimum, the items listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations, including affected contractors.
- a. Personnel essential to the operation

Identify essential personnel roles and responsibilities

b. Area Structural Capabilities

Verify that structural capabilities of the area are adequate to support the proposed manloading level. No increase in previously approved/documented structural capabilities is authorized with this assessment.

c. Rescue Capabilities

Verify that rescue capability of the area for the proposed manloading level is adequate.

d. Ergonomics

Verify that adequate workspace is available to safely perform work at the proposed manloading level.

e. Means of Egress Capabilities

Verify that adequate means of egress of the area for the proposed manloading level exist.

Any changes shall include an additional safety engineering assessment as part of the rationale.

4.4 MANLOADING LIMITATIONS OF COMPARTMENTS

- 4.4.1 Hazardous manloading controls for KSC compartments shall reduce the exposure to the minimum number of people, the smallest quantity of hazard, and the minimum period of time.
- 4.4.2 A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the program/project or directorate organization to establish new manloading requirements or to change existing manloading requirements for compartments. The assessment shall identify the reason for the change, the impact if the proposed change is not approved, and address, as a minimum, the items listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations, including affected contractors.

a. Working Environment/Air Quality

Verify that adequate air quality exists to support the proposed manloading level based on compartment volume, delivered flow rate, and air exchange rates.

b. Ergonomics

Verify that adequate workspace in the compartment is available to safely perform work at the proposed manloading level.

c. Compartment Structural Capabilities

Verify that structural capabilities of the compartment are adequate to support the proposed manloading level.

d. Rescue Capabilities

Verify that adequate rescue capability of the compartment exists for the proposed manloading level.

e. Means of Egress Capabilities

Verify that adequate means of egress of the compartment exists for the proposed manloading level.

CHAPTER 5: OPERATIONAL SAFETY

5.1 SAFETY MONITORING OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS

The program/project or directorate organization shall perform a safety engineering assessment for all hazardous operations to ensure compliance with established safety and health requirements and standards. The assessment shall identify, as a minimum, the areas listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations, including affected contractors.

- a. The appropriate control.
- b. The acceptable level of safety coverage (full-time, part-time, or optional) during the operation based on the likelihood that, in the event of an emergency, the effect will:
- (1) Extend outside the specified control area.
- (2) Cause personnel injury/exposure.
- (3) Result in major equipment/facility damage.

5.2 TOOLS

All tools and equipment shall be tethered when in processing facilities above and around flight hardware or when in working environments where there is the potential for personnel injury or equipment damage. Tools used in flight hardware processing facilities shall be traceable to their storage location.

5.3 PRETASK AND PRETEST BRIEFINGS

- 5.3.1 Pretask and pretest briefings shall be performed as follows:
- a. Pretask Briefings
- 1. A pretask briefing shall be performed prior to all hazardous sequences within a TOP when two or more personnel are involved.
- 2. If shift change occurs prior to the completion of the hazardous sequence, then the appropriate briefings shall be repeated for the relieving employees.
- 3. The following items shall be addressed in pretask briefings: specific hazards to which personnel will be exposed; safety protective equipment; emergency alarms; evacuation routes; emergency instructions; Emergency Procedures Documents (EPDs); and the specific revision of TOPs to be used.
- b. Pretest Briefings
- 5.3.2 A pretest briefing is required for integrated TOPs that require a major control area. The pretest briefing shall be held within 72 hours (96 hours in the event of a Centerwide 3-day weekend) prior to the start of the operational or control sequences of a TOP.

5.4 SAFETY INSPECTIONS AND WALKDOWNS

The program/project or directorate organization shall perform safety inspections and walkdowns and correct discrepancies for their assigned work area(s). All discrepancies, which have been documented in accordance with Attachment B, shall be corrected prior to the start of the affected steps. Required inspections and walkdowns shall be conducted as follows:

a. Readiness Inspections

A readiness inspection shall be accomplished and documented for areas/facilities/systems that have undergone construction or modification work which changes configuration or hazards involved in the process.

b. Preoperational Inspections

A preoperational inspection shall be accomplished and documented within 24 hours prior to the start of all operations having a major control area.

c. Operations Inspections

An operations inspection shall be accomplished and documented immediately prior to the start of any hazardous operation.

5.5 HEAT-PRODUCING DEVICES

5.5.1 Nonflame, Heat-Producing Devices

- a. Nonflame/heat producing devices used within 10 feet of flammable, combustible or explosive materials shall require the applicable organization to obtain a Welding and Burning Permit (KSC Form 2-271), or shall utilize a controlling TOP that contains documented engineering risk assessment controls approved by a safety professional.
- b. When heat-producing devices are used in areas protected by a Halon extinguisher system, the system shall be placed in the manual mode prior to start of the operation.

5.5.2 Arc/Flame-Producing Devices

A Welding and Burning Permit (KSC Form 2-271) shall be obtained from the applicable office if a flame-producing device is required to be used within:

- a. Areas containing hazardous materials.
- b. The perimeter of hazardous processing facilities.
- c. A control area.

5.5.3 Roofing Operations

a. Roofing operations involving use of a tar kettle require obtaining a Tar Kettle Operation Hot Work Permit (KSC Form 2-272).

- b. Roof torch down operations require obtaining a Torch Down Roof Operations Hot Work Permit (KSC Form 2-270).
- 5.5.4 Spark-Producing Devices and Smoking

Spark-producing devices and smoking shall be prohibited within the following areas:

- a. Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) perimeter fenced area;
- b. 100 feet of propellant storage containers;
- c. 25 feet of propellant transfer lines;
- d. 25 feet of explosives;
- e. 50 feet of Crawler Transporter (CT) operations;
- f. 100 feet of CT operations with stacked or partially stacked segments;

5.6 USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT

- 5.6.1 A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the program/project or directorate organization prior to the use of all photographic equipment used within 10 feet of open grain, explosive materials, Category A Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs) [Faraday cap removed/firing circuit exposed], open containers of flammable/combustible fluids, or when used in confined spaces where a hazardous atmosphere may be present. The assessment shall evaluate the potential for the equipment to produce an arc or spark and the ability for components to remain securely installed within or on the camera or in remotely located equipment. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed.
- 5.6.2 In addition, the following requirements shall be in effect:
- a. The camera and all attached parts shall be tethered to the photographer.
- b. All camera parts shall be self-contained and unable to fall into flight hardware.
- c. Single-use, heat-producing flashbulbs, flashcubes, or sunguns shall not be permitted.
- d. In hazardous atmospheres, remote-operated, hazardproofed photographic equipment shall be utilized.
- e. Lighting for remote cameras shall be either Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), Factory Mutual (FM), or Bureau of Mines approved, or shall be hazardproofed, specified for the hazard, and enclosed or shielded.
- 5.6.3 Cameras and electronic flash assemblies to be used inside a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) bore shall be specified for that particular use and shall include the above requirements.

5.7 USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

- 5.7.1 All Radio Frequency (RF) transmitting devices shall be assessed and approved by the controlling safety organization prior to use in "controlled access areas".
- 5.7.2 The use of headphones or earphones with personal, portable electronic devices shall be prohibited in controlled access areas where hazardous operations are conducted.
- 5.7.3 Electronic equipment shall meet the National Electric Code (NEC) for hazardous locations when used in controlled access areas during hazardous operations where combustible dusts, flammable vapors, or flammable liquids have the potential of release.
- 5.7.4 Cellular phones, answer back pagers, portable computers and transceivers (e.g., radios) shall not be used within 25-feet of operations involving explosives or pyrotechnics.

5.8 ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING SYSTEMS

- 5.8.1 Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System (ODMS)
- a. If an ODMS indicates a low oxygen condition, the applicable room, area, or compartment shall be cleared and controlled. If an ODMS malfunctions, the affected area shall be cleared. Work may resume in the affected area provided a portable oxygen detector is used and confirms an acceptable oxygen level.
- b. If the inert gas lines of the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) are to remain pressurized during transfer, the ODMS shall remain operational in the local mode.
- 5.8.2 Portable Oxygen Analyzers
- a. Prior to the installation of a portable oxygen analyzer, the following shall be determined:
- 1. The unit is operational and the battery is charged per manufacturer's specifications.
- 2. The audible alarm can be heard above the noise in all areas of the compartment in which it is to be used or shall be placed in such a location that all occupants will hear it.
- b. The unit shall be checked once per 8-hour shift and a log shall be maintained documenting the time, location, and the name of the person performing the check.
- c. The unit(s) shall be checked and a normal oxygen (O₂) atmosphere shall be verified at the beginning of each shift prior to any work in the controlled area when the area has been left unoccupied on the prior shift.
- 5.8.3 Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
- a. At least one HGDS shall be operational prior to any remote Hydrogen (H₂) operation. A HGDS monitor shall keep the team advised of H₂ readings.
- b. Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) detectors shall be utilized for all local H₂ operations.

- c. If H_2 readings exceed 10,000 parts per million (ppm) the Task Team Leader (TTL) shall evaluate the magnitude of the leak and determine the actions to take to protect personnel and equipment.
- d. Loss of HGDS during Power Reactant Supply and Distribution (PRSD) tank pressurization, and before stabilization, shall require depressurization immediately. Loss of HGDS after tank stabilization shall not require depressurization if no leaks are present.

5.9 CRYOGENICS

- 5.9.1 The Orbiter Maneuvering Subsystem/Forward Reaction Control System (OMS/FRCS), wings/mid-body/payload bay, and aft compartments shall be inerted to less than 1 percent O₂ prior to PRSD tank servicing and External Tank (ET) loading.
- 5.9.2 Cryogenic fluid systems shall be depressurized and made safe before attempting any type of maintenance.
- 5.9.3 During handling of cryogenics, emergency showers shall be available for immediate use. However, water under high pressure of water that feels warm to the touch should not be used for cryogenic exposure first aid.
- 5.9.4 The oxygen content in Liquid Hydrogen (LH₂) transfer lines shall be verified less than 1 percent (inert) prior to start of LH₂ flow.
- 5.9.5 CRYOGENIC SKIN EXPOSURE FIRST AID PROTOCOL
- a. This section provides instruction for delivery of first aid for individuals involved in a cryogenic exposure related incident. This instruction is applicable to cryogenic workers and first aid care providers that may deliver immediate assistance for a cryogenic material skin exposure injury in the field at KSC/CCAFS.
- b. In the event of any cryogenic liquid/gas exposure to the skin, immediate response by first aid providers is required to limit the extent and severity of cryogenic burns to exposure victims. First Aid consists of the following steps:
- 1. If necessary, remove the victim from contact with the cryogen to a safe location.
- 2. Notify the EMS system (call 911 or 867-7911 by cell phone).
- 3. Follow Basic Life Support guidelines: the ABC's (airway, breathing, circulation and c-spine control).
- 4. Thaw tissue as soon as possible, situation permitting (see below).
- 5. Immobilize the affected area with a splint, if applicable, and loosely wrap with a blanket or similar dry clothing.

NOTE: Do not attempt to rub skin or remove any frozen clothes or articles since they may be adherent to the skin and could result in damage to the skin if forcibly removed.

c. THAWING PROCEDURE:

The best method used for thawing of frozen tissue depends upon the resources available at the scene of the accident and shall be based on a credible mishap scenario. These methods are listed in order of preference to minimize the severity and extent of resulting cryogenic burn injuries:

- 1. *First option* is to immerse the affected area in a prestaged basin of tepid water (105 degrees F/40-42 degrees C) until the affected area is thawed. If tepid water is not available then;
- 2. **Second best option** is to immerse the affected area of the body in a prestaged basin of water that is at a temperature comfortable to normal tissue (assistant's hand). If not available then:
- 3. **Third best option** is to pour water or use very gentle irrigation (do not spray or squirt) with water that is at a comfortable temperature. If not available then;
- 4. Fourth best option is to wrap the affected area of the body with a blanket.

NOTE 1: Decontamination/thawing times will vary depending on the extent of the frozen injury.

NOTE 2: Thawing of frozen tissue is generally associated with a lot of discomfort from the victim. Encourage the victim to continue the thawing process via the 'water bath method' as described above until the affected part is completely thawed.

- d. AFTER THAWING:
- 1. Gently remove all wet and constricting clothing.
- 2. Gently wrap the affected area in a dry blanket or clothing.
- 3. Keep the affected area clean, do not apply pressure to the site, except for bleeding control, and do not puncture any blisters.
- 4. Immobilize the affected area.
- 5. It is recommended that no weight bearing occur on any affected areas.
- 6. Arrange for Emergency Medical Services transport to the nearest appropriate medical facility.
- e. REPORTING:

Following the procedure implementation, documentation of the event shall be accomplished in accordance with Chapter 10, Mishaps and Close Calls herein.

NOTE: For additional information on cryogen first aid, contact the KSC Aerospace Medicine and Occupational Health Office.

5.10 HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

- 5.10.1 Communications and Television Support
- a. All hazardous operations shall require primary and backup communications between the operation's control point and the operation.
- b. Recorded voice communication and Operational Television (OTV) coverage shall be required during the performance of all hazardous operations having a major control area.
- 5.10.2 Safety Radio Net
- a. Emergency forces supporting hazardous operations shall be required to maintain continuous monitoring on Safety Net 105 or Net 205. Verification of operational status shall be accomplished a minimum of once per day.
- b. The Safety Net shall be used during transit and when Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) personnel are off Operational Intercommunications System (OIS).
- c. Telephones or other means of radio communications shall be available for summoning assistance in emergencies in areas where hazardous operations are conducted.
- 5.10.3 Loss of support and equipment during any phase of the operation shall be reported immediately to the appropriate program/project organization for assessment of necessary actions.

5.11 HANDLING OF FLAMMABLE/COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS NEAR FLIGHT HARDWARE

- 5.11.1 Containers used for liquids, flammable/combustible or not, shall be labeled to specify the contents.
- 5.11.2 All flammable/combustible liquids brought into, or within 3 feet of, the Orbiter, ET, Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) or International Space Station (ISS)/payload hardware shall be in nonshatterable containers equipped with leak-proof closures that can be positively secured in the closed position. The container material shall be compatible with the contents.
- 5.11.3 Individual containers of flammable liquids exceeding 1 pint and allowed within 50 feet of flight hardware shall meet the following requirements:
- a. A risk assessment for operational use shall be performed by the program/project or directorate organization.
- b. The process for use shall be controlled by a hazardous TOP per KNPR 8715.3, Attachment B, Section 10.k.
- 5.11.4 Plastic squeeze bottles that produce a mist shall not be used to dispense flammable liquids with a flash point below 100 degrees Fahrenheit (°F).

5.12 SAFETY WARNINGS

Flashing safety warning lights, warning signs, and public address systems shall be installed at the control point, in appropriate work areas or facilities where hazardous operations exist as a part of routine work.

5.12.1 Warning Lights

Warning light designations at KSC shall be:

- a. Flashing red. A danger period exists and personnel shall be cleared from the control area immediately.
- b. Flashing amber. A hazard period exists and entry to the control area shall be limited to essential personnel.
- 5.12.2 Warning Signs

Warning signs will be used in conjunction with and adjacent to warning lights as follows:

a. Warning signs adjacent to red lights shall read as follows:

EMERGENCY SITUATION EXISTS CLEAR AREA IMMEDIATELY

b. Warning signs adjacent to amber lights shall read as follows:

ENTRY ON CONTROLLED BASIS HAZARDOUS MATERIALS/OPERATIONS PRESENT ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ONLY

c. Paging and Area Warning System (PAWS)

An announcement, preceded by a high-pitched warbling sound (where available), shall be made when an emergency condition necessitates clearing the area immediately of all personnel.

5.13 ELEVATORS

- 5.13.1 All maintenance of elevators and any work performed in the elevator shaft shall require the affected elevator to be locked out.
- 5.13.2 Protective screens must be installed between the elevator shaft being worked on and adjacent operational elevator shafts at all levels where work shall be performed.
- 5.13.3 Adjacent elevators shall be locked out during protective screen installation and removal.

5.14 HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS EMERGENCY POWER

Adequate emergency power shall be required for all hazardous operations that utilize electrical power for safing or securing.

5.15 CONCURRENT OPERATIONS

Concurrent hazardous operations involving major control areas within the same facility shall require:

- 5.15.1 Utilization of a TOP, providing a single control point, for one or more similar operations.
- 5.15.2 For concurrent hazardous operations involving significant loss potential or high energy, the following shall be met:
- a. The operations can be safely and quickly terminated.
- b. Personnel performing the operations are provided a route of rapid exit in the event of an emergency.
- c. Emergency vehicles have ready access to an emergency without proceeding through another operational cleared/controlled area.

5.16 EMERGENCY SHOWER/EYEWASH REQUIREMENTS

- 5.16.1 The preservation of sight, and the minimization of the effects of chemical exposure, are the most important aspects of this policy. When it is determined that engineering and administrative controls cannot eliminate the hazard then the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) such as safety glasses, goggles, face shields, chemical resistant gloves and aprons, or body suits are the primary means of protecting the eyes, face and body from chemical exposure. In the event of exposure to injurious corrosives, Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment (EE&SE) is the best first aid measure until medical personnel arrive.
- 5.16.2 The EE&SE on Kennedy Space Center shall comply with OSHA and ANSI Z358.1 (latest revision) with the following clarifications:
- a. The determination for the installation/removal of EE&SE is the responsibility of the controlling entity, i.e., the "owner" of the EE&SE who is responsible for the protection of their employees.
- b. For the installation/removal of plumbed units, the justification will be sent to the NASA-KSC EE&SE Program Manager (Institutional Safety). The justification for installation shall include who will perform the required inspections and maintenance and the justification for removal shall state whether or not other organizations would be impacted by the removal. The EE&SE Program Manager will review the EE&SE installation or removal justification and either concur/non-concur. This concur/non-concur will not be for the justification that a unit is required as this is the responsibility of the controlling entity, rather it will be to ensure that the installation/maintenance/inspection of the unit has been planned for, or that the removal will not negatively impact other KSC employees.
- c. The EE&SE shall be maintained and inspected per the following:
- (1) Plumbed Units (potable water)
- (a) Annual Inspection: Documentation that an ANSI compliant annual inspection was performed and the records of that inspection shall be maintained by the controlling entity for a period of two years. Additionally, the completed inspection of plumbed EE&SE shall be

documented on KSC Form 20-202/KSC Emergency Eyewash/Shower Inspection, and affixed to the unit.

- (b) Weekly Inspection: Inspections shall be documented on KSC Form 20-202/KSC Emergency Eyewash/Shower Inspection, and affixed to the unit.
- (c) Operational Check: All EE&SE shall be verified operational prior to commencement of operations requiring such equipment.

NOTE: Potable water on KSC is near the Mean Low Temperature of 63F, and the Mean High Temperature of 81F therefore it is assumed that the EE&SE supplied water at KSC is in the tepid range.

- (2) Self-Contained Units (Pressurized Units, Non-Pressurized Sealed Units)
- (a) Annual Inspection: An annual inspection will be performed to ANSI or manufacturer instructions. (Note: ANSI inspection criteria need not include the discharging of self-contained EE&SE. Perform all other inspection criteria that can be accomplished without interfering with the integrity of the equipment). All recommended inspections of self-contained EE&SE shall be documented on KSC Form 20-202, and affixed to the unit. Records of that inspection shall be maintained by the controlling entity for a period of two years.
- (b) Other Inspections: As required by the manufacturer and documented on KSC Form 20-202, and affixed to the unit.
- (c) Operational Check: All EE&SE shall be verified operational prior to commencement of operations requiring such equipment. This shall only include verification that the path to the EE&SE is unobstructed, that a current inspection is showing on the inspection tag, and that the EE&SE has not been tampered with or activated since the most recent inspection.
- 5.16.3 Personal eyewash (bottles) will not be used as Emergency Eyewash; it can be provided only for irrigation and/or for removal of dirt or other particles from the eye, or for personal hygiene.

EXCEPTION: Sealed water rinse or neutralizing packs may be substituted for the quick drenching facilities where sealed storage batteries of the enclosed type are in use {CFR 29 Part 1910.268(b)(2)}. If batteries require servicing, i.e., adding electrolytes, fully functioning EE&SE equipment is required per this policy.

- 5.16.4 Plumbed EE&SE in facilities that are unoccupied or are not operationally required will not be verified operational until work in the facility requires the EE&SE, and shall be identified with KSC Form 20-165/Danger Do Not Use or Operate. The EE&SE shall have a documented inspection on KSC Form 20-202 before KSC Form 20-165 may be removed and the EE&SE considered available for use. A documented annual inspection of the plumbed EE&SE shall be performed if one was required during the period of time the EE&SE was identified with KSC Form 20-165.
- 5.16.5 If existing EE&SE meets the requirements of OSHA 29 CFR 1910.151c, ("Where the eyes or body of any person may be exposed to injurious corrosive materials, suitable facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body shall be provided within the work area for

immediate emergency use") but cannot feasibly meet the requirements of ANSI Z358.1, a safety variance will be submitted per KNPR 8715.3.

5.16.6 When a non-compliant EE&SE is found, KSC Form 20-165, shall be immediately affixed. Operations that require the use of the EE&SE shall not be conducted if the EE&SE is found to be non-compliant unless a documented Safety (controlling entity) approved work-around is in place. EE&SE having KSC Form 20-165, remaining after one year shall be assessed by NASA-KSC EE&SE Program Manager and the controlling entity.

CHAPTER 6: UNIQUE HAZARDOUS FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

6.1 GENERAL

The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and Rotation, Processing and Surge Facility (RPSF) are designated as explosives handling facilities. Explosives operations shall limit the exposure to a minimum number of persons, for a minimum time, to the minimum amount of explosive material consistent with safe and efficient operations.

6.2 VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING

6.2.1 Dual Operations

- a. Additional crane operations involving the other 175/250/325 ton cranes shall not be permitted during Orbiter breakover or when lifting an Orbiter, SRM segment, or SRB forward assembly to/from the transfer aisle and high bay. External tank entry, fire protection outages, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities requiring personnel above the ET checkout cells or on the VAB roof shall not be scheduled during the above crane operations.
- b. Major hardware moves and other operations requiring opening the VAB doors shall be evaluated for impact on other operations within the building.
- c. VAB crane operations involving nonhazardous/noncritical equipment and O&M activities shall be permitted outside the control area during ET lifts or when supporting the Orbiter or SRM if the crane is static and the Orbiter or SRM is within 5 feet of the transfer aisle floor.

6.2.2 Housing

Personnel housing shall be minimized.

6.2.3 High Bay Roof Access

Stair tower egress doors shall be configured to permit access from the interior to the roof. Only west side perimeter roof doors shall remain unlocked. East side perimeter doors shall require a key to access off the roof.

6.2.4 Aft Booster and Segment Lift

Aft booster and segment lifts shall be permitted from the transfer aisle to within 3 feet of the holddown posts and clevis, respectively, between the hours of 4:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., Monday through Friday. Exceptions must have the concurrence of the KSC Launch Director, KSC S&MA Shuttle Division Chief and the SFOC Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance (SQ&MA) Director.

6.2.5 Door Configuration

The VAB doors shall be configured based on operational needs, personnel safety and egress, effects of high winds, lightning, solar radiation, large sail areas, multiple operations, and RF controls. VAB door configurations shall be based on KSC-DF-502, SRM/VAB Inadvertent Ignition Effects Study, dated September 1981.

6.3 ROTATION, PROCESSING, AND SURGE FACILITY

6.3.1 Dual Operations

Concurrent Operations - The following shall not be done concurrently in the Rotation Building:

- a. Grain inspection (when man is in bore).
- b. Segment lift or rotation to vertical. (Not applicable if crane is secured and segments suspended within 5 feet of floor.)
- c. The following operations shall not be performed with (a) or (b) above. Unless the following operations violate another operation's control area or require unrelated work above open grain, no restrictions shall be imposed on performing the following operations concurrently with each other.
- (1) NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) resistance measurements.
- (2) Insta-Foam operations when personnel are on breathing air or inside enclosure.
- (3) Nozzle preparation and mating operations require personnel inside the environmental enclosures. This also includes personnel inside the nozzle after mate.
- (4) Air Load Debond Test.
- (5) Personnel shall not be allowed above the build-up stands' upper levels, including roof during (1)(a) or (1)(b) above
- 6.3.2 Housing
- a. The RPSF manloading level shall not exceed 80 personnel.
- b. Personnel housing shall be limited to the Support Building.
- c. Additional buildings, trailers, or workshops shall not be permitted within the facility perimeter fence.
- 6.3.3 Special Requirements
- a. Exterior doors in the Rotation Building shall be closed whenever a Faraday cap/shorting plug on an NSI or electrical cable attached to an NSI is removed.
- b. Locomotives shall not enter the Rotation Building. The locomotive shall use a spacer car when moving railcars in or out of the building at all times.
- c. The SRM Shuttle Wagon/SRM Transporter may enter the Rotation Building without an Internal Combustion permit to move railcars or segments, providing there is no open grain. The SRM Shuttle Wagon shall require a spacer car only when open grain exists in the building.

- d. Work within the Surge Buildings shall be limited to periodic segment inspection and Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) cleanup when performed on each segment sequentially.
- e. No more than three segments shall have open grain at any one time in the Rotation Building. Only one segment may be exposed at a time in the Surge Buildings.
- f. Segments shall not be left unattended when open grain conditions exist.
- g. No more than six segments shall be in the Rotation Building at a time (for a total of 22 segments located inside facility perimeter fence).

6.4 OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT (O&C) BUILDING

No payloads containing liquid fuels or solid propellant shall be permitted inside the O&C Building.

CHAPTER 7: MATERIALS PROCESSING

7.1 GENERAL

- 7.1.1 Materials to be used in KSC facilities in support of programs (e.g., Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Launch Support Program), as well as KSC institutional activities (e.g., Research and Development [R&D] projects, propellant farms, laboratories, testbeds) shall be selected, tested, assessed, and approved per the requirements of Kennedy NASA Procedural Requirements (KNPR) 8072.1, KSC Materials and Processes (M&P) Control Procedural Requirements. KNPR 8072.1, which establishes the minimum requirements for M&P selection and control in the design, fabrication, and processing/operation of aerospace GSE and flight hardware in associated KSC facilities, implements the applicable requirements of Agency M&P documentation (i.e., NASA-STD-6001).
- 7.1.2 SC program and institutional organizations shall ensure associated contractor processes and procedures are implemented for safe materials selection, approval, and usage.

CHAPTER 8: KSC SUPPLEMENT TO OSHA 29 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR), PARTS 1910/1926

8.1 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS

Reference KNPR 8715.5, Personal Protective Equipment Program

- a. Splash (KSC vapor suit): The suit shall not be used for protection against hypergolic propellants.
- b. Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA)/Breathing Escape Unit (BEU): All breathing escape unit containers shall be "safety green" and white striped with 4-inch black lettering, on a white background with a "safety green" border, stating "Breathing Escape Units." The green and white stripes shall be 2 inches in width.
- c. Contact lenses: Personnel attired in Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE), toxic vapor suits, or full-face respirators shall not wear contact lenses.
- d. Eyeglasses worn in SCAPE, toxic vapor suits, or full-face respirators, shall be secured.
- e. Minimum requirements for garments used at KSC during hazardous operations in noncleanroom environments:

8.2 MACHINE SHOP SAFETY

- 8.2.1 An eyewash basin shall be located within 6 feet of degreasing tanks.
- 8.2.2 Gloves, identification badges, rings, and other jewelry shall not be worn when operating rotating machinery. Long hair shall be kept in place.

8.3 SCAPE REQUIREMENTS

- 8.3.1 When using Cat. I SCAPE, personnel shall observe a 60-minute rest period between consecutive SCAPE operations. Time in Cat. IV suits shall not exceed 4 consecutive hours. The use of Cat. VI suits is limited only to those operations requiring entry into a confined/limited access space not achievable by a Propellant Handlers Ensemble (PHE).
- 8.3.2 Showering of SCAPE Personnel and Equipment.
- a. All personnel shall shower immediately when exposed to Nitrogen Tetroxide (N_2O_4) liquid, and within 10 to 15 minutes when exposed to N_2O_4 vapors. Personnel may return to the workstation after showering.
- b. All personnel directly involved in a fuel task shall shower thoroughly before proceeding from a fuel task to an oxidizer task or vice versa if toxic vapor parameters are exceeded. In case of actual or suspected hypergolic liquid contamination of the suit, personnel shall shower as required and shall change suits prior to switching tasks.
- c. All personnel wearing a Cat. VI suit exposed to hypergolic liquid fuel or oxidizer or vapors heavy enough to envelop the suit shall shower for 5 minutes within 5 minutes of exposure.

- d. Prior to leaving the work area for normal SCAPE operations, SCAPE personnel with:
- 1. No or low hypergolic vapor residual exposure, shall shower for a minimum of 1 minute.
- 2. Heavy hypergolic vapor or hypergolic liquid contamination, shall shower with all exposed tools and equipment a minimum of 5 minutes.
- 3. Tools and equipment exposed as below shall be cleaned separately.
- (a) Items exposed to hypergolic vapors only, shall be thoroughly washed by field flushing or water immersion and released for normal use.
- (b) Items exposed to hypergolic liquids shall be field flushed, double bagged, and identified as "Hypergolic Contaminated."
- 8.3.3 Elevator Support for SCAPE Operations at Launch Complex (LC) 39 A/B
- a. For operations below the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) 120-foot level and Fixed Service Structure (FSS) 115-foot level, a minimum of two of the three elevators shall be accessible based on Pad configuration, and operational prior to starting SCAPE operations.
- b. For operations at the RSS 120-foot level and above the FSS 95-foot level, both FSS elevators shall be operational prior to starting SCAPE operations. Once SCAPE operations have begun, at least one elevator shall remain operational throughout the operation.
- c. For operations in the Payload Changeout Room (PCR), the PCR elevator shall be operational prior to start of SCAPE operations.
- 8.3.4 SCAPE Support
- a. During periods of non-SCAPE operations, contingency SCAPE support shall be provided within 4 hours of notification.
- b. During all SCAPE operations, adequate personnel shall be immediately available, onsite, to safe the system in the event of an emergency.

Protective Clothing and Ensembles				Approved for use with:				Hypergolic Ops			
Protective Garment Used					(A = approved for			for use)	Category		/
Name	Category	Туре	Type Air	Type Gloves	N ₂ O ₄	MM H	N ₂ H	Contaminat ed Scrubber Liquor/ Rinsates	Clas s A	Clas s B	Clas s C
SCAPE	I	PHE	Back-pack	50 Mil/ 32 Mil	Α	Α	Α	NO	Α	Α	NO
SCAPE	IV	PHE	Hose-line	50 Mil/ 32 Mil	Α	Α	Α	NO	Α	Α	NO
SCAPE	VI	CPS	Hose-line	32 Mil	Α	Α	Α	Α	NO	YES	NO
Splash/ Apron	Other	*	**	See Note Below		NO		A	NO	NO	Α

TABLE 8-1: CLOTHING ENSEMBLES

NOTE: Type Gloves Approved
Long Gauntlet gloves
Pioneer rubber Pylox V20 gloves
North butyl gloves

^{* -} Selection based on level of hazard potential associated with task (clarify in TOP).

** - Full-face, Supplied Air Respirator (SAR) when inhalation hazard present. When no inhalation hazard is present, use chemical splash goggles and/or face shield.

8.4 EMERGENCY EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS

- 8.4.1 Emergency evacuations shall be announced over the public address system. The announcer shall define the location and nature of the emergency specifying evacuation exits, alternate routes, and fallback area/location. The announcer shall also be responsible for activating area (flashing red) warning lights and/or the evacuation/fire alarm system, as appropriate.
- 8.4.2 A person shall be appointed to notify all personnel in areas of high noise level or those not within hearing range of public address speakers.
- 8.4.3 Upon completion of an emergency evacuation in designated areas, a head count shall be conducted in the designated marshaling area and then the Incident Commander or Test Director (TD) shall be notified of any unaccounted for persons.
- 8.4.4 The Pad Slidewire System shall be operational at all times except during scheduled outages.
- 8.4.5 At least one ELSA shall be provided at the workstation for every person in the Orbiter forward and aft compartments. When a hazardous payload is installed in the Orbiter, ELSAs shall be provided for each person working in the mid-body anytime the payload bay doors are closed. ELSAs shall not be required when the payload bay doors are open, regardless of payload, or when closed with no hazardous payload, provided the ODMS is installed and operational.
- 8.5.6 Emergency evacuation exercises shall be conducted annually for all facilities conducting hazardous operations. Exercises shall be conducted for each shift where 10 or more employees commonly work.

8.5 LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM

Reference KNPR 8715.3, KSC Lockout/Tagout Program Procedural Requirements.

- 8.5.1 Locks used shall be keyed padlocks.
- 8.5.2 All KSC personnel shall use KSC Form 20-195 for tagout.
- 8.5.3 Locks and tags issued for use shall be traceable from the using employee back to the issuing employer.
- 8.5.4 The issuing employer shall maintain an accountability log of all issued and returned devices.

8.6 DANGER TAGS

8.6.1 The KSC Danger Tag, KSC Form 20-165, shall be used to identify defective or nonconforming equipment that presents a threat of death or serious injury to personnel or destruction of flight hardware or equipment.

- 8.6.2 Each organization issuing Danger Tags shall maintain accountability through the use of a log for all issued and returned tags.
- 8.6.3 Each organization using Danger Tags shall conduct an annual audit of the Danger Tag program.

8.7 BATTERY HANDLING

- 8.7.1 Equipment used for handling and servicing lead acid and potassium-hydroxide electrolyte batteries shall be kept separated from each other and shall be properly labeled.
- 8.7.2 Adequate ventilation and exhaust shall be provided to prevent acid vapors from entering nickel cadmium or silver zinc battery areas.
- 8.7.3 Charging benches and tables shall be coated with acid/electrolyte-impervious coatings and shall be equipped with splash/drip trays to prevent drips/ leaks from running onto the floor.
- 8.7.4 Individual/liquid-filled battery charging/ conditioning shall be accomplished in battery shops. Battery charging equipment shall be continuously monitored by personnel when operating. Battery-operated vehicles and equipment shall be recharged only with recharging equipment designed for that purpose.

8.8 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

The requirements for the development, management, and implementation of a KSC compliant Environmental Health Program are contained in KNPR 1840.19, KSC Industrial Hygiene Program. Other applicable documents are KNPR 1820.4/KSC Respiratory Protection Program, KNPR 1820.3/KSC Hearing Loss Prevention Program, KNPR 1860.1/KSC Ionizing Radiation Protection Program, KNPR 1860.2/KSC Nonionizing Radiation Protection Program, KNPR 8715.5/KSC Personal Protective Equipment Program Procedural Requirements, and KNPD 1800.2/KSC Hazard Communication Program.

8.9 FALL PROTECTION ON ELEVATED STRUCTURES

8.9.1 POLICY STATEMENT

- a. NASA Kennedy Space Center endeavors to protect all government employees, contractors, subcontractors, international partners, and persons who are exposed to falls through the course of their work. Fall hazards shall be eliminated, mitigated, and\or controlled before an employee is exposed to the hazard.
- b. This policy is meant to strengthen existing fall protection programs, policies, and regulations. It does not replace OSHA regulations, NASA, KSC, or contractor safety programs requirements, except where this policy is more stringent. This policy does not attempt to repeat OSHA, but rather defines KSC's more stringent fall protection requirements. ANSI Fall Protection Standards will be followed except where deemed inadequate by a qualified person.
- c. Kennedy Space Center Fall Protection Policy states that persons involved in activities on "any walking working surface where a person is exposed to a fall to a lower level of 4 feet or greater shall be provided with fall protection." Fall hazards lower than 4 feet require protection if

the work is over an uncommon hazard (moving machinery, chemicals, electrical, impalement hazards, etc.).

- d. Components and systems that are commercial off-the-shelf shall be supplied with complete installation and operation instructions, and those instructions must be followed. Only a qualified person may change the instructions, and those changes are documented prior to use.
- e. Safety Nets are not permitted to be used at KSC.
- f. Construction contractors working at KSC are required to submit a written, site-specific Fall Protection Plan as a part of their Safety and Health Plan for contracts requiring work at heights. The written plan shall address the contractors approach to implementing the requirements of this policy and all applicable OSHA requirements.

8.9.2 DEFINITIONS RELEVANT TO FALL PROTECTION

Anchorage	A secure point of attachment for lifelines, lanyards, or deceleration devices that is capable of supporting 5000 pounds per person (exception is a fall restraint system which requires an anchorage of 1000 pounds) or designed by a Qualified Person with a safety factor of 2.
Authorized person (user)	Employee required to use fall protection in performance of their work and trained and certified to use fall protection PPE and systems.
Body Harness	Straps secured about the employee in a manner that shall distribute the fall arrest forces over the thighs, pelvis, waist, chest, and shoulders with means for attaching it to other components of personal fall arrest system.
Competent Person	Employee trained and certified in fall protection and who is capable of identifying hazards, has the authority to take corrective actions, is knowledgeable of applicable regulations, standards, equipment, and systems, and understands the mandatory requirements for fall protection equipment and systems.
Competent Person Trainer	A person in possession of a recognized formal training certificate from an industry recognized trainer, training center, or an equivalent OSHA training program, who has successfully demonstrated their extensive knowledge and experience to perform Competent Person training.
Competent Safety Monitor	Person trained in duties and responsibilities of performing in position of Safety Monitor.
Connector	A device which is used to couple (connect) parts of the personal fall arrest system and positioning device systems together. It may be an independent component of the system, such as a carabineer, or it may be an integral component part of the system (such as a buckle or D-ring sewn into a body belt or body harness, or snap-hook spliced or sewn to a lanyard or self-retracting lanyard.)
Dangerous Equipment	Equipment (i.e. galvanizing tanks, degreasing units, machinery, electrical equipment, and other types) which, as a result of form or function, will be hazardous to employees who fall onto or into such equipment.
Deceleration Device	Any mechanism, such as a rope grab, rip-stitch lanyard, specially-woven lanyard, tearing or deforming lanyards, automatic self-retracting lifelines/lanyards, etc., which serves to dissipate a substantial amount of energy during a fall arrest, or otherwise limit the energy imposed on an employee during fall arrest.

D 1 "	
Deceleration	The additional vertical distance a falling employee travels, excluding
Distance	lifeline elongation and free fall distance, before stopping from the point at
	which the deceleration device begins to operate. It is measured as the
	distance between the location of an employee's body harness attachment
	point at the moment of activation (at the onset of fall arrest forces) of the
	deceleration device during a fall, and the location of that attachment point
	after the employee comes to a full stop.
Engineered Fall	A fall protection system that has been designed and approved by a
Protection System	Qualified Person.
Fall Arrest System	A system designed to stop one or more persons from striking a lower level
	or obstructions if a fall occurs. Fall Arrest Systems require the use of a
	Full Body Harness, a Connecting Means, a suitable Anchorage, planned
	rescue procedures, and proper training of all users.
Fall Protection	A plan prepared by a qualified person, developed specifically for the site
Plan	where the working at heights is being performed, must be maintained up
1 Idii	to date, and must meet the requirements of 29CFR 1926.502(k).
Fall Restraint	A fall protection system that prevents them from reaching an unprotected
System	edge. The system is comprised of a body harness along with an
System	anchorage, connectors, and other necessary equipment. The other
	, , , ,
	components typically include a lanyard and may include a lifeline and
Floor On anima	other devices.
Floor Opening	An opening measuring 12 inches or more in its least dimension in any
	floor, platform, pavement, or yard through which persons may fall.
Free Fall	The act of falling before a personal fall arrest system begins to apply force
E	to arrest the fall.
Free Fall Distance	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the
Free Fall Distance	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the
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Guardrail System	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels.
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Guardrail System Infeasible	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection.
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Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage.
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard Leading Edge	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction.
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. A component consisting of a flexible line for connection to an anchorage
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard Leading Edge	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. A component consisting of a flexible line for connection to an anchorage at one end to hang vertically (vertical lifeline), or for connection to
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard Leading Edge	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. A component consisting of a flexible line for connection to an anchorage at one end to hang vertically (vertical lifeline), or for connection to anchorages at both ends to stretch horizontally (horizontal lifeline), and
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard Leading Edge	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. A component consisting of a flexible line for connection to an anchorage at one end to hang vertically (vertical lifeline), or for connection to anchorages at both ends to stretch horizontally (horizontal lifeline), and which serves as a means for connecting other components of a personal
Guardrail System Infeasible Lanyard Leading Edge	The vertical displacement of the fall arrest attachment point on the employee's body harness between onset of the fall and just before the system begins to apply force to arrest the fall. This distance excludes deceleration distance, and lifeline/lanyard elongation, but includes any deceleration device slide distance or self-retracting lifeline/lanyard extension before they operate and fall arrest forces occur. A barrier to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. It is impossible to perform the work using a conventional fall protection system, (i.e., guardrail system, or fall arrest/restraint, system) or that it is technologically impossible to use any one of these systems to provide fall protection. A flexible line of rope, wire rope, or strap which has a connector at each end for connecting a body harness to a deceleration device, lifeline, or anchorage. The edge of a floor, roof, or formwork for a floor or other walking/working surface (such as a deck) which changes location as additional floor, roof decking, or formwork sections are placed, formed or constructed. A leading edge is considered to be an unprotected side and edge during periods when it is not actively and continuously under construction. A component consisting of a flexible line for connection to an anchorage at one end to hang vertically (vertical lifeline), or for connection to anchorages at both ends to stretch horizontally (horizontal lifeline), and

Metal Roof	A roof with metal surface that engineering has determined is load bearing
	or is a structural support surface.
Mechanical	All motor or human propelled wheeled equipment used for roofing work,
Equipment	except wheelbarrows and mop carts.
Non-Engineered	An anchor point for which no engineering calculations have been
Anchorage	performed.
Non-roof Work	Preventive maintenance (PM), repair of equipment on roofs such as heat, ventilation, air conditioning, (HVAC), lightning protection systems, rigging of fall protection systems, etc.
Positioning Device	A body harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported on
System	an elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands free while leaning. It is not a fall protection system.
Positive Fall	Fall protection by the use of a guardrail system or personal fall protection
Protection	to include harness with a fall arrest/restraint system or the use of other means such as vehicle mounted platforms and/or scaffolding.
Program	A person designated in writing to manage the Fall Protection Program.
Administrator	The state of the s
Qualified Person	A person in possession of a recognized engineering degree and a formal
	training certificate from an industry recognized trainer, training center, or
	an equivalent OSHA training program, who has successfully
	demonstrated their extensive knowledge and experience to perform
	structural engineering for design, evaluation, and approval of fall
	protection systems.
Roof Work	The hoisting, storage, application, and removal of roofing materials and
	equipment, including related insulation, sheet metal, vapor barrier work, and leading edge work.
Rope Grabs	A deceleration device that travels on a lifeline and automatically engages
	the lifeline, by friction, and locks to arrest the fall.
Runway	A passageway for persons elevated above the surrounding floor or
•	ground, such as a foot-walk along shafting or walkway between buildings.
Safety Monitoring System	A system in which a competent monitor is responsible for recognizing and warning employees of fall hazards. The person monitoring the other
	workers is to be on the same walking\working surface as employees being monitored; is to be within visual sighting distance of the employees being monitored; is to be close enough to communicate orally with the employees being monitored; must not have responsibilities which could take the monitoring attention from the monitoring function.
Self-Retracting	A deceleration device containing a drum-wound line which can be slowly
Lifeline/Lanyard	extracted from, or retracted onto, the drum under slight tension during
(SRL)	normal employee movement, and which, after onset of a fall, automatically locks the drum and arrests the fall.
Steep Roof	A roof having a slope greater than 4 in 12 (vertical to horizontal).
Toe-Board	A low protective barrier that prevents material and equipment from falling to lower levels and provides protection from falls for personnel.
Tower	Free-standing or guy-supported structure that is essentially vertical with
	access via vertical ladder or ships ladder; used to support antennas,
	boresite instruments, weather instruments, cameras, radars, lightning

Tower Climber	Employee trained and certified as a Tower Climber and who, by possession of formal training certificate from an industry recognized trainer, training center, or an equivalent ANSI/OSHA training program, has successfully demonstrated their extensive knowledge and experience to perform communication tower climbs.
Unprotected Sides or Edges	Any side or edge (except at entrances to points of access) of walking/working surface (e.g., floor, roof, ramp, or runway) where there is no wall or guardrail system at least 39 inches high. Midrails shall be installed at a height approximately midway between the top edge of the guardrail system and the platform surface.
Walking/Working Surface	Any surface, whether horizontal or vertical on which an employee walks or works, including but not limited to floors, ramps, bridges, runways, formwork, and concrete reinforcing steel. Does not include ladders, vehicles, or trailers on which employees are located to perform their work duties.
Warning Line Systems	A barrier erected on a roof to warn employees that they are approaching an unprotected roof side or edge, and which designates an area in which roofing work may take place without the use of guardrail or personal fall protection system to protect employees in the area.

8.9.3 ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND TRAINING

8.9.3.1 FALL PROTECTION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATOR

NASA-KSC, NASA-KSC prime contractors, contractors/subcontractors shall appoint in writing a fall protection program administrator and/or team.

- a. The fall protection program administrator and/or team shall have the skills, experience, and abilities to ensure effective management of the employers fall protection program. This would include a working knowledge of current fall protection regulations, standards, fall protection equipment, and systems.
- b. The program administrator shall ensure the development, implementation, and management of the employers' fall protection program.
- c. The program administrator shall ensure an annual review and audit of the fall protection program is performed to address the use of new technology, regulations, industry practices, and to ensure compliance.
- d. The program administrator shall ensure that this policy is adhered to as written.
- e. Education and Training required for program administrators shall cover skills, including at least the following:
- Competent Person training
- Developing and maintaining a managed fall protection program
- Fall protection system selection
- Ensure development of equipment purchase controls
- Understanding of written fall protection and rescue procedures and plans
- Understanding of fall protection engineering system standards

- Fall Protection Training
- f. The program administrator shall remain current with changing requirements, laws, and new fall protection systems.

8.9.3.2 QUALIFIED PERSON

A qualified person shall be formally identified by the Fall Protection Program Administrator. A qualified person shall support the program administrator, competent and authorized person, and the fall protection program by supplying technical information and serve as a subject matter expert.

- a. A qualified person shall be used when the authorized and/or competent person cannot select an appropriate non-engineered anchorage for a fall arrest or fall restraint system.
- b. A qualified person shall be used to design any permanent anchorage, fall arrest system, fall restraint system, or lifeline (vertical and/or horizontal), and the design shall be documented and maintained.
- c. The qualified person shall be familiar with fall protection practices, equipment, regulations, engineering principles, and the effects that permanent fall protection systems will have on the surrounding structure.
- d. A qualified person shall be trained by an industry recognized trainer, training center, or locally developed Training Program equivalent to ANSI and OSHA compliant training program requirements. Qualified person education and training shall include at least:
- Engineering degree
- · Fall hazard identification, elimination, and control methods
- Applicable fall protection regulations
- Responsibilities and requirements in accordance with the ANSI Standards and OSHA regulations
- Inspection of equipment components and systems
- Selecting fall protection systems
- Developing engineering system standards
- Determining system clearance requirements
- Designing and selecting anchorages
- Determining when fall protection systems are infeasible
- Designing new and evaluating existing horizontal lifelines
- Assessing system component compatibility
- Fall protection system assessments and determining when a system is unsafe
- Analyzing various anchorages
- Developing written fall protection procedures and rescue procedures
- Determining swing fall arresting forces
- Determining potential arresting forces
- Investigating fall protection related accidents/incidents/near misses
- e. The qualified person shall remain current with changing requirements, laws, and new fall protection systems.

f. The qualified person shall ensure that this policy is adhered to as written.

8.9.3.3 COMPETENT PERSON

A Competent Person shall be formally identified by the Fall Protection Program Administrator, and is responsible for the immediate application of fall protection work where fall protection is required. Competent persons shall be knowledgeable of applicable fall protection regulations, standards, equipment and systems, and mandatory requirements for fall protection equipment and systems used by their employers.

- a. A competent person shall have work experience related to the application where fall protection is required.
- b. The competent person shall have the ability to identify unsafe conditions or practices as they relate to fall protection during the course of the work and have the authority to take prompt corrective action.
- c. The competent person shall be available to authorized persons when fall protection situations arise.
- d. The competent person shall assist authorized persons when requested to ensure that non-engineered anchorages selected are acceptable, fall protection system(s) will work as intended, fall protection equipment is inspected prior to use, fall protection systems are used in accordance with manufacturer recommendations, OSHA requirements, qualified person designs, local policy, and rescue plans are in effect.
- e. Competent person education and training shall be administered by an industry recognized trainer, training center, or locally developed Training Program equivalent to ANSI and OSHA compliant training, and shall include the following as a minimum:
- Use of all types of equipment and systems used in locations where the authorized persons work, including inspecting systems prior to use
- Installation, component compatibility, estimating free fall distances, total required clearance, dismantling, storage and the common hazards associated with each system
- Fall hazard elimination and controls methods
- Applicable fall protection regulations
- Development of written fall protection procedures and plans
- Understanding of fall protection engineering system standards
- The responsibilities under the ANSI Standards and OSHA regulations
- Detailed inspection of equipment components and systems
- Fall protection system assessments and determining when a system is unsafe
- Fall protection rescue procedures
- The selection and use of non-engineered anchorages
- f. The competent person shall remain current with changing requirements, laws, and new fall protection systems or task applications and shall be retrained a minimum of once every three (3) years.

- g. Non-engineered anchorages can be selected by a competent person, providing the competent person can predict the arresting force (<900 pounds.) and the total required clearance of the system.
- h. The competent person shall ensure that this policy is adhered to as written.

8.9.3.4 AUTHORIZED PERSON (USER)

Each authorized person shall protect themselves by applying fall protection practices during the course of the work. When the nature of the work, the workplace, or the methods of control change to an extent that prior training is not adequate, the authorized person shall be retrained. Retraining is also required when it becomes apparent to supervision, a competent person, and/or qualified person that the authorized person does not have the required level of skills and knowledge or is not following the required means and methods.

- a. Each authorized person shall inspect, install, use, and dismantle fall protection equipment according to manufacturer instructions, OSHA requirements, and local policy.
- b. The authorized person shall not conduct any work where required fall protection is not in place or the performance of the fall protection system is unpredictable. In these situations the competent person for that work or area shall be notified for determination of the appropriate action to be taken.
- c. Every authorized person shall receive formal classroom training in fall protection from a competent person or qualified person before they use fall protection systems or are exposed to a fall hazard. Training for authorized persons shall include:
- How to select a non-engineered anchorage that will support 5,000 pounds
- How to inspect, anchor, assemble, and use the fall protection equipment commonly used in locations where they work
- Fall hazard recognition
- Fall hazard elimination and control methods
- Applicable fall protection regulations
- Their responsibilities under OSHA regulations
- How to use written fall protection procedures
- Inspection of equipment components and systems before use
- Fall protection rescue procedures
- Limits of authority relevant to fall protection
- The use of applicable fall protection equipment, ensuring equipment meets OSHA and ANSI Fall Protection Standards, local fall hazards, and the employers' local equipment and systems
- d. The authorized person shall remain current with changing requirements and shall be retrained a minimum of once every three (3) years.
- e. The authorized user shall ensure that this policy is adhered to as written.

8.9.4 FALL HAZARD CONTROLS

The following controls, in order of preference, shall be used:

- a. Hazard Elimination: The specific work that created the fall hazard should be evaluated to determine if a change in process, area, technology, or equipment would eliminate the fall hazard.
- b. Guarding: Physical barriers between the worker and the fall hazard can be established so the barrier prevents the worker from falling (i.e. Guardrails, vertical netting, covers, man-holes, etc.).
- c. Fall Restraint: Fall protection personal protective equipment can be used to assemble a system (permanent or temporary) that will prevent a worker from reaching the fall hazard.
- d. Fall Arrest: Fall protection personal protective equipment can be used to assemble a system (permanent or temporary) that allows a worker to fall, but arrests the fall safely before the worker strikes the ground or surrounding structure.
- e. Administrative Controls: Administrative controls are reserved for where no other fall protection methods are required. Administrative methods of control improve workers awareness and do not provide fall protection.

8.9.5 FALL PROTECTION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

8.9.5.1 FALL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS

Fall Restraint Systems: Fall restraint systems shall be designed according to the following:

- a. To prevent a worker from reaching the unprotected edge
- b. Anchorage point must be able to hold 1,000 pounds.
- c. Waist belts shall not be used for fall restraint.
- d. Fall Restraint Systems shall be designed according to OSHA and ANSI.

8.9.5.2 FALL ARREST SYSTEMS

Fall Arrest Systems shall be designed to meet the requirements set forth in the applicable OSHA subpart(s). ANSI Fall Protection Standards will be followed except where deemed inappropriate by a qualified person. Fall arrest systems shall be used and installed to reduce the free fall distance.

- a. When using fall arrest systems, the free fall distance of the system shall not exceed 6 feet and 900 pounds maximum arresting force except when designed by a qualified person. In no case shall the manufacturer instructions be violated without the approval and documentation of a qualified person, nor shall an arresting force of 1800 pounds be exceeded in a fall greater than 6 feet.
- b. The installer of the fall protection system (authorized / competent person) shall be knowledgeable of the arresting force and the total required clearance of the system.

- c. If the system is being installed for workers other than the installer a procedure shall be provided to ensure that the authorized user can determine that the system is approved for use.
- d. Acceptable anchorage structure may be I-beams, columns, tower legs, stairwell support structure, or other structure that is capable of holding 5,000 pounds per person or designed by a qualified person with a safety factor of 2. If the anchorage is questionable, the system shall not be used and a competent or qualified person shall be notified.

8.9.5.3 FALL ARREST AND RESTRAINT SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Fall arrest and restraint system components shall meet the OSHA standards, and ANSI Z359.1 Standard when applicable. Only a qualified person is permitted to approve not complying with ANSI and those cases must be documented as indicated in this policy.

8.9.5.4 PERSONAL FALL ARREST SYSTEM

A personal fall arrest system shall be used in conjunction with a work positioning system. It shall be rigged so the employee shall not free fall more than 2 feet.

8.9.6 FALL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

- a. Fall protection equipment shall be selected from equipment meeting or exceeding the OSHA and ANSI Fall Protection Standards. All fall protection equipment must meet ANSI Z359.1 current at the time of purchase.
- b. Fall protection equipment shall be used according to manufacturer instructions. Only a qualified person may change the instructions, and those changes are documented prior to use and maintained until the equipment is removed.
- c. Equipment not designed for fall protection use shall not be used without prior approval of a qualified person, documented, and be labeled "For Fall Protection Use Only."
- d. The program administrator is responsible for ensuring that fall protection equipment procured is included in the training of competent, authorized and applicable qualified people.

8.9.7 FALL HAZARDS AND ASSESSMENTS

- 8.9.7.1 FALL PROTECTION FOR WALKING/WORKING SURFACES WITH UNPROTECTED EDGE/OPENING OR OTHER FALL POTENTIAL OF 4 FEET OR GREATER TO SURFACE BELOW.
- a. If a vehicle or trailer is used as a walking/working surface other than normal operational modes such as operation, maintenance, transport, loading, off-loading, the need for fall protection shall be evaluated by a competent person.
- b. If work requires employees to be closer than 6 feet from any unprotected edge or opening, positive fall protection (Guardrail system or personal fall protection to include harness w/arrest or restraint system) or the use of other means such as vehicle mounted work platforms and/or scaffolding is required.

8.9.7.2 HORIZONTAL LIFE LINES

Commercially available ANSI approved temporary horizontal life lines are to be installed per manufacturer's written instructions. Only a qualified person may change the instructions, and those changes are documented prior to use. If not commercially designed, then a qualified person must design and provide installation.

8.9.7.3 OVER/NEAR WATER OPERATIONS

If employees are required to work Over/Near Water they shall be protected from falling as required by this policy. This section applies to construction activities, and is not intended to apply to marine operations that are governed by 29 CFR 1917, Subpart B, Marine Terminal Operations. For construction/maintenance activities the requirements of 29CFR 1926.106 shall also be complied with.

8.9.7.4 TOWER CLIMBING OPERATIONS

Climbing towers present unique hazards not associated with other jobs requiring fall protection. Prior to tower climbing it is required that the following be addressed: weather conditions, coordination with Fire Rescue, development of a rescue plan, safe transport of equipment/tools, tower energy sources have been safed, and at least two climbers are present and trained to climb towers.

8.9.7.5 ROOFS - FALL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

- a. Roof Work On Roofs
- (1) Metal Roof: Work on metal roofs requires the use of positive fall protection at all times regardless of slope.
- (2) Non metal roofs:
- (a) Low-sloped or flat roofs:
- (1) From unprotected edge to 6 feet: Positive fall protection required.
- (2) From 6 feet to 15 feet: In lieu of positive fall protection a warning line and safety monitor system may be used.
- (3) 15 feet or more from unprotected edge: In lieu of positive fall protection a warning line may be used without a monitor.
- (b) Steep roofs require positive fall protection at all times.
- b. Non-Roof Work on Roofs (Metal and non-metal)
- (1) All work on steep roofs requires positive fall protection such as a personal fall arrest system or restraint system, guardrails or use of other means such as aerial lifts or scaffolding.
- (2) Work on roofs with a pitch less than 4:12 above 4 feet requires:
- (a) From unprotected edge to 6 feet: Positive fall protection is required.

- (b) From 6 feet to 15 feet: A warning line will be used.
- (c) 15 feet or more from unprotected edge: No warning line is required.
- c. Roof Inspections and Assessments:
- (1) Employees needing to access roofs for the sole purpose of performing roof inspections or assessments may do so only during pre and post construction work and shall follow the policy for "Non Roof Work on Roofs".
- (2) If access is required during construction activities, the policy for "Roof Work On Roofs" applies.

8.9.8 EXTENSIBLE / ARTICULATING LIFTS

An energy-absorbing length-adjustable lanyard and full body harness shall be used. The lanyard shall be connected to an approved anchor point in the basket and adjusted in length in such a manner that it reduces the possibility of the worker falling over the guardrails yet permits the work to be accomplished.

8.9.9 SCAFFOLD

- a. Scaffold platforms where the potential for a fall 4 feet or greater exists shall be protected by the use of fall protection systems (guardrails, fall arrest, fall restraint). If these can't be accomplished, a qualified person shall develop a fall protection plan for scaffolding up to 10 feet in height. A scaffold greater than 10 feet shall have positive fall protection.
- b. A competent person shall evaluate the scaffold erection and dismantling to determine if fall protection systems (guardrails, fall arrest, fall restraint) can be used while erecting and dismantling scaffolds. If these can't be accomplished a qualified person shall develop a fall protection plan.

CHAPTER 9. TECHNICAL OPERATING PROCEDURES (TOPs) (SUPPLEMENTS NPR 8715.3, NASA GENERAL SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS)

9.1 GENERAL

- 9.1.1 TOPs provide a written communication that identifies and directs work to be performed; provide detailed instructions necessary to accomplish the intended task; and are to be followed step-by-step unless otherwise permitted by Section 9.9 of this Chapter. The use of TOPs ensures an organized and systematic approach for performing work and to identify and control hazards.
- 9.1.2 TOPs shall be required when any of the following apply:
- a. Equipment operations, planned or unplanned, are hazardous as defined in paragraph 9.8 herein.
- b. An operation constitutes a potential launch, test, vehicle, or payload processing constraint.
- c. An operation is detailed or complicated and there is reasonable doubt that it can be performed correctly without written procedures.
- d. TOPs shall be reviewed for KSC and offsite areas to ensure that hazardous operations are properly classified and the appropriate safety precautions have been specified.
- e. TOPs shall be classified as hazardous or non-hazardous. Each operation shall be evaluated for the task and location. Hazardous operations are defined in paragraph 9.8 herein.
- f. A Category II TOP may be used for one-time-only hazardous operations when work is of limited scope, and for repetitive non-hazardous operations when work is of limited scope. Category II procedures shall not be used to change or replace Category I procedures.
- g. TOPs shall be prepared in clear, precise language that can be readily understood by personnel involved in the operation.
- h. Space Shuttle Program/International Space Station (SSP/ISS) payload organizations shall comply with the requirements of KHB 1700.7, Space Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Handbook, in lieu of the requirements of this Attachment.
- i. Laboratory operations shall comply with 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.1450 in lieu of the requirements of this Attachment.
- j. Unique symbols shall be used on all bar charts, integration, and element schedules to differentiate between operations having a major control area, a local control area, and no control area. A legend shall be provided on each page.

9.2 ALL TOPs

All TOPs shall contain:

9.2.1 A cover identifying the TOP as either hazardous or non-hazardous.

- 9.2.2 A brief description of the purpose or objective of the task, operation, or procedure.
- 9.2.3 Identification of the operating location and/or departing/arriving areas.
- 9.2.4 Identification of specific hazards that personnel will be exposed to during the operation.
- 9.2.5 Operations Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD), Hazard Analyses, and/or Payload Hazard Reports that specify procedural controls for specific hazardous conditions. These procedural controls shall be uniquely identified within the TOP.
- 9.2.6 Safety precautions (WARNING/CAUTION notes), for any activities, hazardous or non-hazardous, where specific guidelines must be observed or actions taken to prevent or limit hazards. These notes shall immediately precede the step that directs the activity. For multiple steps for related work within a TOP, the WARNING/CAUTION shall immediately precede the first step that requires the safety precautions.
- 9.2.7 Identification of tools, equipment, clothing and/or any other personal protective equipment (PPE) required for the safe performance of the operation or as required by emergency procedures associated with the operation shall be contained/specified within the WARNING note.
- 9.2.8 Identification of organizational elements and facilities required to support the operation.
- 9.2.9 A list of applicable safety documents and references that are specifically called out within the TOP required to support the operation. The list shall contain the document identifying number, latest issue (LI), and title.
- 9.2.10 Safety rules and requirements that are required for the safe conduct of the operation.
- 9.2.11 Identification of the personnel certifications required for the safe performance of the operation.
- 9.2.12 Emergency instructions when operations directed in the TOP activate a system or equipment capable of causing personnel injury or equipment damage if not expeditiously shutdown or safed, should a malfunction occur. When a TOP is in progress, the emergency instruction in the TOP shall take precedence over the Emergency Procedures Document (EPD). Reference JHB 2000 for facility EPD requirements. Emergency instructions shall:
- a. Contain specific actions necessary to cope with emergency conditions.
- b. Address hazards unique to the operation and shall provide for rapid safing to protect personnel and equipment.
- c. Contain all the steps required to accomplish the shutdown or safing, or shall be readily available as part of the work package.
- d. Be available to the test team at all times and be contained within the document with uniquely identifiable pages; eg. distinctive border or cut corners.
- 9.2.13 The following data when involving the pressurization of vessels within GSE or facilities:

- a. Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP).
- b. Relief valve set pressure (if installed).
- c. Burst disc pressure/temperature rating (if installed).
- d. For initial (first-time) pressurization, a WARNING stating the MAWP immediately before the step that calls for pressurization. For subsequent pressurizations this may be in the form of a statement.

NOTE: A sketch or diagram which shows the configuration of the system to be pressurized and which includes maximum allowable working pressures, relief valve set pressures, and burst disc pressure/temperature ratings may be used to meet the requirements listed in (a), (b), and (c) above.

9.3 HAZARDOUS TOPs

Hazardous TOPs, as defined in paragraph 9.8 herein, shall contain, in addition to the above:

- 9.3.1 Identification of all conditions that cause the TOP to be classified as hazardous.
- 9.3.2 A procedural step verifying the performance of a pretest briefing for integrated TOPs that require a major control area.
- 9.3.3 The following items shall immediately precede the step(s) that direct the hazardous task/sequence:
- a. A procedural step requiring the performance of a pre-task briefing.
- b. A procedural step with task leader verification that personnel participating in the hazardous operation are certified and ready to proceed.
- c. A procedural step to identify/specify each control area for hazardous operations. The instructions shall include placement of signs, barriers (i.e. ropes, chains, tape), warning lights, and directions for all non-essential personnel to clear the specified control area, allowing sufficient time for them to do so before the start of the hazardous step(s).
- d. A list identifying all the essential personnel required to perform the hazardous operation. The list shall identify the individuals by call sign/ functional title, number of personnel, and the organization or contractor employing the individual.
- e. A procedural step providing for public address announcements, or other positive means, to be made to alert personnel of the dangers and information associated with the hazardous operation.
- f. A procedural step verifying that a pre-route survey has been accomplished before transporting Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and flight hardware where length, height, or width may cause interference problems/hazards.

- g. A procedural step verifying that a pre-operational inspection for operations having a major control area and/or an operational safety inspection for all hazardous operations has been performed. Any discrepancies that constrain or have the potential to impact the operation shall be documented and dispositioned or resolved, prior to the commencement of any hazardous step(s).
- h. A procedural step requiring Safety concurrence prior to starting the hazardous step(s), and prior to opening the area for controlled work at the conclusion of the hazardous step(s).
- i. A WARNING note, or a Note, specifying the start of a hazardous operation immediately preceding the first hazardous step, and a Note specifying completion of the hazardous operation immediately following the last hazardous step.
- j. A step verifying the safed and armed circuits are safed and the Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) capacitors are discharged prior to the disconnection of live explosives.

9.4 SUBTASK SAFETY CONTROLS

Integrated/controlling TOPs shall manage the specific safety controls contained in subtask TOPs/documents.

9.5 JOB CARDS

Safety requirements for Job Cards shall be identical to safety requirements for Category I TOPs.

9.6 OPERATIONS PLANNING SHEETS

The responsible safety and health professional(s) and, if required, the appropriate NASA KSC S&MA Division representative shall approve Operations Planning Sheets that include hazardous operations (as defined in 1.h of this Attachment) prior to implementation of the TOP.

9.7 PLACARD PROCEDURES

- 9.7.1 The use of placards shall be limited to non-hazardous repetitive simple tasks.
- 9.7.2 Placards shall be used only for GSE and facility items. They shall not be used for equipment when interfacing with flight hardware, unless authorized by a TOP.
- 9.7.3 Placards shall define any prerequisites, contacts, or pre-operations that must be performed or made prior to implementation.
- 9.7.4 Placards shall be attached to equipment or positioned near equipment to provide assembly or operating instructions.
- 9.7.5 Installation of placards shall be authorized using a TOP initiated by the organization using the placard and an exact copy of the placard shall be attached to the authorizing TOP.

9.8 HAZARDOUS CLASSIFICATION OF TOPs

A TOP is classified as hazardous to ensure that an operation which has potential to result in loss of life, serious injury to personnel or damage to systems, equipment or facilities is

performed in a step-by-step fashion and contains all appropriate hazard controls. TOPs shall be classified by the originating organization as hazardous if the activity controls or involves, but not limited to, operations that:

- 9.8.1 Require personnel to be present in an enclosed or dangerous area (tanks, manholes, etc.) in which the environment deviates from a normal atmosphere.
- 9.8.2 Involve the handling, receipt, storage, transportation, installation, removal, checkout, or closeout of explosives including solid propellants. For any operation or checkout of an explosive system, following explosive item installation/connection and prior to power on/off simulated or direct explosive system checks or tests, the condition or status of the explosives (connected, safed, or disconnected) must be stated and verification required within the TOP.
- 9.8.3 Involve liquid propellant loading, unloading or flow, venting, sampling, connecting or disconnecting, moving or storing of loaded storage units, or opening of contaminated systems.
- 9.8.4 Involve cryogenic loading, unloading or flow, venting, sampling, connecting or disconnecting, moving or storing of loaded storage units, or repairing of a system containing cryogenics.
- 9.8.5 Involves the handling or transfer of hazardous fluids, hazardous gases, combustible/corrosive liquids, or other materials hazards when the given quantity of the gas or liquids's vapor, when mixed or unmixed with air, is hazardous to personnel or equipment due to flammability, toxicity, or extremes of temperature.
- 9.8.6 Involve moving GSE or flight hardware where length, height, width, or weight may cause interference or hazards.
- 9.8.7 Involve crane-hoisting operations. The procedure for crane hoisting shall be classified hazardous unless the cognizant program/project or S&MA Division determines that the size or weight of the equipment to be hoisted is such that it would not be considered a hazardous operation.
- 9.8.8 Involve forklift operations for loading, unloading, and transporting of hazardous materials.
- 9.8.9 Involve the use of ionizing or non-ionizing radiation sources that have hazard controls specified in the approved Radiation Use Authorization for that source as issued by the KSC Radiation Protection Program.
- 9.8.10 Involve an electrical hazard that may cause injury or death.
- 9.8.11 Call up hazardous step(s) of subtask TOPs. The controlling TOP shall be classified as hazardous.
- 9.8.12 Involve the pressurization of systems or components and include at least one of the following cases:
- a. Flight system pressure vessels controlled by fracture mechanics with:
- (1) Any pressurization that exceeds any previously recorded pressurization in the pressure vessel operational time/ cycle log.

- (2) Any pressurization above the MAWP.
- (3) Any pressurization above 25 percent of the MAWP when the vessel contains hazardous fluids.
- b. Flight system pressure vessels not controlled by fracture mechanics with:
- (1) Any pressurization above 25 percent of MAWP that exceeds any previously recorded pressurization in the pressure vessel operational time/ cycle record log.
- (2) Any pressurization above MAWP.
- (3) Any pressurization above 25 percent of MAWP when the vessel contains hazardous fluids.
- 9.8.13 Involve the pressurization of ground-based pressure vessels/systems and include at least one of the following cases:
- a. Any pressurization above the MAWP/Design Pressure.
- b. First time pressurization to rated pressure of any new vessel/system or the modified portion of an existing vessel/system. This excludes pressurization after removal or replacement of a component with a like item that has been pressure tested prior to installation. This also excludes pressurization of flex hoses up to rated operating pressure, provided hose restraints required by Attachment E of KNPR are in place.
- c. In-place calibration at more than 80 percent of full scale for pressure gauges with scale range over 200 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) unless the gauge has a solid front case with pressure relief back.
- d. Involve procedures that manually control pressurization of systems where MAWP/Design Pressure can be reached. The TOP shall contain a CAUTION/WARNING note stating the maximum allowable pressure.

9.9 TOP CHANGES AND REVISIONS

- 9.9.1 Interim changes (reference Glossary section of KNPR 8715.3) to existing Category I and II TOPs shall be in accordance with the following:
- a. Insufficient time exists to make a formal change to a previously released TOP.
- b. An approved deviation authorizing an interim change is obtained prior to implementation.
- c. Each change shall specify whether it adds or modifies hazardous step(s).
- d. Safety approval is required for interim changes that add or modify hazardous step(s), including out-of-order processing.
- e. All approved deviations or other documentation authorizing permanent changes to a TOP during its use shall be incorporated, or addressed, as part of the next printed change or revision.

9.9.2 A written approved deviation is required for changes to any section of a TOP. All deviation requests shall be processed using an approved deviation process, and shall be approved prior to implementation. For emergency or time-critical situations, operations may continue with the deviation written after the fact, provided concurrences are recorded on the net and/or documented within the TOP. Deviations shall not be required for non-technical or clerical errors.

The following apply to changes that allow for steps/sequences to be performed out-of-order:

- a. Out-of-order processing for hazardous steps
- (1) Out-of-order changes to hazardous steps require a written approved deviation. For emergency or time-critical (real-time) situations, operations may continue with the deviation written after the fact, provided concurrences are recorded on the net and/or documented within the TOP. Actual order shall be documented within the TOP.
- (2) Pre-planned out-of-order changes to hazardous steps documented within the TOP may be performed without a deviation. Actual order shall be documented within the TOP.
- b. Out-of-order processing for non-hazardous steps
- (1) Out-of-order changes to non-hazardous steps require a written approved deviation.
- (a) For emergency or time-critical (real-time) situations, out-of-order changes to non-hazardous steps may be performed without a deviation after necessary concurrence is obtained and documented within the TOP.
- (2) Pre-planned out-of-order changes to non-hazardous steps documented within the TOP may be performed without a deviation.
- c. Pre- and post operations tasks may be performed in any order without a deviation provided it is preplanned and documented.
- 9.9.3 All TOPs/changes/deviations involving the flight termination system shall be forwarded to the KSC Range Safety Manager for coordination with the appropriate signatories per NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program.
- 9.9.4 All TOPs/changes/deviations involving hazardous operations at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), or involving hazardous operations for NASA Launch Services Program (LSP) at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), shall be forwarded to the LSP S&MA Division.
- 9.9.5 All TOPs/changes/deviations involving hazardous operations for NASA payloads (KSC or CCAFS) shall be forwarded to the ISS/Payload Processing S&MA Division.

9.10 PROCESSING OF TOPs

All organizations operating in areas under KSC jurisdiction shall ensure all TOPs they originate are developed, classified (hazardous or non-hazardous), and processed as follows:

9.10.1 Category I TOPs

- a. Prior to use, final version of any new, changed, or revised Category I hazardous TOP shall be reviewed and approved (by signature) by the appropriate safety and health professional(s) for compliance with the requirements herein.
- b. New Category I hazardous TOPs shall be released at least 7 days prior to scheduled use.
- c. Changed or revised Category I hazardous TOPs shall be released at least 5 days prior to scheduled use and 3 days prior to scheduled use for page changes.

9.10.2 Category II TOPs

- a. Prior to use, Category II hazardous TOPs shall be reviewed and approved (by signature) by the appropriate safety and health professional(s) for compliance with the requirements herein.
- b. Category II hazardous TOPs shall be released at least 2 days before the procedure is performed, except in the case of real-time TOPs.
- 9.10.3 Non-hazardous TOPs are not required to be approved by safety if the responsible safety organization has an audit/sampling plan to ensure the safety requirements are met. The sampling plan shall be developed and documented by each program/project and audited by the appropriate NASA KSC S&MA Division.
- 9.10.4 Prior to use, all repetitive TOPs shall be reviewed and updated, if needed, for compliance with current requirements (e.g.,ORMSD, QPRD, KNPRs) if it has been 3 years since its last publication.

CHAPTER 10: MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS (SUPPLEMENTS NPR 8715.3, NASA GENERAL SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS)

10.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

All mishaps and close calls shall be reported to the responsible supervisor and the organizational (NASA or contractor) safety office and shall be investigated to determine the root cause(s), to develop and implement corrective actions in order to prevent recurrence, and to document and share lessons learned. In addition, all mishaps and close calls shall be electronically entered into the NASA Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) database. The requirements stated herein implement NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Report, Investigating, and Recordkeeping. The KSC mishap and close call processes are documented in the respective Launch Contingency Plans (KSC-PLN-2001, ISS/Payload Processing Contingency Action Plan; KSC-PLN-1705 KSC Shuttle Program Contingency Plan; and LSP Contingency Plan is LSP-PLN-365.01); KDP-KSC-P-1473, KSC Mishap Reporting and Investigating; KDP-KSC-P-1474, Mishap Investigation Board; and KDP-KSC-P-2111, Reporting Close Calls.

10.2 DEFINITION OF MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS

10.2.1 Mishaps

A mishap is an undesired and unexpected event that results in injury requiring more than first aid, occupational illness to personnel, and/or damage to property of at least \$1000. Mishaps also include injuries or occupational illnesses resulting from repetitive stresses or exposures over a prolonged period of time. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or ground support equipment that meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in which the damage was unexpected or unplanned. For purposes of investigation and reporting, mishaps are categorized as follows:

a. Type A Mishap

A mishap resulting in one or more of the following:

- (1) An occupational injury or illness resulting in a fatality, a permanent total disability, or the hospitalization for inpatient care of 3 or more people within 30 workdays of the mishap;
- (2) A total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of \$1 million or more;
- (3) A crewed aircraft hull loss;
- (4) An occurrence of an unexpected aircraft departure from controlled flight (except high performance jet/test aircraft such as F-15, F-16, F/A-18, T-38, and T-34, when engaged in flight test activities).

b. Type B Mishap

A mishap that caused an occupational injury or illness that resulted in a permanent partial disability, the hospitalization for inpatient care of 1-2 people within 30 workdays of the mishap,

or a total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least \$250,000 but less than \$1,000,000.

c. Type C Mishap

A mishap resulting in a nonfatal occupational injury or illness that caused any days away from work, restricted duty, or transfer to another job beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or a total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least \$25,000 but less than \$250,000.

d. Type D Mishap

A mishap that caused any nonfatal OSHA recordable occupational injury and/or illness that does not meet the definition of a Type C mishap, or a total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least \$1,000 but less than \$25,000. Permanent occupational hearing loss in excess of 25 decibels in either ear is classified as an incident.

10.2.2 Close Calls

An occurrence or a condition of employee concern in which there is no injury or only minor injury requiring first aid and no significant equipment/property damage/mission failure (less than \$1000), but which possesses a potential to cause a mishap or negative mission impact.

10.3 CLASSIFYING MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS

10.3.1 Initial assessment

For purposes of initial assessment of mishaps and close calls, it is recognized that severity of the event may not be known. Therefore, a worst-case estimate of injury/illness and/or damage or its potential shall be made and updated as needed.

10.3.2 Mishaps

Mishaps are classified as Type A, B, C, or D in accordance with the definitions in Section 10.2.a. All mishaps shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database. If any program/project or directorate organization requires assistance with the NASA IRIS database or its use, contact the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Institutional Safety and Quality Division for assistance.

10.3.3 Close Calls

The definition of a close call is contained in Section 10.2.b. For close calls, an assessment of the worst case potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence shall be performed. The mere existence of a hazard does not constitute a close call. In order to meet the definition of a close call, there must be an undesired and unexpected event that has potential for causing a mishap or negative mission impact, even though neither occurred. For example, a sidewalk that is buckled and uneven is classified as a hazard by its mere existence. If someone were to trip or fall, and escape injury or only require first aid, the event is classified as a close call if the event had significant potential to have been any type of mishap. All close calls shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database. If any program/project or directorate organization requires assistance with the NASA IRIS database or its use, contact the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Institutional Safety and Quality Division for assistance.

10.3.4 Exposure to Hazardous Substance

Personnel exposure, or suspected exposure, to a hazardous substance exceeding allowable limits (quantity level or exposure time) shall be reported immediately to the Occupational Health Facility (OHF) or, if not located at KSC, to a licensed medical physician. All exposures shall go through the OHF or licensed medical physician (if not located at KSC) for medical evaluation and treatment. Confirmed exposures exceeding allowable limits shall be reported and documented as a mishap or close call.

10.3.5 Musculoskeletal Disorders (MSD)

Lost time cases due to a MSD or repeated trauma injury or illness shall be classified as a mishap. For these cases, the date of diagnosis by a licensed physician or the first official lost time day, whichever occurs first, is the date that shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database.

10.3.6 Occupational Illness

For cases of occupational illness due to long term exposure to hazards, such as abestosis, silicosis or hearing loss, the date of diagnosis by a licensed physician or the first official lost time day, whichever occurs first, is the date that shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database.

10.3.7 Injuries Incurred as a Result of a Recreational Activity

Recreational activitiy injuries shall be classified as NASA mishaps if the employee is on duty and is required to participate for job certification, training or by labor agreement. Each program/project or directorate organization sponsoring such recreational activity shall determine which activities employees can perform. Recreational activities shall be designed to minimize the potential for personal injury. Injuries resulting from off-duty use of KSC exercise facilities are not classified as NASA mishaps. On-duty, nonsponsored recreational activities are prohibited.

10.3.8 Natural Phenomenon Mishaps

Damage resulting from natural phenomena or acts of nature (e.g., flooding, hurricanes, tornados, lightning strikes, wild fires), without human intervention, shall be classified as a NASA mishap by the organization owning/controlling the damaged or lost property. An assessment of all damages incurred shall be performed and cost of repairs and/or replacement shall be tracked and entered into the NASA IRIS database. Natural phenomenon damage resulting from or made worse by failure of personnel to follow established procedures or standard practices, such as damage caused by animals as a result of personnel failing to properly secure and protect facilities and equipment, is not considered damage from natural phenomena, but is still classified as a NASA mishap or close call.

10.3.9 High Visibility Mishaps and Close Calls

Mishaps or close calls that may draw media attention, cause embarassment to NASA, or other events deemed important by NASA management are considered "high visibility" mishaps or close calls and may warrant a full NASA mishap investigation board.

10.3.10 Mishaps and Close Calls Involving Property Damage

Reported damage shall include the direct cost of replacement of damaged equipment and parts, plus labor, as well as the cost of cleanup and environmental investigation activity and restoration of property as required by environmental regulations. The reportable cost also includes replacement of any lost commodity (i.e., compressed gasses, coolants, propellants). In cases where replacement parts are available from salvaged or excess equipment at little or no cost to NASA, the actual costs of replacement parts may be used plus labor. The cost of the safety mishap investigation is not included.

10.4 REPORTING MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS

10.4.1 General Requirements (Civil Service and Contractor)

a. Initial Reporting

Initial reporting requirements for mishaps and close calls are based on the preliminary, worst-case assessment of actual or potential severity and visibility.

b. NASA IRIS Database

All mishaps and close calls shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database within 24 hours of the event. As much information as is available at this time shall be entered. IRIS cases shall be continuously updated as new information becomes available and, at a minimum, updated at least every 30 days until it is closed. When entering a close call into the NASA IRIS database, the worst case potential mishap severity (Type A, B, C or D) shall also be entered. For mishaps or close calls involving injury, the occupational health representative or other medical person shall provide the appropriate medical information regarding the person(s) injured and the nature of the injury(s) to the appropriate S&MA division for inclusion in IRIS.

- 10.4.2 Type A, Type B, or Other Highly Visible Mishaps and Close Calls (Civil Service and Contractor)
- a. In order to facilitate the timely investigation and other notification requirements of NPR 8621.1, the responsible Civil Service or Contractor program/project or directorate organization shall immediately (within 1 hour) provide initial notification by telephone or in person to the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate (SA) in accordance KDP-KSC-P-1473. Initial notification shall include the time, the location, a description of the event, the organization(s) involved in the event, and a preliminary worst case estimate of the injuries/illness and/or cost estimate of the damage resulting from the event.
- b. Additional center-wide and NASA Headquarters notifications will be provided by the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate in accordance with KDP-KSC-P-1473.
- c. Mishap notification must be acknowledged verbally, by e-mailed, or by fax. Information to be reported includes the Center name, location of incident, time of incident, number of fatalities (if known), number of hospitalized employees (if known), type of injury (if known), type of damage (if known), contact person, contact person's phone number, and a brief description of the mishap. In addition, within 24 hours, the S&MA Directorate shall follow up the initial phone notification to NASA Headquarters by sending an electronic notification that includes the following information: Center submitting report; author of report; author's phone number and mail code; date report submitted; time report submitted; incident date; incident time; incident

general location; exact location (if known); responsible organization; organization's point of contact; point of contact's phone number and mail code; mission affected; program impact (if known); number and type of injuries or fatalities (if known); type of damage to equipment, flight hardware, flight software, or facilities; estimate of direct cost of damage; and a brief description of the mishap or close call.

- d. Within 8 hours of a work-related mishap involving death of a Federal employee, or the hospitalization for inpatient care of three or more employees (provided at least one is a Federal employee) within 30 workdays after the mishap, the S&MA Directorate shall notify OSHA and provide the following information: the establishment name, location of incident, time of incident, number of fatalities (if known), number of hospitalized employees (if known), contact person, contact person's phone number, and a brief description of the mishap. After notifying OSHA, the S&MA Directorate shall inform NASA Headquarters that an oral report has been provided to OSHA. Contractors are responsible for reporting directly to OSHA when the mishap involves contractor personnel only. Reference KDP-KSC-P-1473.
- e. For Type A, B or highly visible mishaps and close calls, a formal Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) (Contractor and/or Civil Service) shall be formed per Section 10.5.a. Reference KDP-KSC-P-1474 for Mishap Board formation and implementation.
- 10.4.3 Type C or D Mishaps and Close Calls

a. Contractor

The responsible contractor organization shall, within four hours of the event (or by 7:30 AM the next workday for mishaps occurring during shifts other than first shift), submit an initial report (email or fax) to the S&MA Directorate in accordance with KDP-KSC-P-1473. All mishaps and close calls shall be reported to the responsible supervisor and the organizational (NASA or contractor) safety office and shall be investigated to determine the root cause(s), to develop and implement corrective actions in order to prevent recurrence, and to document and share lessons learned. In addition, all mishaps and close calls shall be electronically entered into the NASA Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS) database. The requirements stated herein implement NPR 8621.1, NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting. Investigating, and Recordkeeping. The KSC mishap and close call processes are documented in the respective Launch Contingency Plans (KSC-PLN-2001, ISS/Payload Processing Contingency Action Plan; KSC-PLN-1705 KSC Shuttle Program Contingency Plan; and LSP Contingency Plan is LSP-PLN-365.01); KDP-KSC-P-1473 Mishap Reporting and Investigation; KDP-KSC-P-1474 Mishap Investigation Board; and KDP-KSC-P-2111, Reporting Close Calls. The initial report shall contain a description, the time, the location, and the organizations involved in the event, a preliminary worst case estimate of the injuries and/or cost estimate of the damage resulting from the event. Within 15 working days, the responsible contractor organization shall enter the mishap report into the NASA IRIS database.

- b. Civil Service
- (1) Civil Service Mishaps Involving Injury or Illness (and which may also include property damage)

For mishaps involving more serious injury or illness involving direct emergency transport to offsite medical facilities, the emergency responders shall provide the OHF initial medical information documented on a KSC Form 6-2. For nonlife threatening injury or illness, the employee shall notify their supervisor and report to the OHF. The OHF shall record the medical evaluation on a KSC Form 6-2, and forward a copy to the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division and to the employee's supervisor (yellow copy). Upon receipt, the employee's supervisor shall fill out Section III of the KSC Form 6-2 and forward it to the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division within 72 hours of the mishap. The S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division shall enter the information into the NASA IRIS database, and update as appropriate.

(2) Civil Service Mishaps or Close Calls Involving Property Damage Only

For mishaps or close calls involving damaged property only , the responsible Civil Service organization shall provide initial notification to the S&MA Directorate in accordance with KDP-KSC-P-1473 and forwarded to the appropriate program/project or directorate S&MA organization and the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and Quality Branch within 4 hours of the mishap or close call (or by 7:30 AM the next workday for mishaps occurring during shifts other than first shift). The appropriate S&MA Division within the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate shall ensure that the responsible civil service organization enters the data into the NASA IRIS database, and update as appropriate.

10.4.4 Reporting Days Away From Work (Civil Service and Contractor)

a. Civil Service and Contractors

Days away from work shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database by the responsible contractor organization (for contractor days away from work) or the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division (for Civil Service days away from work). Days away from work shall be counted for the calendar days away from work for 180 days duration. Reporting of days away from work beyond 180 total days away due to a single injury or illness is not required. A day away from work is defined as a full work day, and results from a nonfatal traumatic injury, or a nonfatal nontraumatic illness, that causes one or more days away from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred. Only days away from work directed or approved by a licensed physician shall be recorded as days away. In calculating total days away from work, the total number of calender days off prescribed by the physician shall be counted, even if the employee would not normally work on some of those days (e.g., weekends, holidays or scheduled days off). For injuries or illnesses that become long-term or permanent disability cases, the mishap report status shall be updated in the NASA IRIS database by the responsible contractor organization or the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality to reflect the new mishap classification.

b. For Civil Service Only

When an injury or illness becomes a "time away from work" case, the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division Chief or Lead Engineer shall provide notification in accordance with KDP-KSC-P-1473, Mishap Reporting and Investigating.

10.4.5 Other NASA Centers Performing Work at KSC

For work performed at KSC that is exclusively under the control of another or other NASA Center(s) (i.e., without the participation of KSC employees or contractors), initial and follow-up mishap/close call reporting will include notification of the host KSC program/project and S&MA

Directorate. This requirement is in addition to their own NASA Center mishap/close call reporting and follow-on investigation, corrective action, and lessons learned requirements.

10.5 INVESTIGATION

10.5.1 Mishap Investigation Boards (MIBs)

a. NASA MIBs

NASA Mishap Investigation Boards shall be formed for all Type A or B mishaps. Mishap Boards may also be formed for other mishaps or close calls as deemed necessary by the Center Director or program/project or organizational Director. Mishap Board investigations shall be accomplished in accordance with the requirements of NPR 8621.1 and KDP-KSC-P-1474, Mishap Investigation Board.

b. Contractor MIBs

For NASA mishaps resulting from NASA contractor operations, the NASA Board Appointing Official, with the concurrence of the S&MA Director, may delay the formation of a separate NASA Mishap Investigation Board (or activity) pending the review and acceptance of the contractor report. In this case, a letter signed by the NASA Board Appointing Official shall be sent to the contractor notifying them of NASA's intent to delay formation of a separate NASA Mishap Investigation Board. NASA also retains the option of providing a Government representative on Contractor-managed MIBs.

10.5.2 Non-board Mishap and Close Call Investigations

All mishaps and close calls shall be investigated to identify the root cause(s) and other contributing cause(s). Within 30 working days of the mishap or close call, the results of the investigation shall be documented in the NASA IRIS database (reference KDP-KSC-P-1473, Mishap Reporting and Investigating and KDP-KSC-P-2111, Reporting Close Calls).

a. Civil Service Non-board Mishap and Close Call Investigations

For mishaps or close calls with damage to property exclusively under the control of NASA Civil Service personnel, the appropriate S&MA Division within the Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate shall ensure that the NASA program/project conducts the investigation and enters the data into IRIS. When injury or illness to civil service personnel is involved, the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division, in conjunction with the NASA program/project or S&MA Division, shall conduct the investigation. Civil Service injury and illness investigation results shall be documented in Section III of KSC Form 6-2 and submitted to the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division for entry into the NASA IRIS database. The program/project or S&MA Division shall maintain involvement and oversight in the investigation and analysis, and provide consultation on an as needed basis.

b. Contractor Non-board Mishap and Close Call Investigations

Contractor organizations are responsible for investigating their own nonboard mishaps and entering the results of the investigation directly into the NASA IRIS database. Both the appropriate program/project and the appropriate S&MA Division shall maintain insight into the investigation of contractor mishaps, track progress as documented in the NASA IRIS database

and perform independent assessments of the investigation results and the effectiveness of the identified corrective action.

10.6 MISHAP REPORTS

10.6.1 Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) Reports

a. The mishap investigation report shall contain a description of the structured analytical techniques used to identify causal factors, detailed documentation of mishap data, discussion of root cause(s), and significant observations, findings and recommendations. The report shall also include a proposed Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to be used as a framework for further development and implementation. Witness statements shall be kept separate from the main portion of the report so that they can be easily separated and withheld from release and distribution of the report. NPR 8621.1 contains detailed information on report requirements and format. Within 75 workdays of the mishap or close call, the MIB shall submit the completed and signed mishap report to the appointing official. Once the report is approved, the MIB Chair shall ensure that the NASA IRIS database is updated with the report and proposed corrective action plan and distribute the final report in accordance with NPR 8621.1 and KDP-KSC-P-1474. The S&MA Directorate (Institutional Safety and Quality Division) is the official repository for all MIB reports and associated documentation. Witness statements and medical records shall be sealed and retained by the S&MA Directorate in a locked file, and are not part of the distributed MIB report.

b. Contractor reports shall undergo a formal review by NASA, and, once accepted, a formal letter of acceptance from the NASA Board Appointing Official will be provided to the Contractor.

10.6.2 Non-board Mishap Investigation Board Reports

A mishap report documenting investigation results including identification of root cause(s), significant observations, findings, and recommendations shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database within 30 days of the event.

10.7 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective action(s) shall be determined and implemented in order to prevent recurrence of similar events. Within 45 working days of the mishap or close call (or approval of the report in the case of mishap board investigations), the responsible program/project or directorate organization shall develop the CAP (or further develop the proposed CAP in the case of MIBs) and enter it into the NASA IRIS database. The CAP shall provide corrective action(s) for the root cause(s) identified, and for all other contributing factors to the mishap or close call. The CAP shall provide a description of the corrective action(s), and identify (to the lowest level possible) the organization(s) responsible for implementation and the organization(s) responsible for ensuring completion the action item(s). In the case where there are no corrective actions that could reasonably be taken, a statement stating this shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database. The program/project and S&MA Division is responsible for monitoring corrective actions activities for mishaps and close calls, and to determine if they are carried out according to plan.

10.8 LESSONS LEARNED

All mishaps and close calls shall be evaluated for any lessons learned. When the evaluation results in lessons learned, then the lessons learned shall be submitted to the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) in order to share this information and prevent recurrence. The LLIS is available to all NASA and NASA contractor personnel at http://llis.nasa.gov. Assistance in the use of this system can be obtained from the EA Directorate.

10.9 METRICS AND TREND ANALYSIS

10.9.1 Safety Statistics Record (SSR)

A Safety Statistics Record, KSC Form 6-22, shall be completed monthly by all KSC contractor organizations and submitted to the NASA S&MA Technical Management Office for use in developing Center-wide safety metrics. If adjustments, corrections or additions to a previous fiscal year's statistical data occur, an updated year-end SSR for the affected fiscal year shall be submitted.

10.9.2 Trend Analysis

All KSC program/project or directorate organizations shall perform regular analysis of safety-related mishap and metric data in order to identify trends requiring corrective or preventive actions.

10.10 MISHAPS INVOLVING PAYLOAD CUSTOMERS, RESIDENT OFFICE PERSONNEL AND OFFICIAL VISITORS

For mishaps exclusively affecting non-KSC Civil Service or Contractor personnel or property (i.e., personnel who are conducting official business on KSC but who are not NASA/KSC Civil Servants or Contractors), KSC will provide initial response, medical services and control of the mishap scene. In this case, the investigation and reporting process will be determined by the appropriate Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Customer Agreement, or the organization's Center or corporate safety office. These mishaps will not be counted as NASA/KSC mishaps unless otherwise stated by a formal agreement. The appropriate NASA/KSC program/project and S&MA Directorate shall be provided insight into the investigation and be provided courtesy copies of the final mishap report.

CHAPTER 11: SAFETY PROGRAM (SUPPLEMENTS NPR 8715.3, NASA GENERAL SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS)

11.1 Safety Enforcement

Each contractor's safety program shall contain provisions for compliance with and enforcement of safety requirements. A means of auditing and enforcing these requirements shall be developed and maintained.

11.2 Safety Program Documentation

Facility Inspection Summary - Program/project or S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division shall identify potential hazards at least annually. The operating organizations shall keep the following information:

- a. Facility name and building number
- b. Date inspected
- c. Hazards identified from the inspection
- d. Status of hazards Open/Closed

11.3 Safety Statistics

All program/project or directorate organizations shall submit a SSR (KSC Form 6-22) per the provisions of Section 10.9.1 of this document.

CHAPTER 12: KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NFPA 70, NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE

12.1 GROUNDING AND BONDING

All sources of static electricity discharges shall be grounded when such discharge would create an unsafe situation. Tank cars, storage tanks, connecting pipes, hose lines, and nozzles shall be bonded together prior to the loading or unloading of flammable materials. Where propellants are stored or handled, facilities shall be provided for personnel to dissipate static charges from their person.

12.1.1 Personnel Grounding

Personnel grounding devices (e.g., legstats, wristats, conductive footwear) shall be worn by all personnel handling Category A electro-explosive devices (EED) when the Faraday caps are removed, or installing Category B items on/in units that will be Category A when the installation is complete, or when working within five (5) feet of exposed solid grain. When using legstats, personnel must stand on a conductive surface and use legstats in pairs to ensure one foot remains in contact with the ground at all times. Personnel required to wear these devices shall ensure resistance checks are performed using a conductive shoe tester prior to operations. The resistance measured from facility ground to the wearer must be between 10,000 ohms and 1 megohm. Reverification of grounding will be necessary if personnel remove their conductive shoes, legstats, wristats, or leave the immediate area where the operation is taking place. The grounding devices shall be removed upon leaving the ordnance operation area. Personnel will exercise caution to avoid all electrical sources when wearing personal grounding devices.

12.1.2 Grounding of Flight Hardware

- a. The Orbiter shall be electrically grounded at all times.
- b. After moving an External Tank (ET) between the Turn Basin and the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), the ET transporter static ground strap shall be connected to VAB ground.
- c. The forward assembly/aft skirt shall be connected to facility ground except when transporting. Forward assembly/aft skirt to pallet to transporter ground shall be maintained during moves.
- d. A payload or canister containing explosives or hazardous fluids shall be grounded to facility ground upon arrival at the facility/handling mechanism.

12.1.3 Grounding of Tools, Equipment, and Materials

- a. Pneumatic (air motor) tools used on hardware containing EEDs, within 10 feet of open grain, or in petroleum/oil/lubricant areas shall be fitted with a conductive air supply hose or be connected to facility ground. Conductive air supply hoses shall be included in a scheduled preventive maintenance program that shall test and verify continuity.
- b. The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) transporter shall be grounded to facility ground at all times when moving in or out from under a segment. When moving a loaded segment, the transporter shall be grounded prior to entering (or until after exiting) a building. The transporter shall not

enter a building at the Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility (RPSF) without being grounded. Segment to pallet to transporter ground shall be maintained during moves.

- c. All material in contact with open grain shall be grounded.
- d. For horizontal SRM segment grain inspection the first pad shall be grounded prior to installation. Subsequent pads shall be butted/ overlapped to ensure electrical continuity of pads.
- e. Conductive plastic sheeting (velostat) shall be placed on railcar surface at entrance to the bore. Sheeting shall be grounded to common ground with railcar prior to installation.
- 12.1.4 Grounding During Hoisting of Flight Hardware

When explosives and/or flammable fluids are involved, electrical grounding shall be required as follows:

- a. Ground crane hook to facility ground (same potential as the load) before connecting to the load
- b. Use bonding strap from load to hook when satisfactory contact (continuity) is not obtained.
- c. The ground may be disconnected after the load is lifted clear of its supporting structure, but shall be reconnected to facility ground as soon as possible while the load is still suspended.
- d. The final ground /detachment shall be at least 10 feet away from any open grain/explosives.
- e. Voltage checks on the crane hooks shall be performed prior to lifting flight hardware containing explosives. During the voltage checks, neither of the voltages (AC nor DC) may exceed 100-mV Root-Mean-Square (RMS) measured across a 1-ohm resistor. The voltage checks shall be performed while operating the crane; all crane motions shall be checked. Crane hook voltage checks shall not be required for lifting of other hazardous commodities providing the crane hook and load are properly grounded.
- f. All grounding devices shall be checked to ensure proper resistance prior to payload canister lift.

12.2 THREE-PHASE POWER CONNECTIONS

- 12.2.1 Three-phase power sequencing shall be verified in each KSC facility prior to connection, including after facility modification or outages.
- 12.2.2 The phasing of the power source shall be verified prior to each closure of the payload canister transporter shore power contactor switch. The phasing of the payload canister transporter systems and subsystems shall be verified upon first use or component replacement.

CHAPTER 13: NASA KSC REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUND-BASED VESSELS AND PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS (PV/S)

13.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Chapter is to assign responsibilities and to ensure the structural integrity of PV/S through implementation of the minimum requirements for ground-based PV/S in accordance with this document, NASA-STD-8719.17, NASA Requirements for Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems (PV/S), NASA General Safety Program Requirements, applicable Federal Regulations, and national consensus codes and standards (NCS).

13.2 APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this Chapter apply to all KSC organizational elements and to their associated contractors and subcontractors; and to all other personnel who design, own, or operate pressure vessels or pressurized systems at KSC, or on property managed by KSC.

13.3 SCOPE

This Chapter defines organizational responsibilities for all ground based equipment designed for, or operating at, positive or negative gauge pressure, defines items excluded from certification requirements, contains specific criteria for inspection, analysis, documentation, testing, nondestructive examinations, marking and labeling of pressure vessels and pressurized systems, and provides reporting data input requirements.

13.4 DEFINITIONS

Pressure Vessel/Systems (PV/S)-related definitions are included in the glossary.

13.5 POLICY

It is KSC policy that all ground-based Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems (PV/S) which are not excluded per 13.17 of this Chapter shall be certified/recertified in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2; ASME B31.3 Code for Pressure Piping; and ANSI/NB-23 National Board Inspection Code. Additionally, all pressure vessels and pressurized systems shall comply with KSC design standards KSC-STD-Z-0005 through KSC-STD-Z-0009. All PV/S shall be safe to operate and be subject to Inservice Inspection (ISI) and periodic recertification to maintain personnel and equipment safety. The following criterion applies:

- 13.5.1 All new PV/S shall be designed, fabricated, installed, operated, maintained, certified, and recertified in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and guides. For existing PV/S which do not conform to these codes, standards, and guides, supplemental analyses, tests, examinations and risk assessments shall be performed to ensure that the safety of personnel, equipment, and facilities is not compromised.
- 13.5.2 Periodic inspection and maintenance activities shall be specified and documented throughout the usage history of the PV/S. Inspection procedures shall be developed on the basis of established codes and standards or as the result of engineering evaluation.

- 13.5.3 In instances where policies set forth in this Attachment are in conflict with KSC pressure systems design criteria and specifications (e.g., KSC-STD-Z-0005), the more stringent requirement shall prevail.
- 13.5.4 Operation of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) systems will be within the manufacture's placard limitations.

13.6 RESPONSIBILITIES

13.6.1 HEADS OF PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS

Heads of program/project or directorate organizations having Design, Operation and Maintenance (O&M), or sustaining engineering responsibility, are responsible for ensuring that:

- a. Design and modification of pressurized systems for use at KSC, or where KSC has design, O&M, or sustaining engineering responsibility are in accordance with current national consensus codes, standards, and guidelines.
- b. Necessary documentation to support the certification program is received for all new pressure vessels, pressurized systems, and all systems being modified, and that such documentation is transmitted to the cognizant O&M organizations and to the KSC Pressure Systems Manager (PSM) via the Document Release Authority (DRA). The document shall also be available through the KSC Electronic Documentation System (KEDS).
- c. Field surveys are performed to verify PV/S are properly categorized and included or excluded in the PV/S certification program, as appropriate.
- d. An inventory database is updated and maintained for pressure vessels and systems. This includes all PV/S that are inactive and active, and those that are exempt from the PV/S Certification Program. For systems excluded from the PV/S Certification Program, documentation should be maintained indicating the rationale for exclusion from certification.
- e. A data management system for maintaining files containing the certification/re-certification and ISI documentation required to certify each vessel or system.
- f. All PV/S are marked or labeled for traceability in the certification program.
- g. Review of existing documentation is performed to determine suitability to support certification, and missing documentation is obtained or developed.
- h. A 20-year ISI plan is developed and implemented.
- i. A certification report describing all of the steps involved, along with the rationale for certifying pressure vessels and systems for continued service is provided.
- j. Training requirements for personnel working on pressure vessels and systems are established.
- k. An individual is assigned to represent the program/project or directorate organization in all matters relating to the PV/S certification program and is identified to the PSM per a letter assigning the individual to the Pressure Vessels/Systems Committee.

NOTE: The above responsibilities do not apply to the Director of International Space Station/Payload Processing for payload-associated Ground Support Equipment (GSE) supplied by other NASA centers and government agencies. This equipment is covered by KSC Procedural Requirements (KHB) 1700.7 or Eastern Western Range (EWR) 127-1 (1997) or AFSPCMAN 91-710 V3.

13.6.2 KSC PRESSURE SYSTEMS MANAGER (PSM)

The PSM is responsible for:

- a. Assuring that necessary documentation to support the certification program is maintained on all systems owned or operated by KSC or its contractors. For systems excluded from the PV/S Certification Program, documentation should be maintained indicating the rationale for exclusion from certification.
- b. Reviewing and approving PV/S certification criteria for special cases not covered in this Attachment: reviewing certification implementation schedules, defining required documentation, analysis, inspection, testing, nondestructive examination, and reporting requirements for pressure vessels and pressurized systems.
- c. Evaluating proposed waivers, deviations, and variances involving PV/S, covered by the certification program.
- d. Evaluating exclusion criteria and approving exclusions other than those listed in Paragraph 13.18.
- e. Reviewing disposition (i.e., de-rate, re-rate, repair, alterations, decommission) of all pressure vessels or systems that do not meet inspection or testing requirements.
- f. Reviewing, as necessary, hazardous and non-hazardous inspection and test procedures utilized by the certification program, to assure adequacy of safety considerations.
- g. Reviewing and approving supplemental analysis, tests, procedures, and examinations, as necessary.
- h. Maintaining a baseline inventory/status of all PV/S for which KSC has design or operational responsibility. This includes vessels/systems that are exempt from certification and the rationale for exclusion.
- i. Reviewing, evaluating, and have readily available all PV/S certification and inservice inspection (ISI) reports.

13.7 PRESSURE VESSELS AND PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS (PV/S) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

13.7.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

a. The PSM has the authority to interpret this standard. (This is not to be interpreted as authority to change or waive the requirements of this document)

- b. Ground-based PV/S listed in Appendix A of this Attachment shall be exempt from the certification requirements of this KNPR.
- c. PV/S shall meet the requirements of State and Local Boiler and Pressure Vessel Statutes unless exclusive Federal laws and regulations apply (e.g., 29 CFR 1910). In the event of a conflict between this document and applicable statutes or regulations, the statutes or regulations govern.
- d. All PV/S shall be certified, recertified, and documented in accordance with the requirements of NPD 8710.5, NASA-STD-8719.17, and this KNPR. The Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP), Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP), temperature range, and other service conditions shall be documented for each PV/S in the certification report.
- e. Compliance with the requirements of this document shall be documented and approved by the PSM in accordance with 13.15.0, Certification/recertification Requirements. PV/S are designated as "Certified" when the PSM has reviewed and signed the certification report.
- f. A periodic inspection plan shall be developed and performed for all PV/S in accordance with 13. 10. or Figure E-3 of this KNPR.
- g. The original service life or remaining safe life of each PV/S shall be documented at the time of certification or re-certification based on relevant failure modes, cyclic service history, rates of degradation, damage mechanisms, or other appropriate factors.
- 1. All conditions that cause changes in the current estimate of remaining life shall be assessed and documented, with appropriate modification to the inspection and recertification plans of record, in accordance with paragraph 13.12.6 of this document.
- 2. Potential damage mechanisms shall be identified and evaluated, including but not limited to fatigue, creep, and corrosion.
- h. Initial certification shall be given only after all known safety-related discrepancies have been corrected. Non-safety related discrepancies shall be dispositioned and corrected in conjunction with regularly scheduled maintenance.
- i. PV/S shall be pressurized only after initial certification is complete, with the exception of pressurization that may be required for initial integrity testing of the PV/S.
- j. Systems requiring a pressure regulator and/or a pressure relief device or both shall not be operated unless such components are in place and operating properly.
- k. When systems of different pressure ratings are connected, a relief device shall protect each section of the system. In those cases where the maximum regulator inlet pressure exceeds the design pressure of the section downstream of the regulator, the relief device shall be set no higher than the MAWP and be sized to prevent the pressure from rising more than 10 percent above the design pressure.
- I. PV/S that do not meet applicable NCS, guides, and regulations shall only be certified and allowed to operate if a risk and hazard assessment has been performed, the owner acceptance of residual risk has been documented, and the Center approval has been formally documented by means of a variance in accordance with 13. 17 of this document.

- m. Inactive vessels shall comply with 13.14, Inactive Systems.
- n. Vessels and systems on standby/contingency, either with or without pressure, should be treated as if they are in continuous service, and the certification of such PV/S shall be maintained to conform to expected service conditions.
- o. A change in the service of a PV/S shall require evaluation for applicability of the original Code for the new service, possible application of a new Code appropriate to the new service, and possible reevaluation in accordance with the applicable NCS.
- p. PV/S shall be exposed only to those fluids that have been demonstrated to be compatible with the vessel or system materials.
- q. A vessel or system that has been de-rated shall be re-rated to the original or new operational parameters only after appropriate testing, examination, repair, alteration, modification, documentation, and engineering analysis.
- r. Program/project or directorate organizations that process spacecraft, missiles or launch vehicle systems with one or more Graphite/Epoxy (Gr/Ep) or Kevlar/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) shall be required to submit data that demonstrates the requirements in section 13.18 have been met.
- s. Pressure systems shall always be depressurized before disconnection, repairs, or replacements are attempted.
- t. PV/S used to transport fluids and gases under pressure shall comply with Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 100 185 or ASME Section XII regulations, as applicable. Non-DOT vessels may be transported with a blanket purge not to exceed 25 psi or 1/5 MOP (which ever is less) for relocation; after relocation the pressure vessels shall be recertified.
- u. Relief valve, pressure relieving device, exhausts, and other vents shall incorporate appropriate means of reacting to thrust loads, including balanced thrust ("zero thrust") vent tees and structural supports as appropriate.
- 13.7.2 DESIGN, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
- a. Operate all PV/S within the certification parameters.
- b. The owner shall maintain change and modification records of PV/S.
 - NOTE: This may be used to identify problem components or PV/S trends.
- c. The owner shall report to the PSM any PV/S incidents within 8 hours of occurrence and shall perform corrective actions as required by the PSM.
- d. The owner shall have certified and qualified personnel operating the system.
- e. The owner shall collect operational data as required to support certification/ recertification of PV/S and provide the data to the PSM as required to facilitate certification/recertification.

NOTE: Some areas of concern are cyclic operation, corrosion, erosion, and creep.

- f. The owner shall operate and maintain boilers in accordance with recommendations of the boiler manufacturer, including water quality. In some cases, due to operational, environmental, or other parameters, maintenance procedures in addition to the manufacturer's recommendations may be necessary.
- g. The owner shall maintain PV/S and their components in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations or with a suitable maintenance plan to ensure continued compliance with the certification/recertification. In some cases, due to operational, environmental, or other parameters, maintenance procedures in addition to the manufacturer's recommendations may be necessary.
- h. The owner shall not operate PV/S unless certified, except for inspection, examination, and testing as required by the NCS or the inspection plan. Maximum operating pressure under these conditions shall be determined by the cognizant design organization.

13.8 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

The Contractor program/project or directorate organization shall prepare and maintain certification files for each vessel or systems under its jurisdiction. If the required original documentation is not available, it shall be re-created to the maximum extent possible. The following documentation shall be required and shall be released in the appropriate documentation centers (KEDS) or Technical or Engineering Documentation Center (TDC/EDC):

13.8.1 PRESSURE VESSELS

- a. Manufacturer's drawings: The drawings shall be either certified shop fabrication drawings or as-built drawings.
- b. In addition to certified shop fabrication drawings or as-built drawings manufacture's drawing, the drawings or certification/re-certification report shall also contain the following:
- c. Manufacturer's name and address.
- d. Date of manufacture (see vessel nameplate).
- e. Dimensions and details of construction.
- f. Design and operating conditions, including service fluid, operating temperature, and MAWP.
- g. Material thickness (head, shell, etc.).
- h. Material corrosion allowance.
- i. Identification of materials, including types of alloys, tensile properties, and impact properties.
- j. Efficiency of weld joints.
- k. Nondestructive Examination (NDE) performed.

- I. Types of pressure tests performed.
- m. Design calculations Design calculations for pressure vessels shall include MAWP, temperature, wind, vibration, and any other applicable loading.
- n. Manufacturer's data report(s) (ASME Forms U-1, U-1A, U-2, U-2A, U-3, U-4, A-1, A-2, A-3 as applicable.)
- o. Inspection, examination, and test records.
- p. Facsimile of nameplate stamping.

13.8.2 PRESSURE SYSTEMS

- a. End-to-end system drawings, including schematics, which show (as a minimum) system operating pressures, safety device set pressures, and line sizes and wall thickness of piping or tubing. Part numbers traceable to the manufacturer shall identify all pressurized components. For existing systems where components cannot be positively identifiable, such components shall only remain in service, provided a review of fabrication and installation drawings, maintenance records, manufacturer's data, etc., verifies proper components are installed.
- b. KSC component specification drawing, component maintenance drawing, or equivalent, or vendor data for each unique pressurized component in the system suitable for verifying pressure rating, materials of construction, flow parameters, operating characteristics, and relief device capacity to maintain system pressure within ASME Code allowable limits.
- c. Approved operating or preventive maintenance procedures that describe requirements for periodic system maintenance and testing, relief device and pressure gage setting and calibration criteria, and flex hose inspection and test criteria.
- 13.8.3 REPAIRED, ALTERED, OR MODIFIED SYSTEMS AND/OR VESSELS
- a. Alterations or repairs to vessels and system modifications shall be thoroughly documented in the appropriate system certification file, and released into KEDS.
- b. Vessel alteration or repair documentation shall include calculations, drawings, specifications, NDE reports, and other pertinent documentation, as applicable by this document and the National Board Inspection Code, NBIC-23.
- c. Any vessel or system that is altered, repaired or modified shall be recertified. A revised certification report shall be issued that describes the alterations, repairs, or modifications.

13.9 TESTING REQUIREMENTS

13.9.1 GENERAL

a. All new, repaired, or modified systems or portions thereof, shall be pressure and leak tested prior to activation. Testing of pressure systems shall be in accordance with applicable NCS and equipment technical manuals.

- b. Leaks shall not be repaired when a system is under pressure or the test fluid has not been drained.
- c. Test record for each pressure vessel shall include the manufacturer's data (e.g., design specification, applicable code for design, test/inspection criteria, operating instructions, location of any dimensional check points, and installation information).

13.9.2 NON-FLIGHT PRESSURE VESSEL

New pressure vessels shall be pressure tested by the manufacturer in accordance with the applicable code. For ASME Code vessels, this test shall be one time only. All repairs, alterations and retest of ASME Code vessels shall be in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/NB-23. Vessels designed per 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) shall be retested/requalified in accordance with 49 CFR requirements. Where 49 CFR regulations do not specify retest, a retest procedure shall be developed.

13.9.3 FLIGHT VEHICLE VESSELS AND SYSTEMS

Pressure vessels and systems that have been pressurized to operating pressure as complete systems prior to delivery to KSC shall require further testing as part of the receiving inspection/ acceptance activity. Retest shall be performed only as specified in approved Technical Operating Procedure (TOP).

- a. Flight Vehicle Fracture Critical Vessels and Systems
- 1. Space Shuttle Program/International Space Station (SSP/ISS) Pressure vessels that are controlled as fracture critical shall be tested/pressurized to levels specified in the appropriate Fracture Mechanics Plan and JSC 08934, "Shuttle Operational Data Book," Volume I, "Shuttle Systems Performance and Constraints Data."
- 2. Pressure vessels and systems shall be processed through turnaround flow at temperature adjusted operating pressures, only if the operating pressures are sufficiently below the threshold pressures to avoid sub-critical flaw growth. The MAWP shall be specified in the applicable operating procedure.
- 3. Fracture critical controlled vessels/systems shall be pressurized to operating pressures, using specified liquids/gases, without remote controls, only if the vessels/systems have been previously pressurized to operating pressure levels.
- 4. A logbook shall be maintained on each Fracture Mechanics controlled pressure vessel/system processed at KSC. The log shall identify how many times the vessel/system has been pressurized, the pressure levels, liquids/gases used, duration of the pressure cycles, and any other pertinent data. The log shall also identify the total number of cycles for which the vessel/system was designed.
- 5. A logbook shall be maintained for each PV/S processed at KSC. The log shall identify how many times the vessel/system has been pressurized, the pressurization levels, fluids used, duration of the pressure cycles, and any other pertinent data. The log shall also identify the design criteria used in fabricating the vessel/system.
- b. Flight Vehicle Non-Fracture Critical Vessels and Systems

- 1. PVS shall not be pressurized above 50 percent of design burst pressure, adjusted for temperature.
- 2. PV/S shall be processed through turnaround flow at pressure levels not to exceed 50 percent of design burst pressure, adjusted for temperature, if warranted by operational considerations.
- 3. PV/S that have not been tested as a system prior to delivery to KSC shall require personnel evacuation and remote controls for the initial (first-time) pressurization and for any subsequent pressurization that will exceed the highest level of pressure reached during previous testing as a system.
- 4. PV/S shall be pressurized using fluids specified in JSC 08934, "Shuttle Operational Data Book," Volume I, "Shuttle Systems Performance and Constraints Data." Pressurization levels specified herein shall not exceed those specified in JSC 08934, Volume I.
- 13.9.4 For flight vehicle systems utilizing both fracture critical and non-fracture critical pressure vessels, pressurization at KSC shall be performed at pressure levels that do not exceed that allowed for the weakest link in the system. The lowest design pressure in the system shall be used as the basis for the pressure to be applied.
- 13.9.5 Any pressurization of systems or components above 25 percent of design burst will require a minimum 200-foot control area when the system or component contains hazardous fluids.

13.10 INSERVICE INSPECTION (ISI) AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

- 13.10.1 The operating organization shall develop a 20-year ISI and test plan consistent with intervals recommended in the applicable NCS and this standard.
- 13.10.2 The operating organization shall perform an external visual examination (VE) or "walk-down" of vessels and systems. For vessels at space vehicle launch pads or other locations that are subject to severe environmental conditions, including exposure to solid rocket exhaust products, shock, and vibration from the launch environment, the external visual examination interval shall not exceed two years. For other vessels not exposed to such extreme conditions, the external visual examination may be extended to no more than 5 years. This "walk-down" is to determine the overall fitness for service, identify any deficiencies that may have compromised the PV/S or any configuration changes, etc. or more frequently if indicated by the ISI.
- 13.10.3 DOT 49 CFR containers used as stationary vessels shall be inspected as defined in DOT 49 CFR regulation. In the event 49 CFR does not specify periodic visual inspection, inspection intervals for DOT 49 CFR vessels shall not exceed 1 year.
- 13.10.4 The ISI plan shall be developed based on the evaluation of the documentation, field inspection results, NDE results, and the engineering evaluation.
- 13.10.5 When a 20-year ISI plan has been prepared by a previous operating organization, the current operating organization shall be responsible for implementing and updating the ISI plan.
- 13.10.6 The ISI data sheet shall be presented in either a tabular or matrix format in the certification report. A sample ISI Form is shown in Figure E-3.

- 13.10.7 The ISI plan shall provide development rationale in the certification report.
- 13.10.8 It shall be permissible to conduct the ISI in conjunction with routine system maintenance, where appropriate.
- 13.10.9 Inspection intervals for all relevant damage mechanisms shall be specified in the inspection plan consistent with intervals recommended in the applicable NCS and this standard.
- 13.10.10 The NDE inspection frequency for fatigue-limited PV/S shall be not more than one half the Code allowable cyclic fatigue life, which is established either by postulating a minimum detectable flaw size using appropriate NDE method(s) to determine remaining life cycles up to reaching critical flaw size or by using the cumulative cyclic usage factor and Stress Number (S/N) diagram approach of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Div. 2, or other applicable NCS.
- 13.10.11 Inservice inspections shall be performed to obtain sufficient data to ensure that unanticipated forms or rates of degradation, service changes, or other factors have not changed the remaining life.
- 13.10.12 Personnel performing inspections and tests shall be appropriately qualified and certified as applicable in accordance with the appropriate NCS.
- 10.13 Baseline thickness shall be verified for all PV/S subject to wall thinning as the limiting damage mechanism prior to initial operation or certification. For pressure vessels, measurements shall be taken on the head and wall considering the service fluid, operating environment, and projected service life. In no case shall the verification interval exceed 20 years.
 - NOTE: If questionable areas are found during the Visual Examination, further examination by NDE techniques shall be performed using techniques that do not compromise vessel or system integrity.
- 13.10.13 Inservice corrosion rate thickness inspections shall be determined by the PV/S integrity assessment.
- 13.10.14 PV/S whose service life is limited by fatigue or brittle fracture shall have fatigue inspections performed no later than when the PV/S has experienced one-half of the specified number of permissible load cycles.
- 13.10.15 Inspection intervals shall be reviewed and adjusted throughout the life of a PV/S to incorporate safety related Code changes, unanticipated rates of degradation, change in service fluid, operating pressure or temperature, or other relevant factors.
- 13.10.16 Records of inspection shall be maintained for the life of the pressure vessel, and for 1 year after the vessel is decommissioned, and disposed of in accordance with KNPR 4000.1, Supply Support Manual. After vessel disposal, the records will be archived per NPR 1441.1.
- 13.10.17 Vessels designed for permanent installation shall be re-inspected anytime they are moved to a different location.

- 13.10.18 The inner vessel of cryogenic (jacketed) vessels and other insulated storage vessels are exempt from the visual examination requirements, provided the pressure retaining boundary is protected from corrosion and leakage is not indicated.
- 13.10.19 Maintain verification that pressure relief devices (PRDs) i.e. relief valves, pressure indicating devices (gages), are in a periodic inspection or recall program. Frequency of inspection or recall is to be based on design and safety standards, codes, and severity of service.
- 13.10.20 Verify system operating pressures, relief device settings, line sizes, and wall thickness, and component pressure ratings are in accordance with approved documentation.
- 13.10.21 Verify that all components and piping and tubing are properly identified. Also verify from vendor drawings or data sheets that all components have been hydrostatically or pneumatically tested.
- 13.10.22 All system and vessel examination intervals specified above are the maximum allowed. When service and environmental conditions, age, and additional concerns arise during analysis and evaluation, a more frequent examination interval may be established. This could result in a shorter recertification interval than would be developed for a similar PV/S with no identified concerns.
- 13.10.23 All changes in service fluids, operating pressure or temperature, all repair records, and conditions found during inspections shall be included in the inspection record. The inspection record must show as a minimum, MAWP, the last date of inspection, and hydrostatic/pneumatic test pressure, and test date(s).

13.11 MARKING AND IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Marking and labeling requirements shall conform to the applicable design specifications, codes, standards, and fabrication and installation drawings. ASME Code terminology shall continue to be used until metric units are incorporated into the ASME Code. Vessels and components shall be identified by unique identifiers (find numbers) that are traceable to the mechanical schematic drawing (refer to GP-435, Vol. 1, paragraphs 2.5.2 and 6.6.1).

13.11.1 GROUND-BASED OR GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) PRESSURE VESSELS

- a. Manufacturer's Nameplate Manufacturer nameplates vary with regards to type, size, location and contents but generally contain the following: MAWP or Design Pressure (D.P.), Temperature Range, Capacity, Material, Media, Model Number or Serial Number and other Information. For ASME stamped vessels, the National Board Number shall be included if the vessel was registered with the National Board. .

 Nameplates must be accessible and legible.
- b. The MAWP and Name of Service Fluid Must be displayed on the vessel in a conspicuous location. Where multiple vessels are grouped together to store the same fluid at the same pressure, only the most conspicuous vessel in the group need be labeled. The marking shall be legible at a distance of 16 meters (50 feet).

- c. Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) MOP designation use is optional. Utilization is generally reserved for those applications where the maximum operating pressure used with a given pressure vessel is lower than the vessel's capability or MAWP. When used, the MOP shall be displayed on the vessel in a conspicuous location. Where multiple vessels are grouped together to store the same fluid at the same pressure, only the most conspicuous vessel in the group need be labeled. The marking, which may be somewhat larger than that for the MAWP, shall be legible at a distance of 16 meters (50 feet).
- d. Find Number (Axxxxxx) The KSC-unique, alphanumeric identifier designated by stencil or corrosion-resistant, metal tag. May be grouped together on conspicuous signage in cases where vessels are banked together.
- e. KSC PV/S Certification Program Nameplate Each certified pressure vessel should have a corrosion-resistant plate, tag or stenciled sign permanently affixed as near as possible to the original manufacturer's name-plate, bearing the following information as a minimum:

"KSC PV/S CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, CERTIFIED MAWP xxxx psig," and "CERTIFICATION DATE (Month and Year)."

13.11.2 PANELS

a. RELIEF VALVES

Each relief valve shall be labeled or tagged to include the following:

- 1. Set pressure in psig
- 2. Date (month/year) valve was set or calibrated
- 3. Find Number
- 4. Next due date (month/year)
- 5. Manufacturer's nameplate

NOTE: The pressure shown shall be the nominal pressure, exclusive of any tolerance, specified by appropriate engineering directive. Also, each relief valve will a Find Number on the panel front (plate) next to the relief valve schematic symbol or the panel back (ink-stamp or tag).

b. PRESSURE GAGES

Each pressure gage that is periodically recalibrated shall have a calibration sticker affixed to the gage dial or cover/lens to include the following:

- 1. Calibration date (month/year)
- 2. Next due date (month year)
- 3. Unique ID Number

Also, each pressure gage will have a Find Number on the panel front (plate) next to the relief valve schematic symbol or the panel back (ink-stamp or tag).

c. TRANSDUCERS

Each transducer that is periodically recalibrated shall have a calibration sticker affixed to the body of the instrument or to an identification tag which will include the following:

- 1. Calibration date (month/year)
- 2. Next due date (month/year)
- 3. Unique ID Number

Also, each transducer will have a Find Number on panel front (plate) next to the transducer schematic symbol or the panel back (ink-stamp or tag).

d. PANEL TUBING

Identification tag is required on each tube assembly letter with:

- 1. Tube size
- 2. Test Pressure
- 3. Test Date
- 4. Other miscellaneous information required by controlling system design specification.
- 5. Direction of flow

The identification shall consist of a metal band secured around the tube or a tag secured by safety wire. For long runs of pipe, a second tag may be affixed.

e. MISCELLANEOUS COMPONENTS

Miscellaneous components (hand valves, check valves, regulators, filters, etc.) shall, as a minimum, be marked or identified with a Find Number. This marking will consist of a Find Number on panel front (plate)/back (ink-stamping or tag).

f. PANEL FACE MARKING

Each panel front (face) shall be marked with a one-line schematic representing commodity flow, panel inlets and outlets, schematic symbols, respective component Find Numbers, etc. Also, each panel front will have signage indicating such descriptive information as panel title, drawing number, program model number, etc as required by respective design specification.

13.11.3 INTERCONNECTING PIPING, TUBING, AND IN-LINE COMPONENTS

Interconnecting piping and tubing shall be marked to indicate commodity, direction of flow, and nominal operating pressure in accordance with respective design specifications. In-line components shall, as a minimum, be marked or identified with a Find Number. If these components are pressure gages or transducers, the marking requirements of 11.2.2 and 11.2.3 of this section apply.

13.11.4 FLEX HOSES

- a. All flex hose assemblies <u>in use</u> shall have corrosion-resistant metal tag(s) attached that bears the following information as a minimum:
- 1. Date (month and year) of Fabrication

- 2. Hydrostatic Test Date (month and year)
- 3. Current, Periodic Visual Inspection and Next Due Date (month and year)
- 4. Manufacturer's Name, Part Number and/or KSC Part Number
- 5. Rated Working Pressure
- 6. Serial Number (S/N)
- 7. Service Media (Only for dedicated fluid hoses in support of any oxygen, hydrocarbon or hypergolic liquid system.)
- 8. For Type I hoses, a Find Number
- b. All new or refurbished flex hose assemblies <u>in inventory</u>, <u>under the control of a Logistics organization</u>, shall have corrosion-resistant metal tag(s) attached that bears the following information as a minimum:
- 1. Date (month and year) of Fabrication
- 2. Hydrostatic Test Date (month and year)
- 3. Manufacturer's Name, Part Number and/or KSC Part Number
- 4. Rated Working Pressure
- 5. Serial Number (S/N)

NOTE: Commercial off-the-shelf equipment which contains flex hoses, and is approved by Underwriter's Laboratory (UL), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or other safety certifying organizations, shall be exempt from these requirements.

13.11.5 MARKING REQUIREMENTS - PORTABLE AND MOBILE PRESSURE SYSTEMS

KSC owned portable and mobile pressure vessels and systems shall be marked in accordance with KSC Drawing 81K04331, "Specification for Marking of Propellant Portable Containers," or in accordance with KSC Drawing 81K00643, "Specification for Marking of Mobile GSE." Other portable and mobile pressure systems shall be marked in accordance with 49 CFR requirements for hazardous materials

13.11.6 NON-CODE PRESSURE VESSELS AND PRESSURE SYSTEMS

Code pressure vessels that have been re-designated as non-code shall be clearly and visibly marked to indicate the non-code status, and the lettering shall be legible up to a distance of 16 meters (50 feet).

13.12 ENGINEERING ANALYSIS

The program/project or directorate organization shall perform an engineering analysis at recertification to determine the disposition of the system or vessel(s). Possible choices for disposition include:

- 13.12.1 Certifying the system or vessel(s) for continued operation.
- 13.12.2 Certifying the system or vessel(s) for continued operation with specific restrictions imposed.
- 13.12.3 Re-rating or de-rating the system or vessel(s) for operation at a new pressure or temperature.

- 13.12.4 Replacing components or portions of the system, after which it may be certified for continued operation.
- 13.12.5 Removing the system or vessel(s) from service.
- 13.12.6 PV/S INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT, REMAINING LIFE
- a. PV/S INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
- 1. Integrity assessment of each PV/S shall be performed and documented at the time of certification or recertification.
- 2. Integrity assessment shall be consistent with the methodologies identified in the appropriate post-construction NCS.
- 3. The PV/S integrity assessment shall include an inspection plan that addresses credible damage mechanisms for the specific PV/S.
- 4. Verification of integrity of each in-service PV/S shall be documented at each periodic inspection interval as specified in the inspection plan in compliance with the appropriate NCS.
- 5. If at any time a PV/S is not fit for the intended service, the PV/S shall be immediately removed from service and the certification of the PV/S shall be revoked.

 Comment: Integrity verification is achieved by meeting the requirements of this document and appropriate reference documents such as ANSI/NB-23. The period of re-inspection for each PV/S is to be based on maintaining a continuous state of compliance with these requirements.
- b. REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS
- 1. The original service life or remaining safe life of each PV/S shall be documented at the time of certification or recertification through a detailed integrity assessment based on nondestructive examination (NDE) and inspection results, relevant damage mechanisms, cyclic service history, rates of degradation, and other appropriate factors.
- 2. The engineering assessment for remaining life shall be consistent with methodologies of appropriate post-construction NCS.
- 3. The rate of service related or environmentally induced wall thinning of PV/S shall be documented by means of periodic thickness inspection, with appropriate adjustments made to the estimated remaining life, inspection plan, and recertification plan.
- 4. When PV/S service life is limited by fatigue considerations, NCS-based fatigue or fracture life assessment shall form the basis for specified cyclic life.
- 5. When NCS fatigue analysis is performed on PV/S that are not fully compliant with the NCS from which the technique is derived (e.g., when ASME Sect. VIII, Div. 2, fatigue analysis is performed on an ASME Sect. VIII, Div. 1, or non-Code vessel), an appropriate additional FS shall be applied to the allowable cyclic life based on the risk and hazard assessment.

NOTE: The fatigue life assessment methodology of ASME Section VIII, Div. 2, may be used to estimate fatigue life of Div. 1 vessels or non-Code vessels provided the allowable stress values from Div. 1 are substituted for Sm and appropriate consideration is given to the additional requirements imposed on Div 2 material, fabrication and inspection. Greater FS on cyclic life must be incorporated as uncertainty and unknowns increase. Similarly, the fracture assessment methodology of Div. 3 may be used to assess non-Div. 3 vessels provided additional consideration is given to uncertainties in stress intensity factors and fracture toughness for material that was not fully documented at the time of fabrication in accordance with Div. 3 requirements, which is typically the case for old PV/S.

- 6. Cyclic life usage shall be obtained from history files or logs or conservatively estimated and documented at the time of each periodic cyclic service inspection, with appropriate adjustments made to the estimated remaining cyclic life in the recertification plan.
- 7. Unless specifically documented in the original design, the certified remaining life of any PV/S shall not exceed 40 years, and the recertification period shall be in accordance with 13.15 of this document.
- 8. Service life extension analysis shall include, but is not limited to, consideration of the following:
- (a) Relevant characteristics of the PV/S as determined by the application of appropriate NDE and/or testing.
- (b) The fidelity of the NDE methods employed to locate relevant flaws.
- (c) Brittle fracture failure mode when actual service temperature may be less than the MDMT of the PV/S material using post-1988 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel or Piping Code rules for fracture toughness (e.g., UCS-66 rules in Section VIII, Div. 1).
- (d) If leak before break failure mode forms the basis of life extension, leak detection requirements shall be implemented and documented in the PV/S risk assessment

13.13 DESIGN, REPAIRS, ALTERATIONS, OR MODIFICATIONS

13.13.1 GENERAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

- a. The PV/S manufacturing or alteration shall be in strict accordance with the quality assurance manual of the manufacturing organization, applicable NCS and KSC design standards (KSC-STD-Z-000X).
- b. ASME Code stamped items shall only be repaired or altered by National Board (NB-23) certified organizations (for example "R" and "VR" stamp holders) in strict conformance with their approved quality manual
- c. The PSM shall review and approve new designs, alteration, modifications, repairs, and design analysis prior to start of PV/S construction.
- d. All welding shall be:

- 1. Performed in accordance with procedures qualified in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX, including all essential variables for the joint in question.
- 2. Performed by welders qualified and current in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX, on such weld procedures.
- 3. Post weld heat treatment shall be performed as required and in accordance with the ASME Code.
- 4. Alterations or repairs to vessels in lethal fluid service shall require all new butt welds to be radiographed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, Paragraph UW-2 (a).
- 5. Except as provided in 13.13.4.c.1.(b)2, impact and other testing shall be performed as required and in accordance with the ASME Code.
- 6. Inspections shall be performed by inspectors trained and certified in use of the techniques being applied, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V.

13.13.2 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW PV/S

All new ground-based conventional (i.e., non-flight) PV/S shall be designed, fabricated, assembled, erected, inspected, examined, and tested in accordance with the appropriate national consensus standards, codes, and regulations.

13.13.3 PRESSURE VESSELS FOR TRANSPORT OF PRESSURIZED FLUIDS

Pressure vessels used to transport fluids under pressure shall comply with the DOT regulations of 49 CFR 100-185 or ASME Section XII as applicable.

13.13.4 PRESSURE VESSELS NOT FOR TRANSPORT OF PRESSURZED FLUIDS

- a. New pressure vessels, including heat exchangers, shall be ASME Section VIII code stamped as specified within the scope of the Division being used and registered with the National Board.
- b. Vacuum vessels shall be ASME Section VIII code stamped and registered with the National Board except as provided in paragraphs 13.13.4.c, 13.4.d and 1318.1.h.1 of this KNPR.
- c. For new vacuum vessels, or alterations/repairs to existing vacuum vessels, operating in high vacuum service (internal pressure less than 10-3 torr) or in other cases involving only external atmospheric pressure (i.e., no external pressure greater than 14.7 psig) where specific operational needs make ASME Section VIII or NB-23 code stamping unfeasible, all of the requirements specified elsewhere in this document shall apply with the following exceptions (this paragraph is not to be construed to accept the purchase or use of non-code stamped vacuum vessels where there is not a specific overriding need):
- 1. No ASME "U" Stamp ("code stamp") or National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) "R" Stamp is required, however all documentation requirements of this document shall be met, except:

- (a) The ASME or NBIC Data Report shall be processed in all respects as for a code stamped vessel, but it shall not be submitted to the National Board, and the Certificate of Shop Inspection shall be signed either by a National Board commissioned inspector or by the PSM.
- (b) For industry standard components such as potted connectors and "Conflat" flanges used in strict accordance with the manufacturer's ratings and recommendations, material records and analysis are not required provided sufficient information regarding material is available to perform properly any welding or brazing processes required.

NOTE: This does not exclude from the ASME Code analysis requirement those industry standard components that are rated by their manufacturers only for external pressure and that require relief protection above a PRD setting of 2 psig (or less, if so specified by the manufacturer). If relief protection is required, bolting or other fasteners shall be analyzed in accordance with the ASME Code or other means acceptable to the PSM to determine that they have a positive pressure rating sufficient for the credible positive pressure scenarios.

- 2. Intermittent welds are permitted on nozzles and reinforcing pads, however an appropriate code equivalent analysis shall be performed to verify the adequacy of the weld design.
- 3. Nozzle reinforcement may be achieved using configurations other than those illustrated in ASME Section VIII, however adequacy of such designs shall be demonstrated by appropriate ASME Code equivalent analysis or testing.
- 4. The ASME Section VIII requirement for an internal pressure test (hydrostatic or pneumatic) may be replaced with a vacuum test to 1.5 times the specified pressure differential, but not to exceed an external pressure of 14.7 psig. This exception shall not be used in those cases where proof test is used in lieu of analysis if an overpressure of 1.5 times the maximum allowable working (differential) pressure is not attained.
- 5. Materials other than those specified for use in ASME Section VIII and its reference documents may be used, however their adequacy for the intended application shall be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the PSM.
- 6. Allowable stresses and other material properties for "non-code" materials shall be obtained following the approach and safety factors used in developing ASME Section VIII allowable stresses and other values.
- 7. ASME Code pressure relief capacity requirements shall be met for internal pressurization sources, but the relief device need not be UV stamped provided the set pressure is less than 15 psig.
- 8. If a vacuum vessel requires relief protection with PRD setting above 2 psig due to the nature of the potential pressurization source, the vessel pressure shell shall be structurally qualified in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section VIII, Division. 1.
- 9. If relief protection of any set pressure is required for a vacuum vessel due to attached pressure sources, bolting or other fasteners shall be analyzed in accordance with the ASME Code or other means acceptable to the PSM to determine that they have a positive pressure rating sufficient for the credible positive pressure scenarios.

- 10. The relief protection for all vacuum vessels attached to any positive pressure source shall be reviewed and approved by the PSM.
- d. The foregoing exceptions to the requirements of this document and of the ASME and NBIC Codes notwithstanding, and not reducing the effect of any other requirement of this document or of the ASME or NBIC Codes, specific note is made of the following requirements:
- e. Vacuum vessels shall be fabricated, repaired, or altered only by manufacturers having either an ASME "Code Stamp" (ASME "U" Authorization) or NBIC "R" Stamp, or that have been audited and determined by the PSM to have an equivalent quality assurance manual and process, including implementation.
- 13.13.5 BOILERS AND BOILER PIPING (ALSO SEE TABLE 6)
- a. Power boilers shall be ASME Section I code stamped and registered with the National Board.
- b. Power boiler piping shall meet ASME B31.1, Power Piping.
- c. Power boiler external piping shall be ASME code stamped.
- d. Heating boilers shall be ASME Section IV code stamped and registered with the National Board.
- 13.13.6 NON-BOILER PIPING SYSTEMS
- a. Process piping shall meet the requirements of ASME B31.3, Process Piping.
- b. Other piping shall meet the requirements of the most applicable ASME B31 series Code.
- 13.13.7 REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC COMPONENTS
- a. PRDs
- 1. PRD exhausts and other vents shall incorporate appropriate means of reacting to thrust loads, including balanced thrust ("zero thrust") vent tees and structural supports as appropriate.
- 2. The location, design, operating parameters, last test date, and due date for re-closable PRDs on each in-service PV/S shall be documented in the PV/S configuration management system.
 - NOTE: Redundant PRDs used only for operational pressure control below the MAWP of the PV/S are not subject to this requirement, provided the system is otherwise protected in accordance with the requirements of the applicable NCS.
- 3. Non-reclosable PRDs shall meet the requirements of paragraph 13.13.7.a.2 of this document with the exception of test date and due date.
- 4. Overpressure protection for PV/S shall be in accordance with the applicable NCS.
- 5. Overpressure protection devices for PV/S rated less than 15 psig shall have adequate relief capacity and set pressure tolerance.

- 6. The accuracy of the pressure set point of pressure safety valves (PRDs) shall be periodically retested, or the PRDs shall be replaced. The following retest intervals shall be used, consistent with the guidance of NB-23, Part RB:
- (a) Steam Systems Annually
- (b) Gas systems above 200 psi MAWP –annually, or if on a case-by-case basis inspections indicate the interval can be extended, but no less frequently than 3 years
- (c) PRDs in combination with rupture disks 5 years
- (d) Category M, corrosive, flammable, or toxic fluid systems 2 years (Note: This paragraph is not directly from NB-23.)
- (e) All others in accordance with Center procedures, but no more than 5 years.
- (f) Rupture disks need not be replaced periodically provided their vent spaces are inspected and confirmed unrestricted (e.g., free of debris) at the intervals listed above for PRDs.

NOTE: Because the normal failure of rupture disc is to fail below rated burst pressure, if it has been determined that such a failure will not result in an increased risk, manufacturer's recommended replacement periods may be increased.

- (g) Adjustments and repairs to Code stamped PRDs shall comply with the applicable NCS.
- (h) Adjustments and repairs to non-Code PRDs shall comply with the applicable NCS to the extent possible.
- (i) Pressure regulators shall not be used to provide overpressure protection to a PV/S.
- (j) Pressure safety relief valves shall only be used in accordance with the applicable ASME code of construction.
- (k) PV/S with an MAWP of less than 15 psig including vacuum systems charged from internal or external gas sources shall have appropriate PRD protection. Code stamped PRDs are generally not available with ratings less than 15 psig. Therefore these low-pressure PV/S may be protected with non-Code/non-conventional PRDs such as check valves with known cracking pressures or lift disks whose relieving pressure depends solely on the weight of the disk. Such non-conventional PRDs are subject to all other applicable requirements of this section, including periodic retesting.

13.13.8 SAFETY-RELATED SWITCHES AND PRESSURE INDICATING DEVICES

When pressure-indicating devices or pressure or temperature switches exist on a pressure system to provide safety and hazard information to personnel, critical operational information to operators or control systems, or to document compliance with Code test pressures, they shall be considered safety-related devices and shall meet the requirements listed below.

- a. The location and last test date of all safety-related pressure-indicating devices and pressure or temperature switches shall be documented in the PV/S Configuration Management Data System.
- b. Safety-related pressure-indicating devices shall meet an appropriate NCS, such as ASME B40.100, UL-404, or MIL-G-18997.
- c. The accuracy of all safety-related pressure indicators shall be periodically verified by means of a Center-approved procedure at an interval no less frequent than that required for PRDs on the same system.
- d. The minimum acceptable accuracy across the system design pressure range for each safety-related pressure indicator shall be in accordance with ASME B40.100 and the design specification.
- e. If a catastrophic failure of a gauge can cause personnel injury the pressure gauge shall be equipped with a relief back case.

13.13.9 PRESSURE REGULATORS

- a. Pressure regulators used to control pressure of gases supplied from compressed gas cylinders or portable tanks shall comply with OSHA regulations in 29 CFR 1910, particularly section 101, and by citation, CGA P-1 (in particular paragraphs 3.3.8 and 3.3.9).
- b. PV/S downstream of pressure regulators shall either be certified for the MAWP of the pressure source, or appropriate PRDs to accommodate a full open regulator failure shall be included in the PV/S installation to preclude the possibility of the downstream pressure exceeding the MAWP or placard rating of the lowest rated component, except as provided in paragraph 13.13.9.c of this document.
- c. When the PSM concurs that the use of PRDs is not feasible downstream of a regulator (such as due to venting or purity constraints), and if there are no pressure vessels downstream of the regulator, a pressure regulator certified in accordance with CGA Standard E-4 may be used in lieu of a certified PRD (since it precludes the possibility of downstream pressurization to a demonstrated high degree of reliability), provided its full-open discharge pressure does not exceed the placard rating of the lowest rated downstream element or component, and provided the regulator has been inspected and maintained in accordance with CGA E-4 and pressure tested within the past five years.

13.13.10 FLEXIBLE HOSES

- a. Metallic and nonmetallic flex hoses shall be assembled, connected and disconnected in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and recommendations and tested in accordance with the applicable NCS.
- b. Rated working pressure for all flex hose assemblies shall not exceed 25 percent of the manufacturer's specified minimum burst pressure.

- c. Flexible hoses shall not be used in PV/S in lieu of rigid piping or tubing unless the use of rigid piping or tubing has been determined to be impractical (such as where vibration isolation, motion allowance, or component flexibility requires their use).
- d. A flexible hose that is permanently installed by welding or brazing shall be included as part of the PV/S inspection and testing requirements, and the retest requirement of paragraph 13.13.10.e does not apply.
- e. Flexible hoses whose rupture would cause unacceptable hazard to personnel or risk to mission shall be retested at the flexible hose MAWP no less frequently than every 5 years.
- f. Flexible hoses whose rupture would cause unacceptable hazard to personnel shall have sufficient intermediate restraint at appropriate intervals along their lengths to mitigate the hazard. Adequacy of the structure to which hose end restraints are attached shall be determined by engineering.
- 1. A hose containment grip (Figure E-2) shall be installed across each intermediate union or splice on hoses over 4 feet (1.2 meters) in length.
- 2. Hoses over 2 feet (0.6 meters) in length, pressurized above 150 psig (1.03 MPa) or higher, shall be restrained at each end by an approved stainless resistant device (Figure E-1) and shall be restrained every 6 feet of length with sandbags.
- 3. Restraint requirements are not required for hoses contained by surrounding structure that can provide protection to personnel and hardware.
- 4. Restraint requirements are not required for hoses outward from the end of swing arms, tail service masts, etc., to flight vehicle interfaces.

a. HYDROSTATIC TEST

- 1. Each hose assembly shall be hydrostatically tested to a minimum 150% of the hose's design rated working pressure at the time of manufacture/ fabrication unless specified by the OMRSD, design-controlled drawing, or manufacture's specification.
- 2. Hydrostatic retest of flex hoses is not required unless they are modified or repaired. Flex hoses shall be retested to verify the integrity of the modification or repair.

b. PERMANENTLY INSTALLED HOSES

- 1. Permanently installed hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids, regardless of operating pressure, shall have the end fittings and intermediate splices leak tested, at a minimum, annually. The leak test shall be performed at the maximum system operating pressure using an inert gas.
- 2. Permanently installed flex hoses that operate at 150 psig [1.03 MPa (gage)] or higher pressure shall be visually inspected over their entire length annually, as a minimum, for damaged fittings, broken braid, kinks, flattened areas, or other evidence of degradation.
- 3. All permanently installed flex hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids, regardless of operating pressure, shall be externally, visually inspected over their entire length annually, as a minimum, for damaged fittings, broken braid, kinks, flattened areas, or other evidence of degradation.

4. All nonmetallic hoses used for N_2H_4 , MMH or N_2O_4 service shall be internally, visually inspected for any indication of the hose liner blistering, after one-year cumulative exposure to any of these fluids.

c. TEMPORARY-USE HOSES

Temporary-use flex hose assemblies are used for transfer of cryogens, gases, hypergols, hazardous waste, and toxic/corrosive fluids in applications where the hoses are routinely connected/disconnected, such as in fluid transfer operations or in test setups.

- 1. Temporary use hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids, regardless of operating pressure, shall have the end fittings and intermediate splices leak tested, as a minimum, annually, at the design rated operating pressure of the hose using an inert gas.
- 2. All temporary-use flex hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids, regardless of operating pressure, shall be inspected over their entire length prior to use.
- 3. All other temporary-use flex hoses that operate at 150 psig [1.03 MPa (gage)] or higher pressure shall be externally, visually inspected over their entire length prior to use.
- 4. All nonmetallic hoses used for N_2H_4 , MMH, or N_2O_4 service shall be internally, visually inspected for any indication of hose liner blistering after one-year cumulative exposure to any of these fluids.
- 13.13.11 VIEW PORTS IN PV/S(INCLUDING SIGHT GLASSES AND LIQUID LEVEL INDICATORS)
- a. View ports shall be treated as hazardous, and hazard mitigation steps shall be employed to ensure the safety of personnel from brittle failures.
- b. For materials in the brittle range, the Code equivalent FS on breaking strength for view ports shall be 10, or as recommended by the manufacturer subject to approval by the PSM.
- c. A view port shall be initially pressure tested in accordance with the applicable NCS for the PV/S in which it is installed.
- d. Fluid compatibility shall be considered during view port testing.
- e. The initial pressure test shall be performed with the view port installed in the PV/S or in a fixture duplicating the installed loads.
- f. View ports shall have an engineering assessment performed (including view port cycle life and ambient noise effects) to determine the appropriate inspection period.
- g. Retesting shall be performed if required by the engineering assessment in paragraph 13.13.11.f of this document.
- h. View ports or windows on PV/S shall be inspected visually annually for cracks, scratches, or other imperfections. An engineering assessment shall be performed on the imperfections to disposition the findings.

13.13.12 DOT CONTAINERS USED AS STATIONARY EQUIPMENT

a. DOT containers used as stationary equipment shall be certified as either DOT cylinders or as non-Code vessels.

NOTE: This document does not address the road worthiness of the trailer.

- b. DOT specification cylinders that are used in non-DOT service, such as in refillable fixed installations, shall be certified as non-Code vessels with risk assessment, acceptance, and approval via the variance process.
- c. The DOT containers used in non-DOT service shall be certified based on the original DOT requalification intervals for the specific cylinder specification (reference Table 1 in 49 CFR 180.209(a) and 49 CFR 180.405)

NOTE: An uncertainty for consideration during certification is that not all DOT specifications are based upon ASME, ASTM, or other standard material specifications. Because of this, minimum assured material strength, toughness, and fracture properties are usually not known, although individual cylinder tensile strength can sometimes be inferred if the original DOT design thickness is known. Thus, for any grouping of cylinders, there is generally no assurance of commonality in material properties from one cylinder to the next. It is therefore difficult to perform conservative fatigue and fracture analysis for remaining life calculations. For these reasons, and because they have lower material strength FS (see paragraph 13.13.12.d below), DOT cylinders cannot generally be considered ASME equivalent.

- d. If a DOT container is used as stationary equipment, and the owner has elected to certify the DOT container as non-Code PV/S, it shall be certified (recertified) as described below.
- 1. ASME Equivalent Derating The original cylinder working pressure shall be de-rated for NASA use, to increase the material FS to be FS =4 (or other appropriate FS applicable to the time and material of construction). The extent of derating shall be based on equivalent stress ratio between DOT and ASME or other suitable engineering analysis.

Example: For 3AA containers, the MAWP is 62% of the service rating stamped on a cylinder, calculated as follows. The test pressure maximum hoop stress is 67% of ultimate for 3AA cylinders (reference 49 CFR 178.37(f)(2)). The test pressure is also 5/3 the service rating (reference 49 CFR 178.37(i)(4)), which means that the stamped service pressure results in hoop stress of (3/5)(.67) = 0.4 times the ultimate stress (i.e., 2.5 normal safety factor on ultimate strength). In order for the hoop stress not to exceed 0.25 times the ultimate stress (FS = 4), the service pressure must not exceed 62% of the rated new service pressure (MAWP) [(0.62)(0.4)=0.25]. Deratings for other containers are determined by applying similar data from 49 CFR 178, Subpart C.

- 2. Consideration shall be given to the service temperature and the potential change in material properties.
- 13.13.13 VESSELS ORIGINALLY NOT DESIGNED FOR, BUT BEING USED FOR MOBILE APPLICATIONS

This paragraph applies to PV/S that were not originally designed to meet DOT requirements and are used to transport material under pressure.

- a. This type of PV/S shall not be used to transport material on public thoroughfares or water ways.
- b. An engineering evaluation shall be performed to document that the fixed vessel design meets the static and dynamic load requirements associated with transport and use as a mobile vessel.
- c. This type of PV/S shall be evaluated as "non-Code PV/S" per paragraph 13.13.16 of this document.

13.13.14 INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING CODE PV/S

- a. Existing Code PV/S shall be documented as meeting the requirements of the original construction Code by means of record collection and physical measurements and condition assessment. Original Code information, if available shall be released into the PV/S configuration management system.
- b. Existing Code stamped vessels that do not meet original ASME Code requirements shall either be repaired in an ASME Code-compliant manner (see paragraph 13.13.14.d of this document) and brought into conformance, re-rated to a lower pressure, recertified as non-Code PV/S in accordance with paragraph 13.13.16 of this document, or removed from service.
- c. Code PV/S shall only be altered or repaired in accordance with the requirements of the applicable NCS.
- d. ASME Code stamped items shall only be repaired or altered by National Board (NB-23) certified organizations (for example "R" and "VR" stamp holders) in strict conformance with their approved quality manual.

Comment: Government or contractor organizations that do not have an "R" or "VR" stamp do not meet the requirement.

- e. Re-rating of ASME Code vessels, if required, shall be in accordance with applicable NCS.
- f. Code PV/S for which current Code requirements have changed from the original fabrication Code shall be reassessed and re-rated as necessary to assure an acceptable risk level.

NOTE: For example, the 1988 changes to fracture toughness rules for prevention of brittle fracture could significantly increase the assessed risk of continued operation at the original design limits. Thus, a 4 inch thick vessel fabricated from A-212 Grade B (Firebox) material is now known to have an allowable minimum design material temperature (MDMT) of 118 degrees F. The vessel nameplate likely shows an MDMT of –20 degrees F. If the vessel normally receives ambient compressed gas at 60 degrees F, the vessel would require risk reassessment and likely additional hazard mitigation to assure continued safe operation.

- g. The PSM has the authority to determine when or which Code requirements changes require reassessment of particular PV/S.
- h. Code PV/S that have been re-designated as non-Code shall be clearly and visibly marked to indicate the non-Code status.
- i. For existing PV/S that have not undergone a full initial integrity assessment in accordance with 13.13 of this document, operation shall only be permitted following approval of a technical variance waiver in accordance with 13.17. The following paragraphs provide guidance on typical evaluations to be performed for waiver documentation through an abbreviated integrity and risk assessment review in order to obtain a reasonable level of confidence that the system to be placed in operation does not involve an excessive level of risk.
- 1. Evaluate major energy and toxic material sources supplying and/or affecting the system.
- 2. Perform typical and worst case wall thickness calculations, including both stress and stability.
- 3. Perform typical nozzle reinforcement calculations.
- 4. Perform analysis of typical high stress areas such as nozzles, supports, or other significant discontinuities.
- 5. Verify material thickness and other aspects of configuration to ensure applicability of analysis.
- 6. Make conservative assumptions as to material characteristics if actual material is not known.
- 7. Consider heat treatment state for materials and operations where this may be a factor.
- 8. Perform visual inspections of overall PVS condition, including such items as system configuration, critical weld configuration, condition and quality, corrosion, erosion, or other system deterioration.
- 9. Perform volumetric inspections of critical welds or welds most likely to experience degradation, with quantity and location subject to the approval of the PSM.
- 10. Evaluate pressure relief capacity versus needs.
- 11. Identify most likely failure modes, including fatigue, and most likely locations for those failures to occur.
- 12. Consider service history with regard to relevant failure modes, including cyclic service history, and most likely locations for accumulated service related damage.
- 13. Evaluate and document the risk for the PV/S.
- 14. Develop a plan and schedule for the full inspection and recertification of the PV/S, based on a ranking of risks and associated analyses, inspections, and mitigations, with schedule determined so as to minimize the overall risk.

J. If the full certification/recertification process in accordance with 13.15 of this document for existing PV/S is not completed by the end of a five year period beginning on the original issue date of this document, the PV/S shall be removed from service.

13.13.15 TECHNICAL VARIANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW NON-CODE PV/S

NOTE: This section does not endorse the purchase of new non-Code PV/S, but offers guidance for those rare cases where new PV/S are essential to mission success but cannot reasonably meet all of the requirements of the appropriate NCS.

- a. Technical variance approval and risk acceptance shall be obtained prior to initial operation of the non-Code PV/S.
- b. New non-Code PV/S shall be certified in accordance with 13.15 of this document.
- c. To the extent possible, Code design and construction techniques shall be utilized on non-Code PV/S, in particular through the use of:
- 1. Code material; i.e., material whose specifications and grades are approved for use by the Code that would otherwise apply to construction.
- 2. Components, (i.e., valves, fittings, elbows, etc.) that are certified to standards approved for use by the Code that would otherwise apply.
- 3. Code-certified welding processes, personnel, and "U" authorized shops that meet all applicable ASME quality assurance and certification requirements for Code construction.

NOTE: NASA fabrication shops that do not possess an ASME "U" authorization, regardless of individual personal training, qualifications, and certifications, shall not be considered equivalent to Code certified shops and hence shall only perform non-Code welding.

4. Assurance of material design factors of safety (FS) of no less than a Code PV/S.

13.13.16 EXISTING NON-CODE PV/S (LEGACY)

- a. Non-Code PV/S shall be documented and evaluated to the extent possible as meeting the requirements of the most applicable NCS.
- b. Non-Code PV/S shall only be altered or repaired in accordance with the requirements of the most applicable NCS to the extent possible. See 13.4.3 for alterations to existing vacuum vessels.

Example: A non-Code stamped PV/S that has a parallel in ASME Code construction shall be repaired or altered by National Board (NB-23) certified organizations in strict conformance with their approved quality manual except for Code stamping.

c. Assessment of non-Code PV/S that have a parallel in an NCS shall include assessing new changes in Code requirements that have updates from the edition used for original evaluation. The PSM has the authority to determine when or which Code requirements changes require reassessment of particular PV/S.

d. The design and operational limits of existing non-Code PV/S shall be determined based on the Factor of Safety (FS) in a manner consistent with the most applicable NCS from the time of construction.

NOTE: For ASME Section VIII, Div. 1 vessels, design tensile stress FS = 3.5 on ultimate stress since issuance of the 7/1999 Addenda to the 1998 Code, 4.0 from 8/1951 Addenda to the 1950 Code through the 7/1999 Addenda to the 1998 Code, and 5.0 prior to 8/1951 (except for a brief period during World War II based on Code Case 968).

- e. All existing non-Code PV/S shall have a risk assessment performed and be processed in accordance with NPD 8710.5, and this document.
- f. When the risk associated with operation of any PV/S is unacceptable, the risk shall be mitigated in accordance with the risk reduction protocol in paragraph 1.7.1 of NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements, or the PV/S shall be removed from service.
- g. Code PV/S that have been re-designated as non-Code shall be clearly and visibly marked to indicate the non-Code status.
- h. DOT specification vessels in permanent or semi-permanent installations that do not strictly comply with 49 CFR 100-185 shall be designated and certified as non-Code PV/S. See paragraph 13.13.12 for additional specific requirements for DOT vessels.
- i. The provisions of paragraphs 13.13.14.i and 13.13.14.j apply to existing non-Code PV/S that must be placed in service prior to certification or recertification in accordance with 13.15 of this document.

13.14 INACTIVE, UNSAFE AND DECOMMISSIONED VESSELS AND SYSTEMS

13.14.1 INACTIVE VESSELS OR SYSTEMS

For each inactive vessel/system, the following information shall be submitted to the PSM within 90 days after removal from service:

- 1. Facility location (number and name) obtained from KSC-GP-14-2.
- 2. Service fluid.
- 3. Pressure Vessel/System drawing Identification (ID) number.
- 4. Manufacturer's name and date of manufacture.
- 5. Vessel's Serial Numbers (S/N).
- MAWP or design pressure.
- 7. Facility O&M organization.
- 8. Vessel capacity.

- 9. Code stamping.
- 10. Certification date.
- 11. Certification report number.
- 12. Associated system baseline number.
- 13. Normal operating pressure, temperature, and pressure cycle.
- 14. A copy of this information shall be maintained in the respective vessel or system documentation file.
- 15. Inactive vessels and systems shall be stenciled or otherwise labeled

"INACTIVE-CERTIFY BEFORE REUSE"

13.14.2 STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INACTIVE VESSELS OR SYSTEMS

- a. When PV/S are put into storage they shall be protected against exposure to adverse environments which could cause corrosion or other forms of material degradation.
- b. PV/S shall be protected against mechanical damages resulting from scratches, dents, mechanical impacts, etc.
- c. Induced stresses due to storage fixture constraints shall be minimized by suitable storage fixture design.
- d. PV/S should be drained; inerted and a blanket purge should be maintained on the system.
- e. An engineering review of minimum maintenance required for the system components will be conducted, to include periodic inspections to ensure all storage conditions have been met.

13.14.3 UNSAFE OR DECOMMISSIONED VESSELS OR SYSTEMS

- a. When a vessel/system is determined to be unsafe for continued use, it shall be removed from service.
- b. If the PV/S is repairable, it should be repaired per the appropriate NCS.
- c. If the PV/S cannot be repaired, it shall be decommissioned and disposed of in accordance with KNPR 4000.1, Supply Support Manual.
- d. Each unsafe vessel/system shall be physically disabled and shall be stenciled:

"NOT USABLE - FOR DISPOSAL ONLY."

e. If the PV/S cannot be repaired, and cannot be physically moved, it shall be abandoned in place and each vessel/system shall be stenciled:

"NOT USABLE - ABANDONED IN PLACE"

- f. A report shall be submitted to the PSM describing the disposal procedure. The procedure should address:
- 1. Disposal method (excessed in accordance with KNPR 4000.1, Supply Support Manual, appropriately marked, and method of physically disabling the pressure vessel).
- 2. Method for flushing and disposing of any vessel or system toxic or hazardous substance.
- 3. Vessel manufacturer's nameplate data, system baseline number, drawing number, or other identifying nomenclature.

13.14 CERTIFICATION/RECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

- 13.14.1 PV/S shall be certified before entering service.
- 13.14.2 All certification and recertification reports shall be published in the KSC Engineering Documentation System (KEDS).
- a. PV/S may be activated after a suitable initial operating safety assessment has been performed and documented.
- b. Prior to certification or recertification a comprehensive integrity assessment shall be performed in accordance with paragraphs 13.12.6.a and or 13.13.14 of this document.
- c. Prior to certification or recertification initial service life and remaining life shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 13.12.6 of this document.
- d. Prior to certification or recertification an inservice inspection plan shall be developed or updated in accordance with 13.10 of this document and all appropriate inspections completed.
- e. Prior to certification or recertification a risk assessment shall be performed or updated in accordance with the requirements of 13.17 of this document.
- f. Prior to certification or recertification all components that require periodic inspection or testing shall be current as required in 13.13 of this document.
- g. Inactive vessels or systems being placed in service shall be recertified when any of the following conditions exist:
- 1. The vessel or system is to be used at a higher or lower temperature, or at a higher pressure, than specified in the original design.
- 2. The vessel or system shows visible indication of deterioration from corrosion or improper handling.
- 3. The vessel or system has not been certified per the requirements of this Attachment.
- 4. There is a change in service conditions that would require that a new inspection interval be developed.

5. The vessel or system has been altered, repaired, modified, or reconfigured to the extent that any previous certification is invalidated.

13.14.9 CERTIFICATION:

The following information, as a minimum, shall be required in the certification report:

- a. System Description: Identification of the major components and a brief description of the operation and configuration of the system. Photographs and drawings may be used as required. System endpoints or boundaries shall be clearly defined.
- b. Documentation Summary: Description of the documentation available, identifying nomenclature, its location, accuracy, and identification of significant discrepancies.
- c. Design Verification Results: Description of the system and vessel design verification effort, identifying applicable codes and standards, input data, and significant findings. Copies of the design verification results shall be retained in the PV/S certification file.
- d. Engineering Work Packages: Description of documentation issued for inspection and tests and description of any repairs and modifications required for PV/S certification.
- e. Inspection and Test Results: Summary of the tests and nondestructive examinations performed, including visual inspections. Unacceptable results should be described in detail. Copies of all NDE test reports shall be retained in the PV/S certification file
- f. Engineering Analysis: Summary of all significant engineering analysis performed, including results of calculations, analysis of inspection results, and special engineering analysis performed (remaining life, RAC codes, etc). Copies of the engineering analysis shall be retained in the PV/S certification file.
- g. Certification Summary: Complete summary of the Pressure Vessels/Systems certification effort and final disposition of the system and components.
- h. ISI Requirements: The 20-year ISI plan, including inspections and tests to be performed, and the frequency, for the system and individual components. ISI guidelines are established with the intervals recommended in the applicable NCS and this document. A discussion of the purpose and extent of inspections identified shall also be provided.
- i. Certification Certificate: Certificate, which indicates that system and vessel(s) comply with this Attachment, except for non-safety- related discrepancies identified in the certification report.
 PV/S shall not be considered certified until all safety related hardware discrepancies are corrected.

13.14.10 RECERTIFICATION

Recertification is the procedure by which previously certified vessels or systems are recertified for use at a designated pressure through appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, and documentation. Reference NPG 1700.6A for full details concerning the recertification process for in service pressure vessels and systems. See Figure E–4 describes the logical recertification procedure for ISI equipment.

- a. PV/S shall be recertified on or before one-half the documented initial service life or one half the recertified remaining life e.g. for a 40 year life vessel initially certified on April 1, 1997, the recertification must be completed on or before April 1, 2017.
- b. Recertification shall be performed when the PV/S service changes (e.g., commodity, design parameters, location, and orientation).
- c. Recertification shall be performed if any repair, alterations, or modifications, change of location, etc. are made to the PV/S.
- d. Recertification shall be performed as directed by the PSM in the case of NCS changes that reduce the estimated remaining life or increase the known risk of continued operation. (An example of this is the incorporation of fracture toughness requirements for MDMT in UCS-66 in 1988.) (Refer to paragraphs 13.13.14.f and 13.13.14.g of this document.
- e. Recertification shall be performed if any unanticipated service degradation is identified that reduces estimated service life, changes probability of failure or failure modes, or changes the risk assessment.
- f. Disregard of maintenance or inspection shall be cause for revocation of the certification at the discretion of the PSM.
- g. Recertification Tests, Inspections and Examinations or Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) will consist of, but not limited to the following:

External Visual Examination (VE) of vessel(s) and system component(s) surfaces for subsequent documentation and correction of the following general conditions:

- (a) Corrosion
- (b) Cracking
- (c) Bulges or Blisters
- (d) Leakage
- (e) Excessive Vibration
- (f) Abnormal Noise
- (g) Overheating
- (h) Vacuum Jacket Line Frost
- (i) Loose Fasteners, Supports, or Misc. Parts
- h. VE requirement may be modified or waived if vessel/system component Preventive Maintenance (PM) is current and there are no long-standing open discrepant conditions from previous PM VE examinations.

Ultrasonic Thickness (UT) measurements of vessel head, wall or nozzles for material thickness determination and subsequent engineering evaluation. UT requirements may be modified or waived in the case of multiple vessel clusters of banks where a random sample percentage of the vessels in a given group will be selected for UT measurement and subsequent evaluation. Whenever possible, UT measurements shall be performed at the same location, except where it is not practicable to do so.

13.14.11 OVERDUE COMPONENTS CERTIFICATION STATUS

- a. If specific component tests specified in paragraph 13.13.7 of this document are not completed within the prescribed interval, the PV/S certification shall be revoked.
- b. A variance is required to extend the period of an overdue item past the interval prescribed in paragraph 13.3.7 of this document.

13.15 PRESSURE VESSELS/SYSTEMS DATABASE

The KSC Pressure Systems Manager shall maintain an inventory and certification status database of all PV/S at KSC.

Data Requirements

- a. Each program/project or directorate organization having responsibility for one or more pressure systems or vessels that are covered by this Attachment shall provide the information, as shown in Figures E-4, and E-5, and E-6 to the PSM. Other formats may be acceptable provided all information in the figures is provided.
- b. Each program/project or directorate organization shall submit updated data, at least quarterly.
- c. Any changes shall be easily identifiable.

13.16 SYSTEM SAFETY AND RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS

Tailored System Safety Requirements for PV/S

- a. Risks shall be identified and documented for all PV/S within the scope of this document, the risk status shall be updated during the certification/recertification process, and new risks shall be identified as appropriate throughout the life of a PV/S.
- b. Risks shall be assessed and Risk Assessment Code (RAC) determined for all PV/S in accordance with paragraph 13.17.a of this document.
- c. The PSM has authority to specify the method and detail of risk analyses appropriate for each PV/S, consistent with the requirements of paragraph 13.17.a of this KNPR.
- d. Planning of risk mitigation activities and residual risk analysis shall be performed and documented in the initial PV/S certification or subsequent recertification to reduce or eliminate risks, and residual risks greater than the thresholds identified in paragraph 13.17.3 of this document shall be accepted to the appropriate level as specified in paragraph 13.17.3 and NPD 8710.5.

- e. The assessed risk of in-service PV/S shall be no greater than RAC 3 after mitigation unless that risk is specifically approved and accepted in accordance with paragraph 13.17.3 of this document.
- f. PV/S risks shall be mitigated in accordance with the risk reduction protocol in Section 1.7.1 of NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.
- g. Measures that reduce the risk classification shall be documented and tracked, and will remain in effect throughout the life of each PV/S.
- h. The PSM has authority to modify risk mitigation requirements or de-certify and remove from service any PV/S that is not safe to operate.
- i. The PSM shall serve as the System Safety Manager with respect to PV/S in accordance with paragraph 2.8.2 of NPR 8715.3 for PV/S.
- j. System safety documentation shall be as specified throughout this document and shall be maintained within the PV/S configuration management system.
- k. The PSM shall identify each PV/S change that potentially affects the baseline risk assessment throughout the life of the PV/S and take appropriate actions to analyze, plan, track, and control the risks associated with each change.

13.16.2 RAC DETERMINATION

- a. The level of risk shall be evaluated based on the likelihood of mishap and on the severity of the consequence. The risk shall be categorized in accordance with Tables 1, 2, and 3.
- b. The RAC is a numerical expression of comparative risk determined by an evaluation of both the potential severity of a condition and the likelihood of its occurrence causing an expected consequence. RACs are assigned a number from 1 to 7 in a risk matrix. The PSM may approve alternative risk determination methods.

Table 1. RAC Determination							
A B C D E Improbable							
l Catastrophic	1	1	2	3	4		
II Critical	1	2	3	4	5		
III	2	3	4	5	6		

Moderate					
IV Negligible	3	4	5	6	7

c. Severity is an assessment of the worst potential consequence, defined by degree of injury or property damage, which could occur. The severity classifications are defined in Table 2.

	Table 2. Severity Determination Table							
Class	Class Description	Equipment Loss ¹ (\$K)	Downtime ¹	Data Integrity ¹	Environmental Effect ¹			
l Catastrophic	A condition that may cause death or permanently disabling injury, facility destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle during the mission.	> \$1,000	> 4 months	Data Not recovere	> 5 years or >\$1M to correct			
II Critical	A condition that may cause severe injury or occupational illness or major property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware.	\$1000 to \$250	4 months to 2 weeks	Repeat program	1-5 years or \$250 - \$1M to correct			
III Moderate	A condition that may cause minor injury or occupational illness or minor property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware.	\$250 to \$25	2 weeks to 1 day	Repeat test period	< 1 yr or \$25K - \$250K to correct			
IV Negligible	A condition that could cause the need for minor first aid treatment though would not adversely affect personal safety or health. A condition that subjects facilities, equipment, or flight hardware to more than normal wear and tear.	\$25 to \$1	< 1 day	Repeat test point	Minor or < \$25K to correct			

Note 1:. The values and ranges are considered default values and ranges and may be adjusted based on actual data.

- d. Probability is the likelihood that an identified hazard will result in a mishap, based on an assessment of such factors as location, exposure in terms of cycles or hours of operation, and affected population
- e. Examples of calculation of the probability estimation are shown in paragraph 13.17.2.f.5 of this document.

Table 3. Probability Determination Table								
Level Description Qualitative Definition								
A (Frequent)	Frequent	Likely to occur immediately	X > 10 ⁻¹					
B (Probable)	Probable	Probably will occur in time	10 ⁻¹ ≥ X > 10 ⁻²					
C (Occasional)	Occasional	May occur in time	10 ⁻² ≥ X > 10 ⁻³					
D (Remote)	Remote	Unlikely to occur	10 ⁻³ ≥ X > 10 ⁻⁶					
E (Improbable)	Improbable	Improbable to occur	10 ⁻⁶ ≥ X					

- f. Default Equipment Failure Probability Estimates
- 1. The equipment failure probability estimates of Table 4 shall be applied only to certified PV/S.
- 2. Without further information on a specific PV/S complying with the certification requirements of this document, the default values of Table 4 shall be used as the equipment failure probability in the RAC determination of paragraph 13.17.2.
- 3. The PSM has authority to modify the failure probabilities, without processing a variance for specific systems covered by Table 4, provided one of the following is met: (1) failure data exists that is more relevant to the particular PV/S, (2) analysis is performed and documented consistent with the principals of risk management found in NPR 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements, (3) informed and conservative engineering judgment based on information relevant to the particular facts and condition of the PV/S in question is exercised and documented.
- 4. PV/S failure probabilities shall be combined with exposure in terms of hours or cycles of operation and affected population in determining the likelihood that a failure will result in a mishap and the overall RAC.
- 5. The values in Table 4 represent the probability of failure, not the likelihood of consequence.
 - Example 1: Small bore piping system with personnel exposure 2 hours/24 hour work day, 5 day work week; PV/S pressurized 24 hours/7 days a week.

State Assumptions:

Equipment Failure Probability from Table 4. Item number 11: 1x10-3 (catastrophic failures)/(PV-year)

Total hours pressurized per year:

52 weeks/year *7 days/week *24 hours/day = 8736 hours.

Exposure hours per year:

52 weeks/year *5 days/week *2 hours/day = 520 hours

Exposure Fraction:

Exposure hours per year/Total hours pressurized per year 520 hours/8736 hours = 5.9x10-2

Likelihood of Consequence to Personnel (ignores risk to equipment/facility): Equipment Failure Probability x Exposure Fraction:

1x10-3 x 5.9x10-2= 6x10-5

This value (6x10-5) would then be used to determine the probability level (i.e., A, B, C, D, or E) from Table 3 by comparison of the value to the definition column and selecting the appropriate level. For this example the level would be D, "Remote".

This level is used in the RAC matrix (Table 1) with the severity determination of Table 2 to determine the RAC for the PV/S.

Example 2: Small bore piping system PV/S pressurized 24 hours/7 days a week with no personnel exposure (personnel are shielded or remote from hazard).

State Assumptions:

Equipment Failure Probability from Table 4. Item number 11: 1x10-3 (catastrophic failures)/(PV-year)

Total hours pressurized per year:

52 weeks/year *7 days/week *24 hours/day = 8736 hours.

Exposure hours per year:

52 weeks/year *5 days/week * 0 hours/day = 0 hours

Exposure Fraction:

Exposure hours per year/Total hours pressurized per year 0 hours/8736 hours = 0

Likelihood of Consequence to Personnel (ignores risk to equipment/facility):

Equipment Failure Probability x Exposure Fraction:

1x10-3*0=0

Probability Level: E, "Improbable"

g. For PV/S whose design life is limited by fatigue or brittle fracture failure mode, and whose life has been extended through the application of NDE, in order to consider the potential for NDE to miss existing crack-like flaws the probability of failure shall be increased by a minimum of one level from Table 4 (i.e., an original level E (10-6) becomes a level D (10-3 to 10-6).

- h. Severity Class assessment shall include consideration of the worst credible consequence due to residual risk for all failure modes.
- i. Where Table 4 requires that a specific failure assessment be performed, that assessment shall consider the particular facts and condition of the PV/S in question and be based on either: (1) analysis consistent with the principles of risk management found in NPR 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements, or (2) informed and conservative engineering judgment that is approved and documented by the PSM.
- j. Failure probabilities of PV/S not included in Table 4 (e.g., plastic pipe systems) shall be specified by the PSM based on one of the following: (1) qualitative or quantitative data relevant to the PV/S in question, (2) analyses performed consistent with the principles of risk management found in NPR 8000.4, Risk Management Procedural Requirements, or (3) informed and conservative engineering judgment that is documented.

Table 4 – Tentative Catastrophic PV/S Failure Rates per Year (Median Values) for Certified PV/S

		Equipment Failure Probabilities				
		>10 ⁻	10 ⁻¹	10 ⁻²		≥10 ⁻⁶
1	D) ((0,0)	'	to >	to	> 10 ⁻⁶	
Item	PV/S Component Type		10 ⁻²			
	Steel Pressure Vessels:	(catast	rophic f	ailures) / ((PV-yr)
1	Code vessels fabricated to 1988 ASME or later and pre-1988 Code vessels operating above the post-1988 MDMT that comply					10 ⁻⁶
	with the certification requirements of this document					
2	Code vessels fabricated to pre- 1988 ASME and operating lower than post-1988 MDMT with validated fracture life assessment				>10 ⁻⁶	
3	Code vessels derated due to safety requirements, Code equivalent FS retained				>10 ⁻⁶	
4	Code vessels with FS less than original Code (e.g., due to degradation or fluid service changes)	>10 ⁻⁶ , Case-by-Case Assessment required				
5	DOT container in static service, maintained under 49 CFR 180 with acceptable VT inspection					10 ⁻⁶
6	Inactive DOT container more than 20 years beyond last 49 CFR 180 stamped retest date				>10 ⁻⁶	
7	DOT container not maintained per 49 CFR 180. See notes for this item re: dual categories	FS ≤4 – Case–by- Case assessment required		>10 ⁻⁶ (FS≥4)		

		Equipment Failure Probabilities				
		>10-	10 ⁻¹	10 ⁻²	10 ⁻³ to	≥10 ⁻⁶
		1	to >	to	> 10 ⁻⁶	
Item	PV/S Component Type		10 ⁻²	>10 ⁻³		
	Steel Pressure Vessels:	(catast	rophic f	failures) / ((PV-yr)
	Non-Code vessels fabricated as		(colde		>10 ⁻⁶	
8	equivalent to ASME (operation colder than vs. meets post 1988		1988 M se-by-	•	(meets	
	rules)		sessm		post-	
		r	equire	d	1988)	
9	Non-Code vessels/non-Code			ase-by-		
	equivalent - *			nent req		
	Steel Piping System: Small bore (NPS 4" and under)	(catast	ropnic	Tallures	/ Piping Sy	rstem-yr) I
	piping system (no double					
10	containment, sensors/alarms,				10 ⁻³	
	etc.) – Small system (less than					
	75 ft. of pipe) Small bore (NPS 4" and under)					
	piping system (no double					
	containment, sensors/alarms,					
11	etc.) – Large system (more than			>10 ⁻³		
	75 ft. of pipe)					
	Large bore piping system (> NPS 4', non-intergranular stress				10 ⁻⁴ (10 ⁻	
12	corrosion cracking (IGSCC)) –				⁵ see	
	Small system (less than 75 ft. of				Note 1)	
	pipe)					
	Large bore piping system (> NPS 4', non-IGSCC) – Large system					
	(more than 75 ft. of pipe) with				10-4	
13	failure modes that include thermal			>10 ⁻³	(see	
	fatigue, fluid dynamic loads, or				Note 1)	
	erosion/corrosion wall thinning as described in 6.2.11.2					
	Degraded or non-Code piping	Cas	e-by-C	Case		
14	systems		sessm			
		r	equire	d		

NOTE 1: adjusted if NASA-STD-8719.17, paragraph 6.2.11.3, failures do not apply

NOTES:

Failure mode is assumed to be catastrophic rupture of the pressure boundary with leak before rupture, which is the dominant failure mode of the data in the listed references.

Failure rates are considered constant throughout the service life. Such a "no-aging" constraint requires that inspections be performed and leaks are corrected.

13.16.3 VARIANCE

- a. Copies of all variances shall be sent to NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.
- b. The rationale and acceptance of variances must be objectively reviewed, evaluated, and documented.

NOTE: NASA does not have approval authority for variances to Federal, State, or local regulations (e.g., OSHA, Cal OSHA), nor to consensus standards that are required by Federal regulations (e.g., ANSI, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)) that apply to NASA. Any variance of a Federal, State, or local regulation must be reviewed by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance prior to submittal to the appropriate Federal/State/local agency for approval.

- c. Policy Variances
- 1. A policy variance shall be used when a Center policy varies from NPD 8710.5 or when Center policy varies from any "shall" statement in this document.
- 2. Policy variances shall be approved in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements and this document.
- d. Technical Variances
- 1. A technical variance shall be used to address case-by-case variations from requirements of this document.
- 2. Technical variances shall be prepared in accordance with NPD 8710.5.
- 3. Technical variances shall be reviewed and approved in accordance with Table 5, Technical Variance Approval Process.

Table 5						
Technical Variance	Approval Pro	ocess				
RAC 1 & 2 RAC 3+						
Headquarters notification	X	X				
Center Director Approval	X					
Safety and Mission Assurance						
Director Approval	X	X				
PSM	X	X				
Program Manager/Owner	X	X				




TYPE E: DOUBLE EYE GRIP - USED WHERE FASTENING IS MADE WITH EYE BOLTS OR SIMILAR ANCHOR TERMINATIONS.



TYPE A: SINGLE EYE GRIP - USED WHERE FASTENING MUST BE MADE FROM FROM ONE ANCHOR POINT.




TYPE U: UNIVERSAL BALE GRIP - USED TO FASTEN AROUND A STRUCTURE OR CLOSED EYE.



NOTES:

- 1. SAFETY APPROVED FOR ALL HOSES SIZES AND PRESSURE RATINGS.
- 2. RESTRAINTS WITH BRONZE COMPONENTS SHALL NOT BE USED WITHIN 25 FEET OF HYPERGOLS OR AMMONIA.

FIGURE E-1, Type E, A, U, Y AND F HOSE CONTAINMENT GRIPS



TYPE T: CONTAINMENT GRIP INSTALLED ACROSS HOSE SPLICE OR UNION JOINING HOSES TOGHETHER.

NOTES:

- 1. SAFETY APPROVED FOR ALL HOSE SIZE AND PRESSURE RATINGS.
- 2. RESTRAINTS WITH COMPONENTS SHALL NOT BE USED WITHIN 25 FEET OF HYPERGOLS OR AMMONIA.

FIGURE E-2, TYPE T HOSE CONTAINMENT GRIP

			(S	AMPLE)			
INSERVICE INSPECTION (ISI) DATA SHEET								
	System					Baseline	e No	
Certification Report No Release Date//								
			Test Metho	ISI F	Require	ements Time Interv	als (Years)	
		Initial	1	2		5	10	20
Vessels	5					-		
Vessel	Supports							
Piping S Compo	System & nents							
Piping S	Supports							
Relief V	/alves							
Pressui	re Gages							
Flexible	Hoses							
		INSI	PECTION A	AND TES	ST ME	THODS		
AET	- Acoustic E	mission Test		С	- C	alibration		
UT- THK	- Ultrasonic	Thickness Mea	S.	PT	- Li	quid Dye P	enetrant Exa	ım.
VE	- External Vi	sual Exam.		MT	- M	agnetic Par	ticle Exam.	
VI	- Internal Vis	- Internal Visual Exam.		RS	- R	ecall Syster	m	
UT- VOL	- Ultrasonic \	Volumetric Test		RT	- R	adiography		
HPT	- Hydrostatio	Pressure Test	t	R	- R	ecertificatio	n Required.	
PPT	- Pneumatic	Pressure Test						

FIGURE E-3, INSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS




FIGURE E-4, RECERTIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR INSERVICE EQUIPMENT

(SAMPLE)							
SYS	TEM	DATA SHEET					
Cert. Report No System Description	Rev	Rev. Date// Needs Rev? (Y/N)					
Location							
No. of Identical Systems in this Cert	_	Facility Number(s)					
Baseline No. (B/L)		Station Set (SS) No.					
PMN (s) ,		,					
,,		······································					
Orig. Cert. Report Date//		System Status - Active/Inactive (A/I)					
System Certified Date//		Certifying Organization					
Cert. Expiration Date//		O & M Organization					
Service Fluid (s)		ISI Requirements Defined? (Y/N)					
System Design Pressure(MPa or	lb/in ² gage)					
SMS Drawing Number(s)		,,					
Number of Vessels in System		Number of Relief Devices in System					
Number of Gages in System		Number of Flex. Hoses in System					
Last Walkdown No		Last Walkdown Date//					
COMMENTS:							

FIGURE E-5 SYSTEM DATA REQUIREMENTS

	(SAMPLE)
v	ESSEL DATA SHEET
System Cert. Report No	Date
Vessel Find No(or other unique designator)	PMN
Vessel Description	
KSC Instl. Dwg. No	Mfgr. Name
Mfgr. Dwg. No	Mfgr. S/N
ASME Code Stamp - Yes/No (Y/N) _	Code Section/Division
Year Built	Vessel Fluid Media
Vessel Status-Active/Inactive/Scrappe	ed/Excessed (A/I/S/X)
Vessel Water Volume	$(m^3 \text{ or ft}^3)$
Certified Vessel MAWP	(MPa or lb/in ² gage) at(⁰ C or ⁰ F)
Original MAWP	(MPa or lb/in ² gage) at(^o C or ^o F)
Min. Design Metal Temp	(^o C or ^o F) at(MPa or lb/in ² gage)
COMMENTS:	

FIGURE E-6, VESSEL DATA REQUIREMENTS

OTHER REFERENCES

The following table is provided for guidance as to applicable codes, standards, and laws. Actual applicability is to be determined by the PSM.

Table 6 - Application of National Consensus Codes, Standards, and Laws to PV/S^{12}

PV/S	Designed, Fabricated, Inspected, Tested, and Installed	Operated and Maintained	Repair, Alteration, Inservice Inspection
Unfired Pressure	ASME B&PVC Section VIII,		API 510 , 572, 579, 580, 581 ANSI/NBIC NB-23
Vessel			
Process Piping	ASME B31.3		API 570, 576, 574, 579, 580, 581 ANSI/NBIC NB-23
<u> </u>			
Power Boiler	ASME B&PVC Section I	ASME B&PV Section	ANSI/NBIC NB-23,
		VII	
Heating Boiler	ASME B&PVC Section IV	ASME B&PV Section VI	ANSI/NBIC NB-23
Power Piping	ASME B31.1		ANSI/NBIC NB-23
DOT Cylinders and	49 CFR, 29 CFR 1910.101	49 CFR	49 CFR, 29 CFR 1910.101
Cargo Tanks	CGA C-6, C-8, P-1, S-1.1, S-1.2	CGA C-6, C-8, P-1, S-	CGA C-6, C-8, P-1, S-1.1, S-1.2
		1.1, S-1.2	
Low Pressure Fixed	29 CFR 1910.106, API 620		API 510, 572, 579, 580, 581
Storage			
			STI – SP001
Liquid Oxygen	NFPA 50, 53, 55, ASTM G88, ASTM MNL 36, and	ASTM MNL 36, and 29	ASTM MNL 36, and 29 CFR 1910.104
Systems	29 CFR 1910.104	CFR 1910.104	
Gaseous Oxygen	NFPA 50, 53, 55, ASTM G88, ASTM MNL 36, and	ASTM MNL 36, and 29	ASTM MNL 36, and 29 CFR 1910.104
Systems	29 CFR 1910.104	CFR 1910.104	
2) 3001113			
Liquid Hydrogen	CGA G-5.4, NFPA 50B, 55, ANSI/AIAA G-095-	NFPA 50B, 55, NASA	
Systems	2004, and 29 CFR 1910.103., NASA/TM-2003-	NSS 1740.16,	
Dy Sterris	212059, ISO TC 197/SC N	ANSI/AIAA G-095-2004	
	, and the second	111 151/111111 G-0/5-2007	
Refrigeration Piping	ASME B31.5		

 ¹ 29 CFR 1910.6 contains a list of all referenced standards and the paragraph of application
 ² 49 CFR 171.7 contains a list of all material incorporated by reference and the paragraph of application

PV/S	Designed, Fabricated, Inspected, Tested, and Installed	Operated and Maintained	Repair, Alteration, Inservice Inspection
Gaseous	CGA G-5.4, NFPA 50A, 55, ANSI/AIAA G-095-	NFPA 55 (50B),	
Hydrogen	2004, and 29 CFR 1910.103, NASA/TM-2003-	ANSI/AIAA G-095-2004	
Systems	212059, ISO TC 197/SC N	NASA/TM-2003-212059,	
		ISO TC 197/SC N	
Acetylene Cylinders	29 CFR 1910.102 (CGA G-1) & 1910.253	29 CFR 1910.102 (CGA	
		G-1) & 1910.253	
Compressed Air	29 CFR 1910.169, ASME B&PVC VIII	29 CFR 1910.169	29 CFR 1910.169
Receivers			
Flammable Liquids	29 CFR 1910.106, 49 CFR 171-180, NFPA 30		
i iaiiiiiaoic Diquius	27 CIR 1710.100, 47 CIR 171-100, 101 A 30		
Liquified Detrolouse	20 CDE 1010 110 110(b)(10) Sofoto Devices DOT	20 CDE 1010 110	
Liquified Petroleum Gases	29 CRF 1910.110, 110(b)(10) – Safety Devices, DOT 49 CFR 178, ASME B&PV VII, NFPA 58	29 CRF 1910.110, NFPA-58	
Gases	49 CFR 1/8, ASME B&PV VII, NFPA 58	NFPA-58	
Anhydrous	29 CFR 1910.111, ASME B&PV VIII, DOT	29 CFR 1910-111	
Ammonia			
Oxygen Welding	29 CRF 1910.253, ANSI B57.1 (CGA V-1), NFPA-	29 CFR 1910.253,	
	51	NFPA-51	
DOT Cylinders	49 CFR 100-180, 29 CFR 1910.101, (CGA S-1.1, S-	29 CFR 1910.101, (CGA	29 CFR 1910.101, (CGA C-6, C-8) and ANSI/NB-23
	1.2, S-1.3)	P-1, S-1.1, S-1.2)	
Tanks (fixed)	29 CFR 1910.106 (API-12A, -12B, -12D, -12F, -620,		API 510, 572, 579, 580, 581, 653
Tunks (IIAcu)	-650, -2000),		111 1 510, 572, 577, 500, 501, 055
	ASME B&PVC VIII, UL-58, -80, -142), AWWA D-		
	100., UFGS 13209.N		
Building Services	ASME B31.9		
and Piping			
Risk Based			API 580, API 581, API -570, API -510
Inspection			711 1 5509 711 1 5019 711 1 -5709 711 1 -510

13.17 ITEMS EXCLUDED FROM CERTIFICATION

13.17.1 GENERAL

The following PV/S do not require certification in accordance with this KNPR, and are excluded from the requirements of this document provided they are covered under appropriate inspection and maintenance programs. Each Center's PSM has the authority to require inclusion of any excluded system at that Center due to the hazards presented by its use in a particular application. Excluded systems are subject to the requirements of OSHA, the applicable NCS, and NASA safety requirements. Operation of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) systems shall be within the manufacturers' limitations.

- a. Water systems under 150 psig for which surge is not a design consideration or has been mitigated.
- b. Fire Protection:
- 1. Water deluge systems not to exceed 250 psig for which there is no hazard to personnel in the event of failure.
- 2. Fire protection water systems for facilities
- 3. Fire extinguishers covered by: 29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart L, "Fire Protection," including portable extinguishers, standpipe and hose systems, automatic sprinkler systems, fixed dry chemical extinguishing systems, carbon dioxide extinguishing systems, and halogenated extinguishing agent systems.
- c. Exclusion limits for natural gas and Liquefied Propane (LP):
- 1. Public utility-owned natural gas supply and distribution systems.
- 2. LP gas storage and distribution systems utilizing 49 CFR storage vessels and used for utility/domestic applications. ASME Code stamped vessels shall not be exempt.
- d. Control, instrument, and shop air or inert gas piping systems with Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) not to exceed 150 psig and line sizes not to exceed Nominal Pipe Size (NPS) 3/8. Relief valves and compressed air receiver vessels are not included in this exclusion. This exclusion does not apply to higher pressure or larger size PV/S that supply the lower pressure PV/S.
- e. Fuel storage PV/S supplied with licensed motorized vehicles and meeting applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) regulatory requirements.
- f. Glove boxes.
- g. Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) PV/S
- 1. Hot water systems for buildings.

- 2. Prepackaged pressurized water and steam cleaning systems maintained and operated in strict accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. This does not include custom fabricated/assembled systems.
- 3. Prepackaged refrigerators, freezers, and Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
- 4. Prepackaged hydraulic systems
- 5. Welding equipment.
- 6. Laboratory equipment. However, equipment that could be pressurized above its MAWP for any reason by the fluid delivery system shall have appropriate overpressure protection installed and the fluid delivery system shall be certified by the PSM in accordance with this document. This exclusion does not apply to laboratory designed and assembled systems.

An example is a mass spectrometer with a manufacturer's placard rating of 25 psig that receives gas from a 2000 psig DOT cylinder via a pressure regulator and plastic tubing. The mass spectrometer and DOT cylinder (see 1.12) are not subject to certification in accordance with this document although they must be safely operated in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations, and there must be a certified pressure relief device (PRD) (see 13.7.1) downstream of the cylinder's pressure regulator (see 13.9), and the plastic tubing must be adequately rated and restrained (see 13.10). The required PRD may be internal to the mass spectrometer, however such an internal PRD is subject to the requirements of 13.7.1. Consequently, a separate external (accessible) PRD is usually added to meet the requirements of this document.

h. Vacuum Systems:

- 1. Vacuum systems with volumes not greater than 100 cubic feet. However, all vacuum systems that could inadvertently be pressurized above atmospheric pressure by internal or external sources (e.g., as a result of valve leakage on a test gas line or a pressure regulator or mass flow controller failure) shall have appropriate overpressure protection (see 13.7.1, particularly 13.7.1.13), and the fluid delivery system is included within the scope of this document.
- 2. Vacuum piping above ground not greater than NPS 6 which is adequately supported and restrained and buried vacuum piping of any diameter. This exclusion does not apply to piping which is connected to a positive pressure source that requires relief protection above a PRD setting of 2 psig. The relief protection of all vacuum piping systems attached to positive pressure sources shall be reviewed and approved by the PSM.
- i. Temporary non-NASA owned construction or maintenance related PV/S, provided there is negligible operational risk or hazard to personnel under any foreseeable failure and the operating contractor is contractually obligated to meet, and demonstrates compliance with, all applicable Federal, State and local safety regulations.
- j. Atmospheric storage tanks that only are subjected to hydrostatic pressure and that comply with the applicable American Petroleum Institute (API) or Underwriter Laboratories Incorporated (UL) standards.

- k. Self-contained pressure eye wash systems, provided overpressure protection devices are periodically tested or replaced in accordance with manufacturers' recommendations.
- I. DOT specification containers that are periodically retested and re-qualified strictly in accordance with 49 CFR 180, provided that the owner's OSHA inspection requirements of 29 CFR 1910.101 are met. This exclusion does not apply, however, to other attached components or laboratory equipment or other systems using or being charged from these containers. The exclusion does include:
- 1. Self-contained Air Breathing Equipment or other Breathing Equipment Apparatus: Covered by 29 CFR Section 1910.134
- 2. Compressed Gas Cylinders: covered by 49 CFR, Subtitle C, and 49 CFR Part 178
- 3. Mobile Equipment for Gases and Liquids: covered by 49 CFR, Subtitle B, Chapter 1, Subchapter C.
- m. Flight weight PV/S used for their intended flight related purpose aboard air or space craft even when that craft is on the ground. This exclusion does not apply to flight weight PV/S that have been converted for ground use outside of their flight related function.
- n. Hydraulic systems:
- 1. Most hydraulic systems designed in accordance with national consensus standards are excluded.
- 2. However, non-flight hydraulic systems that support launch vehicle functions, fixed and mobile launch tower operations, or hydraulic systems that support the transportation of launch vehicles or their payloads, or other hydraulic systems used for processing flight hardware, are not excluded and must be certified in accordance with the requirements of this Attachment.
- o. Assessed Hazard Exclusion

The PSM shall have the authority to exclude other PV/S from the Center's certification program if a risk and hazard assessment that is performed in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements and 13.17 of this document demonstrates that all of the following conditions are met:

- 1. There is negligible operational risk or hazard to personnel under any foreseeable failure.
- 2. A technical variance is approved to document the scope, conditions, and operational scenario of the exclusion.
- 3. All other applicable NASA safety requirements are met.
- 4. All other applicable regulatory safety requirements are met.
- p. Test Articles and Test Specific PV/S Exclusions
- 1. Test article PV/S that have been formally reviewed and accepted in accordance with therequirements of NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements, are excluded.

- 2. Temporary test specific PV/S (e.g., special test equipment (STE)) are excluded if risk assessment has been performed in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements, there is no risk to personnel, and risk to the facility has been accepted by the Center. Equipment is not considered to fall into this category if it consists of components used repeatedly for testing different test articles or configurations.
- 3. Payload-Associated GSE: This GSE, which is used to process or service payloads, is provided by other NASA centers or Government Agencies other than KSC and does not become a permanent part of any KSC ground system.

13.18 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN, TEST, AND GROUND PROCESSING OF FLIGHT COMPOSITE OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (COPVs) AT THE KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (KSC), CAPE CANAVERAL AIR FORCE STATION (CCAFS), AND THE VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB)

NOTE: The interim requirements letter between NASA-KSC and the Air Force dated November 23, 1993, remains in effect for COPVs processed at KSC, CCAFS, VAFB, and Dryden under the requirements of AFSPCMAN 91-710 0.

13.18.1 GRAPHITE/EPOXY (GR/EP)COMPOSITE OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (CPOVS)

- a. The design, qualification, and acceptance testing of Gr/Ep COPVs shall comply with the requirements of ANSI/AIAA S-081A-2006, "Space Systems-Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs)." All existing Gr/Ep COPVs used in Space Shuttle Orbiter flight systems are approved for use and exempt from this design requirement.
- b. Gr/Ep COPVs shall employ proven processes and procedures for manufacture and inspection. The fabrication process shall provide for initial, in-process, and final inspections of the liner and overwrap to support the safe operation and mission success of the vessels as required by ANSI/AIAA S-081A-2006. All existing Gr/Ep COPVs used in Space Shuttle Orbiter flight systems are approved for use and exempt from this requirement.
- c. Prior to the first pressurization of Gr/Ep COPVs at the KSC, CCAFS, VAFB or Dryden, an inspection of the vessel for visible damage shall be performed by a trained inspector. The trained inspector's skills shall be comparable to a Level II visual inspector, per the American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-1A (see ANSI/AIAA S-081-2006, Paragraph 5.5.3). If this inspection is not possible at the launch site (i.e. the Gr/Ep COPV is not accessible), then it shall be conducted the last time the Gr/Ep COPV is accessible for inspection.
- d. After completing the visual inspection, and determining that there is no evidence of critical damage to the Gr/Ep COPV, the vessel shall be pressure tested to 1.1 times the ground maximum operating pressure. The pressure shall be held a minimum of ten (10) minutes. This pressurization shall be conducted remotely or a blast shield shall be used to protect personnel.
- e. If Gr/Ep COPVs are to be pressurized at the KSC, CCAFS, VAFB, or Dryden to pressures greater than one third of the Gr/Ep COPVs design burst pressure, the pressurizations shall be performed remotely or a blast shield shall be used to protect personnel. If the vessel is to

remain pressurized, personnel access shall not be permitted to the area for at least ten (10) minutes after pressurization is completed.

- f. Personnel limits for each operation on or near the Gr/Ep COPV/Spacecraft shall be established to minimize personnel exposure to the pressurized tank when at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure.
- g. The transport of pressurized Gr/Ep COPVs at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure shall be along routes that minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort during designated "off-shift" time periods. Space Shuttle Orbiter moves shall not be restricted to "off-shift" time periods and shall be performed per existing approved procedures, which limit personnel access/exposure.
- h. The Mechanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) for the Gr/Ep COPVs shall be provided by the design agency and made available for review by the applicable NASA Safety organization.

13.18.2 KEVLAR COMPOSITE OVERWRAPPED PRESSURE VESSELS (COPVS)

- a. All new Kevlar COPVs shall comply with the design, qualification, and acceptance testing requirements of ANSI/AIAA S-081A-2006. All existing Kevlar COPVs used in SPACE Shuttle Orbiter flight systems are approved for use and exempt from this design requirement.
- b. Kevlar COPVs shall employ proven processes and procedures for manufacture and inspection. The fabrication process shall provide for initial, in-process, and final inspections of the liner and overwrap to support the safe operation and mission success of the vessels as required by ANSI/AIAA S-081A-2006. All existing Kevlar COPVs used in Space Shuttle Orbiter flight systems are approved for use and exempt from this requirement.
- c. Prior to the first pressurization of Kevlar COPVs at the KSC, CCAFS, VAFB or Dryden, an inspection of the vessel for visible damage shall be performed by a trained inspector. The trained inspector's skills shall be comparable to a Level II visual inspector per the American Society of Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) Recommended Practice No. SNT-TC-1A (see ANSI/AIAA S-081-2006, Paragraph 5.5.3). If this inspection is not possible at the launch site (i.e. the Kevlar COPV is not accessible), then it shall be conducted the last time the Kevlar COPV is accessible for inspection.
- d. After completing the visual inspection, and determining that there is no evidence of critical damage to the Kevlar COPV, the vessel shall be pressure tested to 1.1 times the ground maximum operating pressure. The pressure shall be held a minimum of ten (10) minutes. This pressurization shall be conducted remotely or a blast shield shall be used to protect personnel.
- e. If the Kevlar COPVs are to be pressurized at the KSC, CCAFS, VAFB, or Dryden to pressures greater than one-third the Kevlar COPV design burst pressure, the pressurization shall be conducted remotely or a blast shield shall be used to protect personnel. If the vessel is to remain pressurized, personnel access shall not be permitted to the area for at least ten (10) minutes after pressurization is completed.
- f. Personnel limits for each operation on or near the Kevlar COPV/Spacecraft shall be established to minimize personnel exposure to the pressurized tank when at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure.

- g. The transport of pressurized Kevlar COPVs at pressures greater than one third design burst pressure shall be along routes that minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort during designated "off-shift" time periods. Space Shuttle Orbiter moves shall not be restricted to "off-shift" time periods and shall be performed per existing approved procedures which limit personnel access/exposure.
- h. The Mechanical Damage Control Plan (MDCP) for the Kevlar COPVs shall be provided by the design agency for review by the applicable NASA Safety organization.

CHAPTER 14: KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NSS 1740.12, NASA SAFETY STANDARD FOR EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS, AND PYROTECHNICS

14.1 HUMIDITY REQUIREMENTS

Relative Humidity (RH) in the operational area shall be determined and recorded prior to the start and every 4 hours during operations involving open grain, open flammable/ combustible fluid systems, and Category A Electroexplosive Devices (EEDs) [when the Faraday cap is removed or firing circuits to EEDs are exposed].

14.1.1 At or below 50 percent RH:

- a. Bonding and grounding of nonconductive materials and personnel shall be verified in accordance with Attachment D.
- b. During open flammable/combustible fluid system and open grain operations including Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) processing, electrostatic scanning, not to exceed 1-hour intervals, shall be performed during the operation and at any time additional personnel that are not grounded, equipment, or hardware are introduced into the immediate area, the RH goes lower, or the handling of nonconductive materials is required. All operations will cease if scan levels are above 350 volts.

14.1.2 At or below 30 percent RH:

- a. Operations involving open grain (except SRB segments) and open flammable/combustible fluid systems shall not be permitted.
- b. All operations where Orbiter Docking Systems (ODS) pyrotechnic devices are to be electrically disconnected, reconnected, or exposed for testing shall not be permitted.
- c. Electrostatic scanning shall be performed on all personnel, tools, and equipment within five-foot radius of EED exposed circuits. All EED operations will cease if scan levels are above 350 volts. Electrostatic scanning will be performed prior to each disconnection and at 10 minute intervals.
- 14.1.3 SRB segment processing between 30 percent and 10 percent RH shall use the following requirements:
- a. Electrostatic scanning shall be accomplished at 10-minute intervals if the propellant is exposed and 30-minute intervals if the propellant is covered.
- b. Operations shall not continue on segments with propellant exposed if a potential of 350 volts or greater is measured on the segment case, propellant, or equipment and personnel who are within 5 feet of open grain.
- c. When the segment has the end rings with shipping covers installed, the following shall apply:
- 1. Operations shall stop when electrostatic scan readings are measured above one kV. Processing shall not continue until the electrostatic scan indicates less than 1 kV.

- 2. When electrostatic scan readings on the case (propellant covered) are measured above 4 kV, Safety shall be notified and all personnel shall be evacuated at least 500 feet (radius) from the processing area. Reentry into the operations area shall only be by personnel designated to perform electrostatic scans.
- d. SRB Segment processing shall not be permitted below 10 percent RH.

14.2 EXPLOSIVES REQUIREMENTS

14.2.1 General Requirements

The following general requirements shall be applicable to all activities involving explosives:

- a. EEDs shall be classified as Category A or Category B.
- b. Restrictions for Category B EEDs shall be developed and incorporated into appropriate Technical Operating Procedures (TOPs).
- c. All explosive materials used at KSC shall be delivered, stored, installed, inspected, and tested only in approved areas/facilities.
- d. Explosives shall be under the control of the explosive storage area supervisor until delivery to the requesting organization.
- e. All electrical connectors on equipment entering the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) bore shall be sealed and potted.
- f. Only Factory Mutual (FM)-, Underwriters Laboratory (UL)-, or Bureau of Mines-approved, explosion-proof flashlights/lanterns shall be permitted in explosives controlled areas.
- 14.2.2 Explosives Test Equipment (ETE)
- a. The appropriate program/project or directorate S&MA organization shall approve ETE. The submitting organization shall provide the following data:
- 1. Model number
- 2. Mechanical/electrical engineering drawings and specifications
- 3. System safety analysis
- 4. A valid calibration seal shall be maintained on all approved ETE.
- 5. ETE approved by the 30th or 45th Space Wing (SW) for use in a joint Air Force/NASA jurisdiction facility does not require a separate NASA approval.
- 6. Appendix A to this Attachment contains the list of currently approved ETE.
- 14.2.3 Transportation and Handling

- a. Safety chains or other types of especially designed breakaway control safety features shall be required between towing vehicle and trailer(s) when pintle or lunette fasteners are used.
- b. Explosives delivered to the operation site shall be only that required for the task.
- c. Explosives shall remain in the shipping/ transportation containers until needed.
- d. Explosives delivery to a staged area for all explosives operations, including SRM segments, shall be scheduled as late as possible prior to the start of the operation.
- 1. If the explosives operation is delayed prior to the scheduled start time, the explosives delivery shall be cancelled and rescheduled accordingly.
- 2. If the explosives operation is delayed after explosive delivery and is expected to be delayed more than one shift, the explosives shall be returned to the storage area. Exception SRM segments are not required to be returned to the storage area as long as the VAB ordnance operation has begun, the operational delay encountered is due to technical reasons, and the delay is not expected to be longer than 48 hours.
- e. The minimum number of personnel shall accompany explosives being transported on elevators.

14.2.4 Operations

- a. EED devices shall not be electrically connected to systems until power on/power off stray voltage tests are performed.
- b. The Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) [i.e., the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), SRB, Payload with in the Orbiter) as an integrated vehicle or single element and Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) Ground Support Equipment (GSE) shall be powered down during electrical connection/disconnection of explosive/pyrotechnic devices, except as allowed in (7), (8), and (9) below.
- c. Controlled switching and Radio Frequency (RF) silence shall be in effect during electrical connection/ disconnection or during the removal of Faraday cap/shorting plug of explosive/pyrotechnic devices.
- d. Facility doors and openings shall be closed during electrical connection/disconnection of pyrotechnic devices, except where required for Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) chimney effect.
- e. Safety concurrence shall be required prior to payload power-up testing after payload Category A final explosives connection.

f. RF Transmissions

1. Cellular phones, answer back pagers (RF), portable computers, and portable hand-held KSC-controlled radio transceivers operating in the Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) ranges shall not be allowed within 25 feet of flight hardware or launch accessory equipment containing EEDs, which includes NASA Standard Initiators (NSIs), when the shorting/Faraday caps are removed either from the explosives or firing line(s) connected to explosives. Faraday caps shall remain on EEDs at all times unless RF silence has been

established. Shorting plugs shall not be acceptable unless provided with a shielding cap that is designed to provide RF protection.

- 2. Mobile, KSC-controlled radio transceivers shall not transmit within 50 feet of flight hardware or launch accessory equipment containing EEDs, which include NSIs, when the shorting/Faraday caps are removed and/or firing circuits are not connected.
- 3. Unapproved radio transceivers, Citizen Band, and amateur radios shall not transmit within 600 feet of flight hardware or launch accessory equipment containing EEDs, which include NSIs, when the shorting/Faraday caps are removed either from the explosives or firing line(s) connected to explosives.
- g. Safe and Arm (S&A) Devices
- 1. Pin Removal

Two firing inhibits shall remain when removing an S&A safing pin.

- 2. Rotation
- (a) Rotation of the Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) S&As during ground test and processing shall be performed with the Explosive Transfer Assembly (ETA) or Confined Detonating Fuse (CDF) disconnected from the S&A or at the point of terminus. All rotation testing of S&As shall be completed before the firing circuits are electrically connected, except as required after ordnance connection. Rotation testing of SRSS S&As, with only the initiators electrically connected, shall be performed with a 10-foot clear minimum.
- (b) If a condition exists whereby the firing circuits must be connected during the rotation test, a safety assessment shall be provided to show that inadvertent ignition of the detonators shall not occur.
- (c) For rotations that require the ETA connected (one-time postordnance connection), all personnel shall clear the appropriate Blast Danger Area (BDA), and a remote rotation shall be completed. Safety shall be notified prior to rotation of all S&As. SRB ignition S&As shall not be rotated in the VAB.
- (d) S&A rotation during Phase 1 or 2 lightning warnings shall be prohibited.
- 3. Installation/Removal

Upon S&A removal, the igniter well shall be covered with an appropriate hard cover.

Faraday caps shall remain on EEDs when installing or removing the S&A.

- h. Orbiter Hatch T-Handle Explosives
- 1. The pyrotechnics activation T-handle enclosure lock shall be available at each landing and Transatlantic Abort Landing (TAL) site and shall be installed as soon as possible after a Forward Assessment Team inspection.

- 2. The lock shall not be removed during processing until the T-6 hour BDA clear for the start of ET tanking.
- 3. Removal of the T-handle enclosure lock shall only be per an approved TOP. A pyrotechnic engineer shall control the T-handle enclosure whenever it is unlocked unless the lock is removed and transported to an approved explosive storage facility. The TOP shall provide a line item "OK To Proceed" real-time signature by the pyrotechnic engineer and Safety immediately prior to lock removal.
- 4. Whenever the T-handle enclosure is unlocked, safety pip pins shall remain installed in the hatch and cabin vent T-handles.
- i. SSV Explosives Installation, Connection, Verification and Safeguards
- 1. SSV hypergolic servicing normally will be accomplished prior to SSV explosives operations (Operations and Maintenance Instruction [OMI] S5009, Part I), thus avoiding the need for SRB power up after ordnance operations. Exceptions for SRB power up will be: ordnance (Part II), instrument reads, and launch countdown (OMI S0007).
- 2. For those payloads that are installed in the Orbiter prior to rollout and do not require payload bay access at the Pad, SSV hypergolic servicing will be performed prior to SSV explosives operations (OMI S5009, Part I). For SSV flows where payloads are installed in the Orbiter at the Pad, and perform explosives operations in parallel with SSV ordnance operations, SSV hypergolic servicing may be scheduled following OMI S5009, Part I.
- 3. The following SSV explosives operations and safeguard requirements shall be followed upon completion of OMI S5009, Part I, through launch:
- (a) During OMI S5009 Part I, all vehicle and GSE explosives items, except the Range Safety initiators, Range Safety CDF, and the SRM Ignition S&A control cables, shall be connected.
- (1) Prior to any explosives connection, functional tests shall be performed on critical Master Events Controller (MEC) PIC circuits.
- (2) After completion of the functional tests, the MEC Critical Commands shall be disabled and the SSV and GSE PIC racks shall be powered down.
- (3) In parallel with the subsequent pad clear, the active version of TCS sequence VFC81 shall be replaced with a dummy version (Rev. 0) in the C10 console and any hot spare console that is loaded with C10 software. Console dumps shall be performed to verify that VFC81 Rev. 0 is loaded in both consoles.
- (4) Power-off stray voltage checks will be performed prior to installing/connecting the explosives
- (5) After completion of explosives connection, the SSV and GSE PIC racks will be powered up for PIC resistance tests.
- (6) After PIC resistance tests, the SRBs shall be remotely powered down. The MECs shall be powered down after Space Craft Operator (SCO) ingress.

- (b) After the SRBs are powered down, the following safeguards shall be in effect:
- (1) VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded at C10 and the hot spare(s).
- (2) MEC Critical Commands shall remain disabled.
- (3) Ground Operation Aerospace Language (GOAL) programs capable of firing PICs, except SRSS PICs, shall not be activated.
- (4) SRB power shall be applied for instrumentation reads only, except in OMI S0024, Prelaunch Propellant Loading; OMI S5009, Part II; and OMI S0007 Launch Countdown. Any other exceptions shall be approved by the Space Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) and the KSC Shuttle S&MA organization.
- (c) OMI S5009, Part II, shall be performed in the following sequence:
- (1) SSV powered up for the Range Safety Open Loop Test, flight code insertion and the Closed Loop Test.
- (2) SRBs, ET, Orbiter, and MEC power removed, power off stray voltage checks performed, and the SRSS NSIs, SRSS CDF, and SRM Ignition S&A control cables connected.
- (3) SRM Ignition S&A safing pins removed.
- (4) After completion of explosives Part II (S&A hookup), the forward skirts and ET/Intertank (IT) doors will be controlled with safety signs until flight doors are installed.
- (5) The BDA shall be cleared and the Orbiter/SRB/GSE PIC resistance tests shall be performed, all S&As (SRM ignition and SRSS) will be rotated to the armed position, then back to the safe position.
- (6) The SRBs will be powered down (remotely), the SCO will ingress, and the MECs will be powered down.
- (7) The S&As will be physically inspected to verify that they are in the safe position, then final SRB forward skirts and ET inner tank area closeouts will continue.
- (d) After SRB final power down in OMI S5009 Part II, the following safeguard restrictions shall be in effect in addition to those in effect for Part I:
- (1) GOAL programs capable of arming or firing SRSS PICs, or arming SRSS or SRM Ignition S&A devices, shall not be activated.
- (2) SRSS vehicle power shall remain off.
- (e) If OMI S5009, Part III is performed (i.e., all explosives connected during one operation), the same restrictions for Parts I and II shall apply, and OMI S0024 (i.e., SRM power up) shall be performed before OMI S5009. Part III is authorized to start.
- (f) During SSV explosives operations, the following clearing requirements shall be in effect:

- (1) During explosives installation/connection, nonessential personnel shall be cleared to the Pad fence.
- (2) After explosives connection, and prior to the first MEC power up, all personnel, except the SCO, shall be cleared to the Pad fence.
- (3) After explosives connection, and prior to the first SRB power up, all personnel shall be cleared from the BDA.
- (4) All personnel shall be cleared from the BDA for the PIC resistance tests.
- (g) During processing in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) or at the Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF), Orbiter power down is not required for pyro interrupt box installation. Orbiter power down is required for disconnection of live drag chute explosives.
- (1) For disconnections of live explosives, a hazardous control area shall be established, RF silence and controlled switching shall be in effect, and the OMI shall ensure that PIC circuits are safed by verifying PIC capacitors are discharged.
- (2) A Problem Report (PR) shall be written and the Orbiter powered down prior to disconnection of all live explosives encountered, which was expected to be spent (Nose Landing Gear Strut Thruster and Separation Pyros).
- (3) Orbiter power down or controlled switching is not required when connections/disconnections are made to pyrotechnic circuits that are shorted or isolated from the Orbiter electrical system.
- d. SSV Ordnance Rollback Configuration

If there is a rollback to the VAB after OMI S5009 has been performed, the minimum ordnance configuration shall be as follows:

- 1. No vehicle power in the VAB. Ordnance disconnect is not required (ET Vent Arm System [ETVAS] ordnance disconnect required because of physical ET separation from launch pad). GSE PICs, ground PIC rack circuit breakers open and tagged out. VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded.
- 2. Orbiter power only in the VAB. Ordnance disconnect not required (ETVAS ordnance disconnect required because of physical ET separation from launch pad). MEC 1 and 2 switches open and tagged out. GSE PICs, ground PIC rack circuit breakers open and tagged out. VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded.
- 3. Orbiter and SRB power in the VAB. Orbiter and SRB ordnance disconnect required in accordance with OMI S5009. GSE ordnance disconnect not required (ETVAS ordnance disconnect required because of physical ET separation from launch pad). GSE PICs, ground PIC rack circuit breakers open and tagged out. VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded.
- 4. Ordnance system work required in the VAB. Orbiter, SRB, and GSE ordnance will be disconnected in accordance with OMI S5009.

14.3 PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS

- 14.3.1 General Hypergolic Propellant Systems Operations
- a. Propellant transfers shall be performed only in Safety-approved areas.
- b. Prior to starting, Hypergolic Vent Exhaust System (HVES) shall be operational.
- c. Toxic propellant systems shall be drained and flushed or purged to nonhazardous concentration levels prior to opening unless personnel are properly protected.
- d. Prior to replacement or storage of components or system repair, hypergolic or toxic system components shall be flushed and purged of all residual propellants and appropriately capped or bagged and labeled prior to movement.
- e. Toxic and/or flammable vapor monitoring shall be required during break-in to any propellant system that has been contaminated by propellants and during the handling of contaminated parts. Toxic vapor monitoring shall also be required at the conclusion of any hazardous operation prior to opening of the control area to unprotected personnel.
- f. Component parts and tools which have been in contact with the oxidizers/fuels shall be decontaminated or considered contaminated and as such shall be handled and transported with the same level of safety precautions applied to the oxidizers/ fuels.
- g. Hypergol Deservicing (OPF-1/2)

In the event of a hypergol propellant release during times personnel are authorized in one bay while performing Orbiter hypergol deservice in the other, the following procedure shall be followed, as appropriate:

- 1. In the event of a liquid spill, leak or heavy vapor release, the air conditioning system shall be shut down immediately.
- 2. In event of a vapor release or leak in the OPF scrubber or outside GSE system, and the OPF is downwind, the air conditioning system shall be shut down immediately.

14.3.2 H₂/O₂ Operations

- a. Personnel exposed to higher than normal concentrations of oxygen or hydrogen gases shall not come into proximity of ignition sources until they have been in a normal atmosphere at least 30 minutes.
- b. Systems previously serviced with gaseous or liquid hydrogen shall be purged until the hydrogen content of the purged gases is less than 1 percent. Hydrogen systems shall be purged until the oxygen content of the purged gases is less than 1 percent (inert) before any hydrogen is allowed into the system.
- c. Replenishment of the LH₂/LO₂ storage tanks or local hazardous operations in the storage facilities shall be performed in series.
- 14.3.3 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)/Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) Exhaust/Drain Plugs Removal

APU/HPU plug removal shall be as late as possible prior to clearing the control area for test/launch. Toxic Vapor Checks (TVCs) shall be performed during removal. No other checks shall be required prior to test/launch if a zero reading is obtained at the time of plug removal.

- a. TVCs of the SRB APU exhaust and drain ports shall be performed upon test completion or launch scrub. Plugs shall be installed prior to opening the control area. When the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) is retracted for test, TVCs and Orbiter exhaust plug installation shall be performed upon completion of the first rotation of the RSS to the Orbiter mate position following the tests.
- b. The Orbiter APU exhaust ducts shall be vented outside the Payload Changeout Room (PCR) when the PCR doors are open and plugs are removed. TVCs of the APU exhaust ports shall not be required when the plugs are installed and PCR doors are closed. The Orbiter/SRB APUs shall have TVCs performed daily when the Orbiter/SRB Fuel Supply Modules (FSMs)/APU systems are fueled with N_2H_4 and the exhaust plug is removed.
- 14.3.4 Hypergolic Propellant Scrubber Operations
- a. Scrubber system configuration shall be verified before the power-up of the fuel and oxidizer scrubbers in storage facilities, except in emergency conditions. Restrictions shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 4 of this KNPR. All scrubber liquor shall be sampled.
- b. OPF Hyper Scrubbers
- 1. Each scrubber shall be limited to 400 Standard Cubic Feet per Minute (SCFM) flow.
- 2. The scrubber shall be running when two aspirators are used simultaneously.
- 3. TVCs shall be documented for each backyard entry.
- 14.3.5 Hypergol equipment/parts, including the associated clean gas equipment, shall be dedicated to fuel or oxidizer media systems.
 - Exception #1: Tube/Pipe parts and fittings remain as general use (non dedicated) subject to the following conditions:
- a. The propellant contact surface(s) is to have a material comprised solely of type 304/316 SST, or Type 304L/316L SST (if welded), or engineering approval equal.
- b. Verification of precision cleaning in accordance with Level 300A (minimum), Test Method 1 of KSC-C-123.

Exception #2: Parts/equipment previously dedicated/"part-marked" ("Fuel Use Only" or "Oxidizer Use Only") for use with one media may be re-identified and used with other hypergol media subject to the following conditions:

- a. Verification of Section 3.0e(1) and 3.0e(2) above.
- b. All soft goods (including lining) shall be replaced with new soft goods comprised of a material compatible with the media, as specified in MIL-Type-J-Fluid Service 79K11948, for which it is intended for use.

- c. Remarking shall be controlled through the GSE Material Review (MR) process.
- 14.3.6 Flowing/Venting of Inert/Toxic Gases/Vapors
- a. TVCs shall be performed following the flow or venting of toxic fluids or gases.
- b. Oxygen level checks shall be performed prior to entry into the Orbiter access white room, all Orbiter compartments, and any other areas if inert gases have been activated or released.
- c. Warning signs shall be posted on or in close proximity to all engines being actively purged with an inert gas. Signs need not be attached to the engine but shall be readily visible and worded to alert personnel of the hazard.
- 14.3.7 Orbiter Processing with Hypergolics Onboard
- a. Introduction

These requirements delineate specific information, actions, and controls that relate to processing an Orbiter containing Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem/Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS) propellants. These requirements complement current Emergency Procedures Documents (EPDs), which provide emergency actions for routine and major test operations at their respective sites.

The Orbiter is processed through a normal turnaround with residual hypergolic propellants in the OMS and RCS tanks. In addition, propellants are retained in the RCS manifolds, the OMS feedlines, and the OMS pod crossfeed system.

- b. System Configuration Ground Rules Matrix
- 1. Dual Isolation: All OMS/RCS systems shall maintain dual valve isolation between tank bulk fluids and ambient air from OPF safing until Pad propellant servicing for launch, except when hardware failures, including component removal and replacement, dictate an alternate configuration or when circumstances are such that single valve isolation better protects the system from possible thruster valve leakage.
- 2. RCS Thruster Thermal Conditioning: The RCS primary thrusters must be thermally conditioned to prevent thruster valve leakage of propellant.
- c. Safety Considerations/Requirements for Arming the Driver Switches (VAB)

Arming of drivers or removal of switch guards is not allowed.

- d. Safety Considerations/Requirements for Arming the Driver Switches (OPF/Pad)
- 1. OPF Bay clear or Pad clear above surface, except for two SCOs (in the crew compartment) with emergency breathing devices available.
- 2. In the event of a thruster activation, emergency exhaust fans will be turned on. The SCO will immediately set all driver switches to OFF. SCOs will remain at their station inside the crew module until directed to evacuate by the Orbiter Test Conductor. (The crew compartment is

purged, which should prevent vapor concentrations from intruding.) In the event vapors are detected in the crew compartment, emergency breathing apparatus should be donned and evacuation expedited.

- 3. The driver guards shall be installed and locked prior to resuming scheduled work.
- e. RCS Trickle Current Testing: During trickle current testing, a short 12-15 volt driver output pulse of approximately six milliseconds can occur when a driver is turned on with driver power OFF. While there is adequate margin to preclude any primary thruster valve motion, analysis has shown that a negative margin could exist in the worst-case conditions for vernier testing. Procedures are required to preclude personnel exposure if negative margin causes momentary valve motion.
- f. System Monitoring Tasks

Work areas containing hypergolic propellants shall be monitored periodically for leaks.

- g. SRM Processing Requirements
- 1. General
- (a) Personnel shall not enter the SRM bore when the SRM is in the vertical position until a documented safety assessment has been performed to identify/mitigate all hazardous conditions and ensure compliance with established safety and health requirements and standards.
- (b) Conductive bore inspection pads shall be installed in the bore for personnel access when the SRM is in the horizontal position.
- (c) Loose propellant and Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) shall be removed from nonpropellant surfaces. Any loose propellant on propellant surfaces shall be removed. AP shall be removed from the propellant surface where the inspection pads are to be installed. AP removal shall be accomplished using clean cotton cloths wetted with distilled or deionized water and gently pressing onto the surface and lifting free. Do not rub. Remove excess water.
- (d) Loose propellant, solid propellant cuttings, and AP (including contaminated cloths) shall be placed in velostat plastic bags, inside a closed, grounded, metal container, for pickup and delivery to the Ordnance Storage Facility (OSF) and subsequent disposal. The designated staging area for the waste is the northwest corner of the Rotation Building and the waste shall be removed within one shift (8 hours).
- (e) Conductive plastic sheeting (velostat) shall be placed on railcar surfaces at bore entrances to prevent contamination of propellant. Sheeting shall be grounded to a common ground with the segment/railcar prior to installation.
- (f) Open end(s) of segment shall be covered with velostat sheeting securely anchored to prevent wind damage during outside moves.
- (g) Personnel entering the bore shall wear conductive bags over socks. No shoes shall be worn in the bore.

2. End Ring Covers

End ring covers shall be reinstalled at the completion of all inspections. Forward covers shall be installed prior to break-over operations.

- 3. Cutting and/or Trimming
- (a) Railcars and rolling stock shall be moved from the railroad tracks located between the Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility (RPSF) main gate and Kennedy Parkway North.
- (b) The segment shall remain secured to the railcar, railcar brakes set, and segment connected to facility ground. The forward segment shall be orientated with the forward dome end-facing west during grain trimming.
- (c) Doors on the West end of the Rotation Building shall remain closed during the trimming of propellant.
- (d) Public Affairs (PA) tour buses shall be rerouted during the operation.
- (e) Only tools and equipment designated for cutting/trimming of grain shall be used.
- (f) Upon completion of grain trimming, the segment end shall be securely covered and the segment moved into the Rotation Building.
- h. RPSF Operations

The H77-0412 Impact Covers (Protective Pies) shall be installed as soon as the two point lifting beam is removed from the aft and center segments following breakover. Modified, small diameter, covers may be used during inspection and/or repair of vertical segment when access is limited to the clevis area.

i. Open Grain Inspection of Booster Separation Motors (BSMs)/Rocket Motors at the OSF

Orientation of BSMs for inspections shall be toward the exterior (south) wall to minimize property and equipment damage and/or personal injury.

j. SRB Igniter

The igniter shall not remain at the operational site but shall be installed or taken to the OSF.

- k. SRM Segment Transfers
- 1. A segment shall not remain parked outside the VAB/RPSF any longer than required to perform electrostatic scan unless a written discrepancy condition exists.
- 2. Two segments may be permitted in the VAB transfer aisle only during SRM stacking operations and with Safety concurrence, providing that:
- (a) Segments are spaced a minimum of 240 feet apart.
- (b) Neither segment is a forward segment.

- (c) Any segment attached to a crane must be soft mated or hard down on pallet.
- 3. The segmented storage (impact) cover shall be in place under the weather cover on the forward end of the segment prior to leaving the building.
- 4. After moving a segment between buildings, an electrostatic scan of the pallet shall be required only when humidity levels drop below 30 percent.
- 5. Operations shall be stopped for electrostatic readings greater than 1 kV.
- I. SRB Hoist and Stack on Mobile Launch Platform (MLP)

The SRM impact covers shall be in place on the forward end of the segment when in the VAB. The only exception is when the segment is in the high bay during scheduled operations, with the following precautions:

- 1. The covers may be removed provided the entire high bay, in which the work is being performed, is cleared except for personnel man-loaded by OMI performing the tasks.
- 2. Personnel shall not work above the open grain area or do unrelated work within 10 feet of the open grain operation.
- m. Handling and Transfer of Hydrazine (N_2H_4)/Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH)/Nitrogen Tetroxide (N_2O_4)
- 1. Hydrazine/MMH/nitrogen tetroxide vessels, contaminated tools and GSE, and Propellant Handlers Ensemble (PHE)-suited personnel shall ingress/egress test cells by an exterior door (not through inhabited areas).
- 2. Fuel and oxidizer vessels shall not be transported together or placed within 25 feet of each other.
- 3. Storage of fuels or oxidizers shall not be permitted in test cells or on hypergolic service pads. Placement may precede the start of operations, as directed by the TOP. Only Department of Transportation (DOT) compliant containers specifically marked for anhydrous hydrazine, methyl hydrazine, or nitrogen tetroxide shall be used to collect hypergol fuel or oxidizer (including wastes).
- 4. A limit of four solid waste containers (two in use, two awaiting sample results), and eight liquid waste containers (four in use, four awaiting sample results) shall be allowed to be staged at the hypergolic sump sites. Containers that exceed this limit shall be removed within 3 working days from completion of the operation that generated this waste.
- 5. Containers shall not be filled to more than one-half capacity marked accordingly.
- 6. These requirements shall also apply to tanker operations.

14.4 LIST OF KSC APPROVED EXPLOSIVES TEST EQUIPMENT

Manufacturer	Model	
Alinco	101-5A1 101-5BFG 101-5BPGG 101-5CFG	* * *
AMPTEC Explosive Safety Igniter Tester	620 ES	*
ETI (Dupont) Blasters Multimeter	101 101A	
Fluke	11 77 87 8050 8012A 8024B 8060A 8600A	
Hewlett Packard	3457A 3466A 4328A	
Hypertronics Megaohmeter	НМ6В	
Keithley	580 8600A	
Simpson Digital Multimeter	467	
Space Electronics Igniter Circuit Tester	101-5AF 101-5AL 101-5HJ 101-5HJ/HJR 101-5HP 101-5RZ-3	* * * * * *
Stray Voltage Checker	C72-1127-03	
Valhalla Digital Igniter Tester	4165 4313AB 4314A 4314AN 4314AF	* * * *

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4314B	*
4314KB	*
Alpha 4314 KRC	*
4650A	*

^{*} These meters are approved for NSI Bridgewire Measurements only.

CHAPTER 15: KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NASA-STD-8719.9, NASA SAFETY STANDARD FOR LIFTING DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT

15.1 GENERAL

- a. This attachment supplements procedures and requirements found in NASA-STD-8719.9, NASA Standard for Lifting Devices and Equipment, for lifting operations at Kennedy Space Center.
- b. An initial review of KSC lifting equipment was performed in 1990 to assess design compliance with NASA-STD-8719.9. Non-compliances were approved by the applicable Level III Risk Review Board. Contact the KSC Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager (LDEM) for further information.

15.2 RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. The LDEM shall be the single point of contact for the KSC Lifting Program.
- b. The LDEM and the Lifting Devices and Equipment Committee shall ensure the requirements and procedures contained in this supplement are understood and applied in lifting operations at KSC.
- c. All personnel involved in lifting operations at KSC shall adhere to the requirements and procedures contained in this supplement. Change recommendations, safety variances, and questions about requirements shall be coordinated through the KSC LDEM.

15.3 HOISTING AND HANDLING

- a. Lifting / Suspension of Loads
- 1. Loads shall not be lifted, suspended, or transported over flight hardware or one-of-a-kind Ground Support Equipment (GSE), whose loss would have serious programmatic impact, unless the lift is essential to perform a Technical Operating Procedure (TOP) controlled task. Lifting the External Tank (ET) over the Orbiter sling is permitted.
- 2. Loads shall not be lifted, lowered, or left suspended any longer than necessary to accomplish the task. In the event a problem occurs during a lifting operation that prevents completion of the operation, the load will be safed, to include returning the load to the pre-lift position if necessary. Approved procedures will be used to resolve the problem before the operation resumes.
- 3. Space Shuttle flight hardware lifting, stacking or mating operations in progress during launch countdown shall be static or soft-mated by L-1 hour. Static conditions for Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) segments shall either be within 5 feet of the transfer aisle floor, or if not soft-mated, the segments shall not engage the clevis or Field Joint Assembly Fixture (FJAF). The forward assembly shall remain static above and shall not engage the forward segment. Static condition for the Orbiter and ET, if not soft-mated, shall be in the transfer aisle.
- b. Critical Lifts

- 1. Lifting and movement of flight hardware packaged per its applicable shipment specification shall not be considered a critical lift. The LDEM and affected organizations may designate the handling of specific packaged flight hardware as critical if circumstances dictate.
- 2. Lifting and movement of flight bulk parts (e.g., fasteners) and raw materials shall not be considered a critical lift except for those items with hazards where loss of containment would result in immediate physical harm to operators or other personnel involved in the operation.
- 3. A critical lift for a powered industrial truck would be to directly lift unpackaged flight hardware or any other lift designated critical by the LDEM and affected organizations.
- 4. Transport and lifting of in-process manufacturing products not yet certified or designated as flight hardware shall not be considered a critical lift.
- c. Load Testing
- 1. Lifting equipment load tests shall not be performed above flight hardware or critical GSE or when failure of the lifting equipment could damage flight hardware or critical GSE unless a risk assessment has been performed with concurrence by the LDEM and appropriate management.
- 2. Orbiter and Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Engine Service Platform (ESP) winch load tests should be performed before SRB stacking begins; however, these load tests may be performed at other times based on the following restrictions.
- (a) When the Orbiter is mated to the External Tank, Orbiter ESP winch load tests may be performed only if the Orbiter ESP is in position and supported by the cobra heads. Orbiter ESP winch load tests may be performed with the SRBs stacked or partially stacked.
- (b) When the SRBs are stacked or partially stacked, SRB ESP winch load tests may be performed only if the SRB ESP is in position and supported by the cobra heads.
- 3. Cranes used for Load Testing
- (a) The KSC list of cranes permitted to be used for load testing other lifting devices is posted at the following website:

http://www-ph.ksc.nasa.gov/sma/KSC LDE.htm

- (b) Primary organizations responsible for design, procurement, operations or maintenance of lifting equipment shall submit requests for changes to the LDEM, with rationale, to the list of cranes used for load testing. The LDEM will approve/disapprove changes to the list. Requests for changes to the list shall state what load testing will be performed and should include the following:
- (1) Design standard(s),
- (2) Design safety factor(s),
- (3) Test history,
- (4) Operations history,

- (5) Maintenance history, and
- (6) Other acceptance rationale to perform the load testing.
- 4. Non-Load Test Slings
- (a) The KSC List of Non-Load Test Slings (i.e., slings not requiring periodic load tests) is posted at the following website:

http://www-ph.ksc.nasa.gov/sma/KSC LDE.htm

- (b) Program / project or directorate organizations responsible for design, procurement, operations or maintenance of lifting equipment slings shall submit requests for changes to the LDEM, with rationale, to the List of Non-Load Test Slings. The LDEM will approve/disapprove changes to the list. Requests for additions to the list shall state why the periodic load test will not be performed and should include the following:
- (1) Design standard(s),
- (2) Design safety factor(s),
- (3) Rated load versus actual load,
- (4) Test history,
- (5) Operations history,
- (6) Planned future use,
- (7) Material / construction properties,
- (8) Storage provisions,
- (9) Maintenance performed, and
- (10) Other information that is acceptance rationale not to perform the periodic load test.
- 5. For slings (reference NASA-STD-8719.9, Section 10, Slings and Rigging), the periodic load test factor shall be a minimum of 1.0, however may be tested up to a maximum periodic load test factor of 1.25 at the discretion of the responsible engineer.
- d. Transit of Cranes
- 1. Prior to any crane move, the route of travel shall be planned and checked to ensure that adequate clearances exist along the selected route and that the route is adequate for the loads being transported.
- 2. All cranes shall maintain adequate clearance from walls, overhead trestles, columns, and other structures.

e. Grounding During Hoisting of Flight Hardware

Electrical grounding shall be required, when explosives and/or flammable fluids are involved, per the requirements of Attachment D of this KNPR.

15.4 SUSPENDED LOAD OPERATION ANALYSIS/APPROVAL (SLOAA)

a. General

This procedure implements the "National Aeronautics and Space Administration Alternate Safety Standard for Suspended Load Operations" at KSC. This standard has been approved by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as an alternate to 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.179(n)(3)(vi), 29CFR 1910.180(h)(3)(vi), and 29CFR 1910.180(h)(4)(ii).

b. Analysis / Approval Report

In accordance with the requirements specified in NASA-STD-8719.9, Appendix A, paragraph A.4, a NASA SLOAA report shall be generated by the operating organization for any suspended load operation involving employee exposure. Employee exposure means having any part of the body beneath the load such that if the crane and/or hoist system (including rigging) were to fail and the load were to drop, the employee could be injured or killed if he or she were in the envelope of the falling load. An accepted, permanent residual risk is where the suspended load operation with employee exposure cannot be procedurally eliminated nor corrected by engineering means. SLOAA reports are posted at the following web site:

http://www-ph.ksc.nasa.gov/sma/KSC LDE.htm

- The KSC LDEM shall assign a tracking number and review the SLOAA report.
- (a) Those crane and hoist systems without Single Failure Points (SFPs), whose failure would result in dropping the load, require NASA S&MA approval.
- (b) Those crane and hoist systems with SFPs, whose failure would result in dropping the load, require NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) review and concurrence.
- 2. The operating organization shall prepare a SLOAA report for each suspended load operation to include all supporting data. An Approval Sheet for Suspended Load Operations (KSC Form 20-200 NS is available at http://kscforms.ksc.nasa.gov/findex.cfm) shall be used for all KSC approval signatures including concurrence by the LDEM. The responsible program/project S&MA Division Chief shall sign the last page of the SLOAA.

CHAPTER 16: SYSTEM SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS

16.1 GENERAL

The system safety and reliability engineering requirements delineated herein are intended for systems and operations directly supporting the performance of KSC's mission. Formal, documented system safety and reliability analyses are required for equipment (i.e., facility systems, Ground Support Equipment [GSE]) that supports the KSC institutional infrastructure and is directly involved in flight hardware processing.

Ground systems used at KSC, for which KSC does not have sustaining engineering responsibility, shall meet the applicable system safety and reliability analysis requirements of the NASA Center or Program having sustaining engineering responsibility. KSC shall have the right to review all engineering documentation to assure that risks to KSC personnel and property from such equipment are adequately controlled.

Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated contractors) shall develop documented processes for accomplishing these system safety and reliability engineering requirements on systems and operations for which they have contractual responsibility. All documentation and data shall be available for review by NASA.

Program/project or directorate organizations shall ensure their contractors develop and maintain a list of all systems and equipment for which they have contractual system safety and reliability engineering responsibility. This list shall include the type and level of system safety and reliability analysis performed or required to be performed.

Systems and equipment designed for use in the Space Shuttle, Space Station, and Launch Support Program (LSP) programs shall meet the system safety and reliability engineering requirements of those programs. It is anticipated that other future programs that are implemented at KSC will also have specific ground system safety and reliability engineering requirements that shall be imposed on NASA/KSC-managed development projects.

16.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS/RISK IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

The hazard analysis/assessment process is a principal factor in the understanding and management of technical risk. This process serves several purposes, including assessing compliance of safety requirements; providing feedback throughout the system design and development process to support the optimization of the inherent safety of designs;

- a. Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated contractors) are responsible for the performance of vigorous, proactive system safety engineering hazard analyses throughout the program/project lifecycle (i.e., design, test, operations). The analyses performed shall identify and document hazards to:
- 1. Assess compliance of safety requirements.
- 2. Identify and document system safety and mission success risks early in the program/project and update the status of these risks throughout the program/project.

- 3. Provide feedback throughout the system design and development process to support the optimization of the inherent safety of designs.
- 4. Analyze ground processing operations, beginning in the system design phase, to identify and mitigate any operational hazards, integration hazards and human factor issues.
- 5. Analyze and prioritize hazards (risks) for probability (Likelihood of Occurrence and impact (Severity).
- 6. Assure that valid and verifiable hazard controls are established, implemented, and tracked.
- 7. Provide for management acceptance of risks.
- b. There are several system safety analyses that can be used to identify hazards. There encompass various degrees of specialization, and represent both qualitative and quantitative methods. Example system safety analyses that can be utilized include:
- 1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
- 2. Subsystem/System Hazard Analysis (SSHA/SHA)
- 3. Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA)
- 4. Software Safety Analysis (SSA)
- 5. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
- 6. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
- 7. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
- 8. Lessons Learned

16.3 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY (R&M) ENGINEERING

Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated contractors) shall integrate R&M engineering functions into the overall design, sustaining engineering, and logistics support requirements. For system development efforts, the contractor shall develop system R&M requirements appropriate to the mission profile and shall assess designs to assure the requirements are met. R&M assessments shall be provided to support maintenance planning, logistics support analysis, and ongoing Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) efforts including trending of equipment reliability and effectiveness of the maintenance program.

- a. Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated contractors) shall develop a documented approach to reliability and maintainability engineering, which addresses, as a minimum, the following three support functions:
- 1. The safety risk management process.
- 2. The capability for as-scheduled mission success.

- 3. Cost-effective ground systems maintenance and support.
- b. Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated contractors) shall develop and implement reliability analysis processes that shall verify the fail-safe design requirement for GSE and facility systems developed and used at KSC. Noncompliance's with the fail-safe requirement shall be identified, documented, and processed for management risk visibility/acceptance in accordance with applicable programmatic requirements.
- c. There are several reliability and maintainability analyses that can be used to support fail-safe verification and other R&M objectives. Example reliability and maintainability analyses that can be utilized include:
- 1. Criticality Assessment
- 2. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
- 3. Reliability Block Diagram Analysis (RBDA)

16.4 NASA-MANAGED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

NASA/KSC Project Managers, or Lead Designers with assigned project responsibility, are responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of their developed systems and equipment. This responsibility begins with identification of safety and reliability requirements during the project planning phase and ensuring safety and reliability engineering tasks are included in the project schedule, funded, and executed.

NASA/KSC developed systems and equipment shall be designed to minimize hazards and shall incorporate the fail-safe design philosophy. System safety and reliability analyses shall be selected which provide verification of the safety and reliability design requirements, as well as ensure identification and mitigation of risks (i.e., hazards and critical items) present in the design and the intended operation(s) of the systems and equipment. These analyses shall be performed concurrently with the design process, with the safety and reliability design requirements provided at the project design kickoff meeting. Draft copies of analyses should be included in design review packages (i.e., 30/60/90%) distributed for review. As a minimum, analysis results shall be provided to the design team in sequence with equipment/system design process to allow for design correction of any deficiencies identified by the analyses. Residual risks (hazards and critical items) not eliminated through the design process shall be formally documented and presented to management for risk disposition.

CHAPTER 17. LAUNCH AND LANDING OPERATIONS

17.1 FLIGHT HARDWARE ACCESS AFTER PRSD SERVICING

- a. Payload experiments/equipment shall be planned for installation to minimize late stowage requirements during launch countdown.
- b. Experiments/equipment requiring late installation/ early removal at the middeck level may be performed after prelaunch Power Reactant Supply and Distribution (PRSD) servicing and prior to External Tank (ET) Liquid Hydrogen (LH₂) boiloff or postlanding PRSD deservicing upon completion of Orbiter/pad safing operations.
- c. Habitable Payload Module Access
- 1. Science experiments requiring late access to minimize science degradation may be serviced after PRSD cryo load and prior to ET cryo load. Allowable access shall be only via the Orbiter crew compartment.
- 2. Access to a habitable module via the airlock during postlanding Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) processing may be allowed EXCEPT during the following:
- (a) Orbiter jacking and leveling.
- (b) At the start of PRSD controlled venting, when a 25-foot clear is imposed, and during cryo tank offload.
- (c) When the Orbiter is powered-down, prior to the establishment of PRSD-controlled venting.
- (d) When the control area imposed by other priority hazardous operations would preclude access to the habitable payload module.
- 3. Initial runway postlanding access via the airlock may be granted after the Safety Assessment Team and the NASA Convoy Commander (NCC) have given a total safety downgrade of the Orbiter, providing:
- (a) The Orbiter is powered up, or
- (b) Controlled venting via the S70-1214 and the S70-1215, T-0 Cryo Vent Package has been established.

17.2 SCRUB OPERATIONS

- a. During launch scrub securing, the Safety Control Center (SCC) shall verify the following in sequence:
- 1. For scrubs with no personnel on pad:
- (a) Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) and LH₂ fire sensors indicate safe.
- (b) LH₂ in/to stable Replenish, Stopflow, Revert or Terminal Count Safing.

- (c) Safe to start Liquid Oxygen (LO₂) drain.
- (d) LO₂ in stable drain.
- (e) Safe to start LH₂ drain.
- (f) Safing/securing teams may proceed to BDA.
- (g) ET LH₂/LO₂ de-tanking is completed, LH₂/LO₂ engine cutoff (ECO) sensors indicate dry and LH2 leak and fire detectors indicate safe.
- 2. For scrubs with personnel on pad:
- (a) HGDS and LH₂ fire sensors indicate safe.
- (b) LH₂ in/to stable Replenish, Stopflow or Revert.
- (c) LO₂ in/to stable Replenish, Stopflow or Revert.
- (d) All explosive devices are safed.
- (e) Flight crew egress has begun.
- (f) Flight crew is clear of the Blast Danger Area (BDA).
- (g) Closeout crew has secured the cabin and white room and cleared the BDA.
- (h) Safe to start ET LO₂ drain.
- (i) ET LO₂ in stable drain.
- (j) Safe to start ET LH₂ drain.
- (k) Safing/securing teams may proceed to BDA.
- (I) ET LH_2/LO_2 de-tanking is completed, LH_2/LO_2 engine cutoff (ECO) sensors indicate dry, and LH_2 leak and fire detectors indicate safe.
- 3. For scrubs with only Flight Crew on pad:
- (a) HGDS and LH₂ fire sensors indicate safe.
- (b) All explosive devices are safed.
- (c) LH₂ in/to stable Replenish, Stopflow, Revert or Terminal Count Safing.
- (d) LO₂ in stable drain.

Safe to start ET LH2 preparations for drain.

- (e) Closeout crew is proceeding to the white room.
- (f) White Room O₂ atmosphere is acceptable.
- (g) Flight crew egress has begun.
- (h) Flight and closeout crews are clear of the BDA.
- (i) Safe to start ET LH₂ drain.
- (j) Securing teams may proceed to BDA.
- (k) ET LH_2/LO_2 de-tanking is completed, LH_2/LO_2 engine cutoff (ECO) sensors indicate dry, and LH_2 leak and fire detectors indicate safe.
- 4. Prior to reentry of safing teams:
- (a) Ground Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) racks are powered off.
- (b) BDA roadblocks are maintained.
- (c) Gaseous Nitrogen (GN₂)/air changeover is completed (HGDS switches from prime to backup).
- (d) Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are powered off.
- (e) SRB aft skirt purge is terminated.
- (f) Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System (ODMS) indicates safe.
- (g) Orbiter HGDS (backup system) is active.
- (h) LH₂/LO₂ transfer line purges initiated.
- (i) HGDS (backup system) is monitored during boiloff to less than 1 percent H₂.
- b. During launch scrub securing, the Post Launch Convoy shall proceed to the pad gate and perform the following tasks in sequence:
- 1. Enter the pad after notification by the SCC.
- 2. LH₂/LO₂ storage area inspection and atmosphere H₂ sampling checks.
- 3. Start the MLP skid inspection and atmosphere H_2 sampling checks.
- 4. Establish local control area of 150-foot radius of LO₂ and 200-foot radius of LH₂ storage tanks.
- 5. Start Pad Terminal Connection Room (PTCR)/Environmental Control System (ECS) depressurization, O₂ checks and GN₂ valves lockout.

- 6. Verify less than 1 percent H_2 in LH2 Cross-country line and LH_2 Storage Area vaporizers (less than 4 percent in vaporizers only for 24-hour scrub. If a longer scrub is determined, the vaporizers shall be purged/verified less than 1 percent H_2 .)
- 7. Close E road at pad apron and at Perimeter Road if Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) is present in the LO₂ dump basin.
- 8. Start MLP O_2 checks and depressurization. (Entry to the MLP is prohibited, except for Safety inspection team, until acceptable atmosphere sampling (toxic O_2) checks are performed.)
- 9. Sound suppression water valve closed and locks installed.
- 10. Advise SCC when BDA roadblocks may be released.

17.3 TURNAROUND OPERATIONS

Following launch scrub securing, the following requirements shall be adhered to for turnaround operations:

- a. Entry into the pad (slope and above) shall only be for turnaround safing and securing operations.
- b. HGDS and backup system shall remain powered up and monitored until ET H₂ is less than 1 percent.
- c. Following PRSD tank service through scrub/turnaround, except for the white room and crew cabin, the Orbiter mid/aft/fuselage will remain closed until the PRSD tanks are deserviced and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) inerted. Entry into the aft shall only be performed after concurrence of the KSC Launch Director, S&MA Shuttle Division Chief, and the Space Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance (SQ&MA) Director. Any off-nominal conditions that exist with the vehicle or Pad systems will be evaluated and identified either as a constraint or no constraint to aft entry in the scrub turnaround meeting. The following requirements shall be met prior to and during aft entry.
- 1. GN₂ purge to the Orbiter has been secured and the manual valves are chained and locked in the ECS room.
- 2. LO₂ and/or LH₂ TSM ordnance shall be mechanically safed prior to lowering the triple flip platforms for aft access.
- 3. PRSD T-0 supply line may be pressurized with GH2 venting or gas supply during aft entry. If work is to be performed within four (4) feet of the aft interior side of the LH2 T-0 umbilical, a cover must be installed to protect the exposed PRSD GH2 line, or the PRSD GH2 system shall be safed by isolating/terminating the GH2 line pressure source (i.e., secure tank venting and/or terminate T-0 ground reactant gas supply). If access to the T-0 is required, the PRSD system shall be safed.
- 4. Safety shall verify acceptable O₂ prior to entry and monitor O₂ and H₂ levels during the operation.

- 5. Personnel shall be attired in safety-approved, flame-retardant coveralls and will be briefed on the hazards of the operation.
- 6. Only the minimum number of personnel essential to the completion of the task shall be allowed entry into the aft.
- 7. Only the minimum amount of platforms necessary to safely accomplish the task and allow egress through the 50-1 and/or 50-2 doors shall be installed.
- 8. The TSM final ordnance and closeout for launch or scrub turnaround safing per Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMIs) S0007 and V3517/V3518, may be performed after PRSD tank service. TSM access for non-standard work is permitted after PRSD tank service and during ET LH2 boiloff during launch countdown and scrub turnaround safing. Any off-nominal conditions that exist with the vehicle and Pad systems will be evaluated and identified as either a constraint or no constraint to TSM entry in the Scrub Turnaround Meeting. The following requirements shall be met prior to and during TSM entry:
- (a) No LH2 TSM access is permitted during active ET LH2 tank venting through the TSM or during LH2 tank inerting. Access between tank vents is permitted but must be coordinated with Safety and ET LH2 engineering.
- (b) ECS GN2 purge to the TSMs must be secured and the manual valves must be chained and locked in the ECS room.
- (c) TSM bathtub purges must be off. Both the Orbiter/ET disconnect cavity purge and the T-0 umbilical carrier plate purge may be active.
- (d) Personnel shall be attired in flame retardant overalls and will be briefed on the hazards of the operation.
- (e) Acceptable O2 levels must be verified prior to entry and O2 and H2 levels are continuously monitored by Safety during the operation.
- (f) TSM ordnance shall be secured per the appropriate operation in OMIs V3517 and V3518 prior to commencement of any non-standard work within the TSM.
- (g) LO2 and/or LH2 TSM carrier plate shall be mechanically safed prior to lowering the triple flip platforms
- d. The following facilities/GSE shall remain closed for duration of ET LH₂ boiloff:
- 1. LH₂/LO₂ TSMs.
- 2. H₂ disconnect tower.
- 3. H₂ flare stack area.
- 4. 50 feet of LH₂ cross-country vent line.
- 5. North and ECS bridges.

- 6. LO₂ dump basin.
- 7. GO₂/GH₂ facility.
- 8. MLP zero-level between sound suppression pipes and SRB flame hole.
- 9. Within 10 feet of GH₂ panel on FSS 75-foot level.
- 10. Within 50 feet of GO₂ and GH₂ facility cross-country lines.
- 11. For turnarounds involving Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) firings, access to LH₂ Tail Service Mast TSM may occur to connect SSME drying purge with Safety concurrence.
- e. The rotation of the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) in a scrub turnaround is normally performed after the completion of ET H_2 boiloff and inert to less than 1.0% H_2 . The rotation of the RSS prior to completion of ET H_2 boiloff and inert to less than 1.0% H_2 , requires the concurrence of the KSC Launch Director, S&MA Shuttle Division Chief, and the SFOC SQ&MA Director. Any off-nominal conditions that exist with the vehicle of Pad systems will be evaluated and identified either as a constraint or no constraint to RSS rotation in the scrub turnaround meeting. For additional information, see KSC Hazard Report LL-0112, "Early Rotation of the Rotating Service Structure Prior to External Tank boiloff and Inert to Less Than One Percent GH_2 ."

The following requirements shall be met prior to the start of RSS rotation preoperations tasks:

- 1. Ground PIC racks shall be powered **OFF**.
- 2. BDA roadblocks shall be maintained, as applicable.
- 3. The GN₂/air changeover shall be completed (HGDS shall switch from prime to backup).
- 4. SRBs shall be powered **OFF**.
- 5. SRB aft skirt purge shall be terminated.
- 6. The MLP O₂ ODMS shall indicate **SAFE**.
- 7. The Orbiter HGDS (backup system) shall be active.
- 8. Pad safing/securing teams shall have completed initial pad safing.
- 9. ET LH₂ boiloff shall be stable.
- 10. H₂ fire and leak detectors shall be active and monitored.
- 11. There shall be no H_2/O_2 leaks from the Orbiter, ET or GSE systems. Leaks in the storage facilities shall be evaluated to ensure no impact or safety concern to the RSS rotation operation.
- f. SRB/SSME engine service platforms shall not be installed until boiloff is complete.

g. PRSD servicing shall be prohibited until ET LH_2 purge and inerting after boiloff is complete and less than 1 percent LH_2 has been verified in the ET LH_2 tank

17.4 POSTLAUNCH OPERATIONS

Following launch, the Postlaunch Convoy shall:

- a. Proceed to the BDA upon direction from the Test Director (TD)/SCC.
- b. Hold at the BDA until a safe condition is verified at the pad gate.
- c. Enter the Pad upon concurrence from the TD and after the SCC has verified that:
- 1. The PIC resistance tests are complete and the system is powered down.
- 2. The Safety Operational Television (OTV) scan is complete with no anomalies.
- 3. The fire/leak detector status is complete with no anomalies.
- 4. The LO₂/LH₂ transfer line purges are initiated.
- 5. MLP GN₂-to-air changeover is complete.

17.5 ORBITER NOMINAL LANDING

- a. The entire landing facility area shall be under security-controlled access prior to Orbiter approach. The controlled access area is defined as a 5500-foot radius established from the runway centerline down the entire length of the runway. This control area shall be established 3 hours prior to landing until the Orbiter lands and it is verified there are no major hazardous materials spills.
- b. All essential personnel required to be within the 5500-foot radius shall:
- 1. Have satisfactorily completed emergency escape training for the facility.
- 2. Have egress capability and communications available to someone who can direct evacuation.
- c. KSC Guest Viewing Restrictions
- 1. Viewing shall be at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Midfield Press viewing site. Visitors shall not be permitted at the viewing site during abort landings. The total combined number of guest and press buses shall be limited to 24 at the viewing site. Buses used to transport visitors shall be parked in a manner to provide for evacuation as quickly as possible and visitors shall be separated from convoy and emergency crews/ equipment by fencing.
- 2. The KSC Center Director or his/her designee shall approve runway access for KSC Senior Management during Orbiter postlanding processing. The Launch Director (LD) or his/her designee shall accompany Senior Management and remain in communication with the NCC. The NCC shall give the LD an OK to proceed to the runway after the following operational requirements are met:

- (a) Landing + 45 minutes
- (b) Crew Transport Vehicle moved away from Orbiter
- (c) Successful completion of upper level assessment.
- d. The condition of the Orbiter and wind direction shall determine the safety control area, position of the vehicles after Orbiter landing, and the Safety Assessment Team attire. The following shall be the minimum acceptable control areas until the Safety Assessment Team finishes the safety assessment of the Orbiter and the surrounding area:
- 1. A 1250-foot radius of the Orbiter after wheel stop shall be established and maintained as the safety control area. All vehicles and personnel shall remain at the 1250-foot radius until ingress of required safing vehicles and personnel is allowed.
- 2. A 200-foot upwind and a 700-foot downwind, control area shall be established for hypergolic release/leak potentials until safety assessments are accomplished.
- e. The Safety Assessment Team shall perform the following in sequence, upon direction from the operating organization:
- 1. Approach the Orbiter in the Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) vehicle, wearing Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA):
- (a) Upwind Landing: Proceed to a point 200 feet from the nose of the Orbiter, deploy the Assessment Team, and return to the rear of the mini-convoy. The Safety Assessment Team shall take continuous vapor readings and proceed to approximately 50 feet from the Orbiter and hold until advised by the operating organization.
- (b) Downwind Landing (or winds less than 3 knots): Proceed to a point 700 feet from the Orbiter as directed by the operating organization. Deploy the Safety Assessment Team and return to the rear of the mini-convoy. The Safety Assessment Team shall take continuous vapor readings and proceed to 50 feet from the Orbiter and hold until advised by the operating organization.
- 2. Start the assessment, proceed towards the Orbiter taking continuous readings.
- (a) If readings are acceptable, proceed with the forward and aft assessments as outlined in the applicable TOP.
- (b) If the initial readings exceed Orbiter postlanding GH₂ requirements (per Table K-1) then fallback and proceed to personnel evacuations as outlined in Section 5.0j.
- (c) While performing the forward and aft assessments, checks shall be made for gas or fluid leaks, fire, hot wheels/brakes, and tire damage, staying outside the danger areas outlined in Section 5.0i.
- (d) Any anomalies found during any part of the safety assessment shall be immediately reported to the operating organization.

- 3. After the forward assessment is completed and acceptable, the vehicles required for safing and crew egress may move into position to perform their assigned tasks at the direction of NCC, Safety, and the operating organization. Any critical entry requirement, beyond the required vehicles, shall require approval by NCC, NASA Safety, and the operating organization.
- 4. After the aft ground-level safety assessment downgrade is given, then the remaining safing vehicles may move within 50 feet aft of the Orbiter. Umbilical access vehicles shall not be positioned at the Orbiter until after Auxiliary Power Unite (APU) shutdown.
- 5. Upon connection of T-0 panels and HGDS Quick Disconnects (QDs), Safety shall monitor for GH₂ content in the aft, payload, and mid-fuselage ports.
- 6. After the forward and aft ground level assessment is complete and acceptable, essential payload and/or flight crew systems personnel and vehicles may move into position as approved by NCC, Safety, and the operating organization.
- 7. Upon acceptable reading of payload bay HGDS hydrogen sampling and following the Payload Bay 10-minute purge, support vehicles may move into the control area with approval from NCC and Safety.
- 8. If mission-returned cargo contains hydrazine, monitor vent doors numbers 8 and 9 after purge has been initiated.
- 9. Continue to monitor toxic vapor sensing instruments and general area of Orbiter during postlanding inspection and tow operation.
- 10. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) downgrade shall take place only after toxic and explosive atmospheric checks are within acceptable limits
- 11. A 25-foot radial control area shall be maintained around the T-0 S70-1214/1215 prior to initiating controlled PRSD venting.

H ₂ CONCEN- TRATIONS	VENT DOOR #3 READING (NOTE 6)	INITIAL HAZ GAS READING (NOTE 5)	FIRST 10 MINUTE MONITOR	AFTER 10 MINUTE MONITOR
Over 1% (NOTE 2)	Reposition vent doors Power down Orbiter Evacuate Flight Crew Evacuate all personnel Assess quantities and leakage for reassessment Try to initiate purge Monitor Vent Door #3 until repositioned	Power down Orbiter Evacuate Flight Crew Evacuate all personnel Try to initiate purge Take another Haz Gas reading	Power down Orbiter Evacuate Flight Crew Evacuate all personnel Maintain purge Take another Haz Gas reading	Power down Orbiter Evacuate Flight Crew Evacuate all personnel Maintain purge Take another Haz Gas reading
Trace 1% (NOTE 2)			 Essential ops (NOTE 4) Maintain Orbiter power Maintain purge Continuous monitor (NOTE 1) 	 Essential ops (NOTE 4) Maintain Orbiter power Maintain purge Continuous monitor (NOTE 1)
0%	Controlled ops (NOTE 3)	Controlled ops (NOTE 3)	Controlled ops (NOTE 3)	Controlled ops (NOTE 3)

TABLE K-1 ORBITER POSTLANDING GH2 REQUIREMENTS

Table K-1 Notes:

- (1) Spikes are expected; you should expect a downward trend within five minutes of initiating purge (should be below one percent H₂ within 15 minutes of initiating purge).
- (2) Meter Readings: (All readings above baseline zero percent Lower Explosive Level (LEL) shall be reported.)
- (a) Trace: A meter reading of at least 10 percent LEL for 30 seconds.
- (b) Over 1 percent: A meter reading of at least 25 percent LEL for 30 seconds.
- (3) Controlled Operations: Definition as currently stated in landing OMI.
- (4) Essential Operations: To maintain purge, cooling, Orbiter power, and flight crew egress only.
- (5) Initiate purge after initial Haz Gas reading or within 30 minutes of upper aft downgrade, whichever occurs first. Without Haz Gas readings, initiate purge and monitor vent door No. 9. If reading is less than trace after five minutes, open upper aft left and right for controlled operations per landing OMI. Monitor vent door No. 9 until Haz Gas reading is available.
- (6) If vent door No. 3 reading is 1 percent or less, it is acceptable to use the white room vehicle to evacuate the flight crew, provided ground level hydrogen at hatch area is also 1 percent or less.

- f. When Orbiter power-down is required after the safety assessment, the S70-1214/1215 PRSD vent panels shall be installed.
- g. Personnel shall remain clear of Main Landing Gear (MLG) for a minimum of 45 minutes after landing. The restricted area shall be bounded by 20-foot radius circles around MLG struts and 60-foot radius, 45-degree sectors whose apexes shall be at center of wheels. The centerline shall be projected from wheel axles. Strobe lights shall be placed 60 feet from the Orbiter MLG (both sides). Strobes shall be activated after ground level downgrade is completed and acceptable and shall be turned off 45 minutes after wheel stop.
- h. Personnel shall remain clear of restricted area around the Orbiter side hatch until the Convoy Commander receives confirmation of hatch safe. Restricted area is a 15-foot by 100-foot corridor projected out from the side hatch.
- i. Mission-returned cargo containing hydrazine and/or nitrogen tetroxide shall be checked at Orbiter left and right hand vent doors No. 3 for toxic and explosive vapor readings. If acceptable readings are exceeded, SCAPE is required to continue safing operations. Acceptable readings are 0 to 1 ppm for fuel and 0 to 20 ppm for oxidizer. If hydrazine readings exceed 180 ppm, the following shall be implemented:
- 1. Crew performs an expedited power-down.
- 2. Mode V aided egress.
- 3. Evacuate all personnel to 1250 feet of the Orbiter.
- 4. Upon the direction of NCC and Safety, attempt to establish purge.
- j. If the drag chute fails to deploy during rollout, personnel and vehicles shall stay clear of drag chute deployment area (10 degrees left to 47 degrees right of Orbiter centerline and 100 feet aft) until pyrotechnic circuits are verified safed. Confirm circuit breaker in crew compartment is verified open.
- k. Personnel Clears for Postlanding Operations
- 1. In coordination with the operating organization and the Convoy Commander, all personnel, including flight crew, shall be cleared to a minimum of 1250 feet from the Orbiter area when explosive/flammability readings are above the maximum allowable concentrations.
- 2. All personnel shall be cleared 200 feet upwind and 700 feet downwind of the Orbiter when hypergolic Threshold Limit Value (TLV) readings are above the allowable limits (unless personnel attired in SCAPE).
- 3. After clearing all personnel, the operating organization shall wait a minimum of 10 minutes and activate the fan machine (if not already activated) before directing the assessment team to approach the Orbiter (upwind) for additional assessments. If this assessment also exceeds the TLV limits, but less than the explosive limits, then further operations shall be conducted in SCAPE.

APPENDIX A - DEFINITIONS

- 1. 1% H2: A measure of hydrogen by volume in air
- 2. <u>Alteration</u>: (PV) Change that affects the pressure containing capability of a pressure vessel. Nonphysical changes such as an increase in the maximum allowable working or design pressure (internal or external) or design temperature of a pressure vessel shall be considered an alteration. A reduction in minimum temperature such that additional mechanical tests are required shall also be considered an alteration. See ANSI/NB-23, Chapter 1, Glossary of Terms.
- 3. <u>Applicable Codes, Standards, Guides</u>: Any national consensus code, standard or guide, or any NASA KSC accepted design code, standard or guide for the design verification of pressure vessels, systems or their components.
- 4. <u>Authorized Personnel</u>: The maximum number of personnel permitted within a control area at any one time. Presence of all personnel is not mandatory. Mandatory personnel participation is normally controlled by call to stations and/or steps/sequences within the body of the procedure.
- 5. <u>Blast Danger Area (BDA)</u>: For the Space Shuttle vehicle with a full load of propellants this area is within a 4485-foot radius centered on the space vehicle including the pad.
- 6. **Breathing Escape Unit (BEU)**: Used only for escape from a hazardous environment.
- 7. **Buddy System:** The buddy system requires two people be designated to be concerned with each other's safety in a hazardous situation. The system does not demand shoulder-to-shoulder contact, but rather visual contact and a proximity that allows each buddy to help the other in an emergency.
- 8. Cat. I SCAPE: PHE with backpack. Operating time from air on to air off is 120 minutes.
- 9. Cat. IV SCAPE: Same as Category I with hose-line breathing in lieu of the backpack.
- 10. Cat. VI SCAPE: 'Chemturion' CPS "blue suit" with hose-line breathing.
- 11. <u>Caution</u>: A notation before an operational step, etc., which, if not adhered to or observed, could result in damage to equipment
- 12. <u>Certification</u>: (PV) Documentation qualifying a vessel or system to operate in its particular service.
- 13. <u>Class A PPE</u>: Personal protective equipment category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic operations that have a potential for liquid flow release and heavy vapor concentrations. Refer to Attachment A, Table A-1.
- 14. <u>Class B PPE</u>: Personal protective equipment category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic operations that have very low or no potential for liquid flow, and a low potential for liquid residuals, and a potential for vapor release. Refer to Attachment A, Table A-1.

- 15. <u>Class C PPE</u>: Personal protective equipment category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic operations that have no potential for liquid flow (hypergolic fluids), and a low potential for limited vapor release, and an expectation that the Threshold Limit Valve/time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) will or has been attained through the monitoring of the breathing zone, and there is a two-valve isolation (with independent controls) from liquid sources. Refer to Attachment A, Table A-1.
- 16. <u>Cleared Area</u>: An area where a hazardous condition exists or a hazardous operation is in progress; personnel are prohibited from entering.
- 17. <u>Close Call</u>: An occurrence or a condition of employee concern in which there is no injury or only minor injury requiring first aid and no significant equipment/property damage/mission failure (less than \$1000), but which possesses a potential to cause a mishap.
- 18. <u>Code PV/S</u>: (PV/S) Pressure vessels and pressurized systems that are designed, fabricated, installed, Code stamped, and maintained in strict conformance with the requirements of the national consensus code or standard
- 19. <u>Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)</u>: (PV/S) Commercial items that require no unique Government modification or maintenance over the life cycle of the product to meet the needs of the procuring agency. A commercial item is one customarily used for non-Governmental purposes that has been or will be sold, leased, or licensed (or offered for sale, lease, or license) in quantity to the general public. An item that includes modifications customarily available in the commercial marketplace or minor modifications made to meet NASA requirements is still a commercial item.
- 20. **Compatibility:** (COPV) The ability of two materials or substances to come into contact without altering their structure or causing a reaction in terms of permeability, flammability, ignition/combustion, functional/material degradation, contamination, toxicity, pressure/temperature, shock, oxidation, and corrosion.
- 21. **Control Area**: A designated, limited-access area where a hazardous condition exists or a hazardous operation is in progress; nonessential personnel are prohibited from entering.
- 22. **Control Point:** The area or place where the task leader and any other support groups direct and monitor the operation.
- 23. <u>Controlled (Risk) Hazard:</u> The likelihood of occurrence or severity of the associated undesirable event has been reduced to an acceptable level through the imposition of appropriate, readily implementable, verifiable controls, resulting in minimal residual risk.
- 24. <u>Controlled Switching</u>: No flight vehicle/element or GSE commands issued, no switches or circuit breakers operated on the flight elements or GSE electrically connected to the flight elements, except those commands and switch/ circuit breaker operations directed by the TD (and sub-tasks) requiring controlled switching.
- 25. <u>Credible</u>: A condition that can occur and is reasonably likely to occur. Failures of structure, pressure vessels, and pressurized lines and fittings are not considered credible failure modes if those elements comply with the applicable requirements.

- 26. <u>Critical Position</u>: A critical position is one in which the worker's job performance can directly impact ground safety, flight safety or mission success. This includes but is not limited to:
- a. Workers dealing directly with flight hardware, software, or ground support equipment, or
- b. Employees having authority to make decisions on flight hardware or software processing, or
- c. Workers involved in launch or landing activities, or
- d. Personnel who work in ground systems that have a functional or physical interface with flight systems, or
- e. Employees working with other systems that are hazardous by nature.

In the types of positions delineated above, there is not more than one level of check and balance regarding the employee's decisions or actions.

- 27. <u>Critical Lift</u>: A lift where loss of control could result in loss of life, loss or damage to flight hardware or a lift involving special, high dollar items, such as spacecraft, one-of-a-kind articles or major facility components, etc., where loss would have serious programmatic impact.
- 28. **<u>De-Rating</u>**: (PV) The lowering of the maximum allowable working pressure or narrowing of the allowable operating temperature range of a pressure vessel or system.
- 29. <u>Design Burst Pressure</u>: (PV) The theoretical pressure at which a vessel or other pressurized component would burst, based on calculations using accepted formulas and material properties. Vessels and systems to be placed in service are never subjected to a burst pressure test.
- 30. <u>Design Pressure</u>: (PV) The pressure used in the design of a vessel or system for the purpose of determining minimum permissible thickness or physical characteristics of the different parts. When applicable (for liquids), static head shall be added to the design pressure to determine the thickness of any specific part of a vessel. (Reference Appendix 3, Paragraph 3-2, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, and Paragraph 301.2, ASME B31.3).
- 31. <u>Design Temperature</u>: (PV) The metal temperature used in the design of a vessel or system for determining the minimum required thickness of the components, and for selecting the maximum allowable stress for the materials used in the vessel or system.
- 32. <u>Deviation (1)</u>: A documented variance that authorizes departure from a particular S&MA requirement, where the intent of the requirement is being met through alternate means that provide an equivalent level of safety with no additional risk.
- 33. **Deviation (2):** Documented and approved permission that authorizes the addition, deletion, or modification of steps or sequences in a Category I or Category II TOP. KSC Form 4-30A is used for this purpose.
- 34. **<u>DOT Service:</u>** (PV/S) Those uses of PV/S covered by the regulations contained in 49 CFR 100 185, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

- 35. <u>Electroexplosive Device (EED)</u>: EED Categories EEDs are categorized based on the effects of inadvertent initiation. EED categories are as follows:
- a. Category A: EEDs which, by the expenditure of their own energy, or because they initiate a chain of events, may cause injury of death to people or damage to property.
- b. Category B: EEDs, which, in themselves, or by initiating a chain of events, will not injure people or damage property.
- 36. <u>Eliminated Hazard:</u> A hazard that has been eliminated by completely removing the hazard causal factors.
- 37. <u>Emergency Instructions</u>: Written instructions, contained within a TOP that provide for safing hardware and for implementing emergency actions required to evacuate or safeguard personnel, and prevent or limit the extent of damage should an emergency arise.
- 38. <u>Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA)</u>: Used only for escape from a hazardous environment.
- 39. <u>Emergency Procedures Document (EPD)</u>: A document produced for work areas to provide the processing teams with procedures to be followed if an emergency occurs at any time in that facility.
- 40. **End Item:** A final combination of end products, components, parts or materials that is ready for its intended use.
- 41. <u>Essential Personnel</u>: The number of personnel required within the control area to perform a particular operation.
- 42. **Excluded PV/S:** (PV/S) A PV/S that is not required to meet the certification (or recertification) requirements of NPD 8710.5, NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems, and need not be included in the PV/S configuration management system. Excluded PV/S are subject to all applicable laws, regulations, safety requirements, NASA requirements, and appropriate NCS and must be maintained in accordance with applicable NCS.
- 43. **Existing PV/S**: (PV/S) PV/S shall be considered to be "Existing PV/S" if installed no later than 6 months from the date of original issue of this document.
- 44. **Explosive Test Equipment**: Electrical circuit test equipment used for testing explosives items, pyrotechnic devices, or circuits connected to those items before or after installation.
- 45. **Explosives:** Any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation, or other suitable initiation, undergoes a very rapid chemical change with the evolution of large volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressures in the surrounding medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or deflagrate.
- 46. <u>Factor of Safety (FOS)</u>: (COPV) Ratio of design burst pressure to maximum ground processing pressure.

- 47. **Factor of Safety (FS)**: (PV/S) Unless otherwise noted, this refers to the material design factor of safety on structural failure and is equal to the lesser of the material strength divided by the material stress under anticipated loading or the actual buckling load divided by the anticipated buckling load.
- 48. **First Aid:** (Ref. 29CFR 1904.7(b)(5)(ii)) "First Aid" means the following:
- (a) Using a non-prescription medication at nonprescription strength (for medications available in both prescription and non-prescription form, a recommendation by a physician or other licensed health care professional to use a non-prescription medication at prescription strength is considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes);
- (b) Administering tetanus immunizations (other immunizations, such as Hepatitis B vaccine or rabies vaccine, are considered medical treatment);
- (c) Cleaning, flushing or soaking wounds on the surface of the skin;
- (d) Using wound coverings such as bandages, Band-Aids™, gauze pads, etc.; or using butterfly bandages or Steri-Strips™ (other wound closing devices such as sutures, staples, etc., are considered medical treatment);
- (e) Using hot or cold therapy;
- (f) Using any non-rigid means of support, such as elastic bandages, wraps, non-rigid back belts, etc. (devices with rigid stays or other systems designed to immobilize parts of the body are considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes);
- (g) Using temporary immobilization devices while transporting an accident victim (e.g., splints, slings, neck collars, back boards, etc.).
- (h) Drilling of a fingernail or toenail to relieve pressure, or draining fluid from a blister;
- (i) Using eye patches;
- (j) Removing foreign bodies from the eye using only irrigation or a cotton swab;
- (k) Removing splinters or foreign material from areas other than the eye by irrigation, tweezers, cotton swabs or other simple means;
- (I) Using finger guards;
- (m) Using massages (physical therapy or chiropractic treatment are considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes); or
- (n) Drinking fluids for relief of heat stress.

Note: Per 29CFR 1904.7(b)(5)(iii) this is a complete list of all treatments considered first aid.

49. <u>Flexhose</u>: There are two basic types of flexhoses – those constructed entirely of metal, herein described by the term "metal hose", and those constructed of elastomeric material or a combination of elastomeric material and metal, herein described by the term "nonmetallic hose".

- a. Metal Hose: A metal hose consisting of a flexible metal pressure carrier tube surrounded by an outer layer of wire braid (some low pressure metal hoses do not utilize an outer layer of wire braid). The flexible metal pressure carrier tube and the wire braid are attached to the hose end fittings by welding, silver-soldering, or brazing (some metal hoses used for cryogenic applications utilize an inner and outer flexible metal tube with a vacuum in the space between the inner and outer flexible tubes).
- b. Nonmetallic Hose: A nonmetallic hose consists of a polytetrafluoroethylene or other flexible elastomeric material pressure carrier tube reinforced by fabric or wire braid with metal end fittings attached by mechanical means such as swaging or crimping.
- 50. <u>Flight Hardware Processing Facilities</u>: Buildings and areas, to include their respective perimeter fence, where flight hardware is processed.
- 51. <u>Flight Termination System</u>: A radio commanded airborne system whose purpose is to detonate explosives installed on the flight vehicle to end the vehicle's flight.
- 52. **Fracture Control**: Fracture control is a set of policies and procedures involving the application of analysis and design methodology, manufacturing technology, and operating procedures to prevent structural failure due to the initiation of and/or propagation of flaws or crack-like defects during fabrication, testing, and service life.
- 53. **Fracture Mechanics**: An engineering concept used to predict flaw growth and fracture behavior in materials and structures containing cracks or crack-like flaws.
- 54. **Ground-based PV/S:** (PV/S) All PV/S, including PV/S based on barges, ships, or other transport vehicles, not specifically excluded in this document. Flight weight PV/S used for their intended purpose aboard active air or space craft, even though on the ground, are not included in this definition, but flight weight PV/S converted to ground use are included.
- 55. **Ground Support Equipment (GSE):** Ground-based equipment used to store, transport, handle, test, checkout, service, and control aircraft, launch vehicles, spacecraft, or payloads.
- 56. <u>Hazardous Fluids</u>: (PV) Gases or liquids of such a nature that a given quantity of the gas or liquid's vapor, when mixed or unmixed with air, is hazardous to personnel or equipment due to flammability, toxicity, or extremes of temperature. The following fluids are considered to be hazardous; additional fluids may be designated to be hazardous at the discretion of the KSC PSM.
- a. Alcohol
- b. Ammonia
- c. Gaseous Hydrogen
- d. Liquefied Petroleum Gases (Propane, Butane, as defined in NFPA 58)
- e. Liquid Air
- f. Liquid Hydrogen
- g. Liquid Nitrogen
- h. Liquid Oxygen
- i. Trichloroethylene
- 57. <u>Hazardous Material</u>: Any solid, liquid, or gaseous material which meets the hazard reporting requirements of 29CFR 1910.1200. This includes commodities that, under

foreseeable conditions, are toxic, carcinogenic, cryogenic, explosive, flammable, pyrophoric, water-reactive, corrosive, an oxidizer, a compressed gas, a combustible liquid, or are chemically unstable.

- 58. <u>Hazardous Operation (Hazardous Tasks)</u>: Any operation involving materials or equipment that has a high potential to result in loss of life, serious injury to personnel, or damage to systems, equipment or facilities.
- 59. **Hazardous Steps Affected/Added:** All changes and deviations which:
- a. Change or modify hazardous steps.
- b. Initiate/add hazardous steps to existing hazardous/nonhazardous TOPs.
- c. Intensify/extend hazardous steps to existing hazardous TOPs (e.g., extend duration/time of hazardous operation, extend hazardous control area, and add number of personnel in control area).
- d. Change the existing safety requirements.
- 60. **<u>Hazardproof</u>**: Prevention of an explosive atmosphere penetrating electrical fixtures where sparking or arcing could occur.
- 61. <u>Hydrostatic Test</u>: (PV) The test of a pressure vessel or system during which the vessel or system is filled with a liquid (usually water) and pressurized to a designated level in a manner prescribed in the applicable code. (Reference Paragraph UG-99, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or Article T-3, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2.)
- 62. **Hydraulics**: (PV/S) Hydraulic systems using commercially available hydraulic fluid. Note: Associated pneumatic storage, actuation devices, or components that are used in a hydraulic system are not considered hydraulics. Pressurized hydraulic fluid containing devices are included if the system is included.
- 63. <u>Impact Limit Line</u>: A line defining a limit beyond which a missile/spacecraft or specified portions thereof will not be allowed to impact.
- 64. <u>Inactive Vessels/Systems:</u> (PV) These are vessels/ systems which are not in service because of changes in program requirements and have no current planned usage but have not been determined to be unsafe.
- 65. <u>Industrial Operation</u>: A task, usually performed in one location, and consisting of one or more work elements in which the person(s) performing the task has had training (certificate, license, etc.) to meet the technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices and methods that have been adopted as standard (e.g., machinist, electrician, plumber, fork lift operator, chemical handler.)
- 66. <u>Inservice Inspection (ISI)</u>: (PV) A periodic inspection of a vessel or system while in service. If required, the vessel or system will be inoperative during the inspection.
- 67. <u>Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan</u>: (PV) The plan is a list of inspections and tests and the frequency to be performed on the pressure vessels and/or pressurized systems.

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- 68. <u>Integrated Procedure</u>: A procedure requiring the concurrence/approval of more than one contractor or KSC Primary Directorate Government organization, or other independent separate organizations involving test of interfacing systems, components, or elements.
- 69. <u>Interim Change</u>: Change made to an existing and approved TOP when there is insufficient time available to prepare a formal change (e.g., change pages). OMI deviations are one form of an interim change.
- 70. Job Cards: A Category I TOP designed for computer release through work control.
- 71. <u>Leak Before Burst (LBB)</u>: (COPV) A failure mode such that any initial flaw in the Gr/Ep COPV liner will grow through the liner to cause leakage without burst of the overwrap.
- 72. <u>Lethal Fluids</u>: (PV) Poisonous gases or liquids of such a nature that a very small amount of the gas or liquid mixed, or unmixed with air, is dangerous to life when inhaled. See ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, Paragraphs UW-2 and UCI-2, Division 2, Paragraph AG 301.1, and ASME B31.1, Appendix M. The following specification-grade fluids are to be considered lethal; additional fluids may be designated to be lethal at the discretion of the KSC PSM.
- a. Aerozene 50
- b. Hydrazine
- c. Monomethyl Hydrazine
- d. Nitrogen Tetroxide
- e. Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine
- 73. <u>Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager (LDEM)</u>: The individual, designated by the KSC Center Director, who is responsible for the overall management of the KSC Lifting Devices and Equipment Program. The LDEM resides in the Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Division.
- 74. <u>Local Control Area</u>: A controlled access area (usually less than a 50-foot radius of the hazardous task) in which control is manageable on location by the operation and maintenance contractor and safety personnel using visual/voice contact to ensure personnel safety.
- 75. <u>Major Control Area</u>: A controlled access area (usually greater than a 50-foot radius of the hazardous task) in which access management requires additional positive controls to ensure the safety of personnel.
- 76. <u>Maximum Allowable Stress Value</u>: (PV) The maximum unit stress permissible for any specified material that may be used in the design formulas.
- 77. Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP): (PV) The maximum gage pressure permissible at the top of a completed vessel in its operating position for a designated temperature. This pressure is based on calculations for every element of the vessel using nominal thickness exclusive of allowances for corrosion and thickness required for loading other than pressure. It is the same as the design pressure for all cases where separate calculations are not made to determine MAWP. The MAWP is the basis for the pressure setting of the pressure relieving devices protecting the vessel.

- 78. <u>Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP)</u>: (PV) The highest pressure at which a vessel or system component normally operates. This pressure is based on operating requirements and may not exceed the MAWP or design pressure. MOP is synonymous with MEOP (Maximum Expected Operating Pressure) or maximum working pressure.
- 79. **Maximum Work Time Deviation:** An authorized exceedance of the MWT provisions that is documented and approved prior to the exceedance.
- 80. **Maximum Work Time Violation:** Exceedance of MWT limits without preapproval.
- 81. <u>Medical Treatment:</u> (29CFR 1904.7(b)(5)(i)) "Medical treatment" means the management and care of a patient to combat disease or disorder. For the purposes of Part 1904, medical treatment does not include:
- (a) Visits to a physician or other licensed health care professional solely for observation or counseling;
- (b) The conduct of diagnostic procedures, such as x-rays and blood tests, including the administration of prescription medications used solely for diagnostic purposes (e.g., eye drops to dilate pupils); or
- (c) "First aid" as defined see First Aid.
- 82. <u>Mishap</u>: An undesired and unexpected event that results in injury requiring more than first aid, occupational illness to personnel, and/or damage to property greater than \$1000.. Mishaps also include injuries or occupational illnesses resulting from repetitive stresses or exposures over a prolonged period of time. For purposes of investigation and reporting, mishaps are categorized as follows: Type A, Type B, Type C or Type D.
- 83. National Consensus Standard: (PV) Any standard, or modification thereof: (1) adopted or promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization using procedures that demonstrate to the Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health that those persons interested in or affected by the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adoption; (2) formulated so that an opportunity existed for diverse views to be considered; and (3) designated by the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies. (NOTE: A standard, as defined, requires appropriate conditions or activities to provide a safe and healthful employment environment.)
- 84. **Non-Code PV/S**: (PV/S) Any pressure vessel that is not stamped with the appropriate symbol and documented as complying with the original construction Code or any pressure piping system that does not meet the requirements of the appropriate fabrication code (e.g. ASME Section VIII, B31.1, B31.3), including PV/S that were fabricated from non-Code materials by non-Code processes or organizations.
- 85. **Non-Safety-Related Discrepancy:** (PV) Any discrepancy that does not increase the potential for injury or death to personnel or damage to hardware. The following are considered non-safety-related discrepancies (others may be added at the discretion of the KSC PSM):
- a. Panels/systems not properly identified.
- b. Stainless steel piping or tubing not coated for corrosion protection.

- c. Missing or illegible identification tags on components (except for relief devices, pressure gages, and flex hoses).
- d. Discrepancies between documentation and hardware.
- e. Minor corrosion of vessels, piping, components, or supports.
- 86. **Nondestructive Examination**: (PV/S) The application of technical methods to examine materials or components in ways that do not impair future usefulness and serviceability in order to detect, locate, measure, and evaluate flaws; to assess integrity, properties, and composition; and to measure geometrical characteristics.
- 87. Open Grain: Exposed solid propellant.
- 88. **Operating or Working Temperature**: (PV) The metal temperature that will be maintained in the part of the vessel or system under consideration during normal operation.
- 89. <u>Operating Pressure</u>: (PV) The gage pressure at which a vessel (top of the vessel) or system normally operates. For a vessel, it shall not exceed MAWP, and for a system, it may not exceed the design pressure, except for occasional variations in design pressure.
- 90. **Operations Planning Sheets:** A form used for repetitive TOPs, which is released for documentation and control of a single performance of a TOP.
- 91. **Owner**: (PV/S) The management of the organization responsible for the PV/S as defined in NPD 8710.5, NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems.
- 92. **Phase 1 Lightning Watch:** Conditions in the atmosphere, developing or observed, that is expected to produce, or is producing, lightning which will arrive at specified areas within 30 minutes.
- 93. **Phase 2 Lightning Warning:** Lightning observed or thunder heard within 5 nautical miles, or forecaster determines the threat of lightning is immediate.
- 94. **Photographic Equipment**: Cameras, still and video, and electronic and/or enclosed flash assemblies.
- 95. **Physical Agent:** Any environmental factor, such as noise, temperature extremes, vibrations, etc., which may cause harm or injury to personnel
- 96. **Placard Procedure:** A simple procedure written or printed on a plaque attached to a facility or GSE end item that provides instructions for activating/deactivating that item.
- 97. <u>Pneumatic Test</u>: (PV) A test of a pressure vessel or system in which a gas is introduced and pressurized to a designated level in a manner prescribed in the applicable code. (Reference Paragraph UG-100, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, or Article T-4, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2, and Paragraph 345.5, ASME B31.1.)
- 98. **Pressure Cycle:** (PV) The initiation and establishment of new pressure levels followed by a return to the conditions that prevailed at the beginning of the cycle. Two types of pressure cycles are considered:

a. Full pressure (startup or shutdown) cycle: any pressure cycle which has atmospheric pressure as one of its extremes and normal operating conditions (not exceeding vessel MAWP/design pressure) as its other extreme.

Partial pressure (normal operating) cycle: any pressure cycle within the full pressure cycle, which is required for the vessel or system to perform its intended purpose.

- 99. **Pressure Relief Device (PRD)**: (PV/S) A pressure relief device designed to actuate on inlet static pressure and to reclose after normal conditions have been restored. This includes relief valves, safety valves, and safety relief valves [Note: this definition is that of ASME PTC 25-2001.]
- 100. <u>Pressure Relief Device Set Pressure</u>: (PV/S) The pressure at which a pressure relief device is set to operate. Set to operate means the set pressure of a relief valve or spring-loaded nonreclosing device, the bursting pressure of a rupture disk device or the breaking pressure of a breaking pin device. (Reference Paragraphs UG-125 and UG-134, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, and Part AR, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2.)
- 101. **Pressure System:** (PV) An assembly of components under pressure, including vessels, piping, valves, relief devices, pumps, expansion joints, gages, etc. This includes systems containing hazardous or lethal fluids at any pressure above 0 MPa (gage) (0 lb/in² (gage)) and systems containing nonhazardous or nonlethal fluids above 0.1 MPa (gage) (15 lb/in² (gage)), unless otherwise specifically excluded.
- 102: <u>Pressure Systems Manager (PSM)</u>: (PV) The individual designated by the KSC Center Director who is responsible for the overall management of the KSC Pressure Vessel/Systems (PV/S) Certification Program. The KSC PSM resides in the S&MA Institutional Safety and Quality Division.
- 103: **Pressure Test:** See Hydrostatic Test and Pneumatic Test.
- 104: **Pressure Vessel:** (PV) Any vessel used for the storage or handling of gas or liquid under positive pressure. Included in this definition are components of systems (e.g., heat exchanger shells and drying towers, and other shell structures) for which the rules of the ASME Code, Section VIII, would apply. Vessels containing hazardous or lethal fluids at any pressure above 0 MPa (gage) (0 lb/in² (gage)), and vessels containing nonhazardous or nonlethal fluids above 0.1 MPa (gage) (15 lb/in² (gage)) are included unless otherwise specifically excluded.
- 105: **Pretask Briefing:** A briefing held immediately prior to the start of (a) hazardous sequence(s), which details the hazard(s) and objective(s) associated with that particular sequence.
- 106. **Pretest Briefing:** A briefing held prior to the start of a hazardous operation with a major control area, which details the hazard(s) and objective(s) of the operation and confirms that all operational and support elements are ready.
- 107. **Processing Mishap/Close Call:** A mishap or close call, which occurs during the act of ground processing of flight hardware.

- 108. **Program/Project or Directorate Organization:** The Government/contractor organization having direct responsibility for performing a task associated with: assembly/ disassembly; checkout, maintenance; servicing; repair; and operation of ground support equipment or flight hardware/systems.
- 109. **Proof Tests to Establish Maximum Allowable Working Pressure**: (PV) Pressure test which establishes the maximum allowable working pressure of a vessel, system, or component thereof, may be used: (1) When the strength cannot be computed with a satisfactory assurance of accuracy; (2) When the thickness cannot be determined by means of the design rules of the applicable code or standard; or (3) When the critical flaw size to cause failure at the certified pressure cannot be identified by other nondestructive test methods. This test is to be performed in a manner equivalent to one of the methods specified in Paragraph UG-101 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1, latest edition. Proof tests may be performed only upon approval of the KSC PSM.
- 110. **PV/S Representative**: (PV) The individual(s) assigned to represent an organization in all matters relating to PV/S and shall be identified to the PSM.
- 111. <u>Radio Frequency (RF) Silence</u>: When all RF transmitters/emitters on the SSV, payloads, associated flight equipment, or GSE within the applicable facility, including LC-39 A/B, are in the power-off position.
- 112. **Rated Load:** The static weight the basic equipment can safely support or lift.
- 113. **Real-Time Decision/Action:** A real-time decision or action is one that affects personnel safety or NASA operational mission accomplishment by causing:
- a. The potential to deviate from a normal or standard practice.
- b. A minimum amount of time or no time to functionally verify the adequacy of the real-time decision or action and its effect to be performed.
- 114. **Recall System:** (PV) A system which tracks selected components subject to periodic calibration, inspection, or test. Components included in recall systems are relief valves, pressure gages, and flex hoses.
- 115. **Recertification:** (PV) The procedure (appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, analyses, and documentation), which qualifies a previously certified vessel or system to continue or be returned to operation at a designated pressure.
- 116. **Recertification Interval**: (PV) The time between recertifications when a certified status is maintained through documented periodic examinations and inspections to determine acceptable vessel or system condition. This time period must me determined when the ISI plan is developed, and the length of this period will depend on the results of the initial and subsequent inspections, tests, and engineering analyses.
- 117. **Reissue:** A revised edition of an existing approved TOP that contains updated material, or has a different effectivity, to which the OMI or change applies.
- 118. **Repair**: (PV) The work necessary to restore a pressure vessel or system to a safe and satisfactory operating condition, provided there is no deviation from the original design.

- 119. **Rerated Vessel or System:** (PV) (1) A vessel or system judged to be unsafe, unsuitable, or unnecessary for continued operation at its original design pressure and/or temperature limits. (2) A vessel or system recertified to operate at a lesser or greater pressure and/or temperature limit relative to its original designs.
- 120. **Revision:** A modification of information contained in an approved existing TOP.
- 121. <u>Risk Assessment Code:</u> A numerical expression of comparative risk determined by an evaluation of both the potential severity of a condition and the likelihood of its occurrence causing an expected consequence.
- 122. **Safety Concurrence:** The consent required from the safety organization, having operational jurisdiction, prior to start of procedures containing hazardous operations, prior to hazardous steps or sequences, prior to the alteration of hazardous steps/sequences, and prior to opening the control area for controlled work at the conclusion of hazardous activities.
- 123. **Safety Coverage**: The presence of a Safety professional, or designee, during operations as determined by an assessment as follows:
- a. Full-time Coverage: The safety professional will be onsite to provide a go-to-proceed with the operation, monitor operations and controls to ensure compliance with safe performance and provide technical safety assistance as needed during the entire operation.
- b. Part-time Coverage: The safety professional shall be onsite to provide a go-to-proceed with the operation, periodically and at the end to reopen the area.
- c. Optional Coverage: The safety professional is not required for onsite coverage.
- 124. <u>Safety Critical</u>: Any condition, event, operation, process, equipment, or system that could cause or lead to severe injury, major damage, or mission failure if performed or built improperly, or allowed to remain uncorrected.
- 125. **Safety Factor**: The ratio of a load that predicts a failure to a rated load.
- 126. **Safety Professional:** Person meeting the Office of Personnel Management standards for such occupations defined in 29CFR 1960.2(s) (Definitions) for Government operations or equally qualified military, agency or nongovernment for contractor operations. NASA KSC Safety shall be responsible for determination of equally qualified personnel. Safety Specialists, Representatives, and Inspectors shall have competence to recognize Safety and/or health hazards in the workplace.
- 127. <u>Safety-Related Hardware Discrepancy</u>: (PV) Any hardware discrepancy that could increase the potential for injury or death to personnel or damage to hardware. The following are considered safety-related discrepancies:
- a. Primary relief device set above the certified MAWP or design pressure.
- b. Relief device with insufficient flow capacity.
- c. Relief device past due for calibration.

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- d. Relief device with missing or illegible identification tag.
- e. Pressure gage out of calibration or past due.
- f. Obvious physical damage (e.g., crushed or kinked flexhose, dented or nicked piping/tubing/vessels, or heavy corrosion of vessels/piping).
- g. Not labeling the vessel's MAWP/service fluid.
- 128. <u>Safety-Relief Device Set Pressure</u>: (PV) The pressure at which a pressure relief device is set to operate. Set to operate means the set pressure of a relief valve or spring-loaded nonreclosing device, the bursting pressure of a rupture disk device or the breaking pressure of a breaking pin device. (Reference Paragraphs UG-125 and UG-134, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, and Part AR, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2.)
- 129. <u>Safety or Safety Representative</u>: The term Safety is used without context to contractor or NASA personnel. When the phrase "NASA Safety" is used, it shall be construed to mean a Government Safety representative only.
- 130. **Shall:** A mandatory S&MA requirement. Noncompliance with a "shall" statement requires approval of a variance.
- 131. **Should:** An S&MA rule/requirement that is recommendation (guidance). The advisability of a "should" statement depends on the specific facts in a given situation. Implementation of a "should" statement is at the discretion of the responsible KSC program/project or directorate organization.
- 132. **Software:** Computer programs developed to operate, control, service, or check out flight (including payload systems/subsystems) and/or ground support systems/ equipment hardware.
- 133. **Splash (KSC Vapor Suit)**: Two-piece garment consisting of a hooded pullover blouse and trousers with boots and lightweight, long gauntlet gloves.
- 134. **Sub-task TOP:** A procedure used to perform work when called up by another TOP (usually an integrated TOP).
- 135. <u>Sub-task-only TOP</u>: A procedure preplanned to be performed only as a subtask to a controlling procedure and may contain limited Safety controls.
- 136. **System Certification Pressure**: (PV) The maximum pressure that has been applied to a system; however, no system element can have its MAWP exceeded when the certification pressure has been applied.
- 137. **System Safety:** Application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize risks within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle.
- 138. <u>Task Leader</u>: A person who has been trained and certified/stand boarded by his organization for a particular task.

- 139. <u>Technical Operating Procedure (TOP)</u>: A written communication that identifies and directs work to be performed and provides the detailed instructions necessary to accomplish a task.
- a. Category I TOP: Provides detailed procedures for the operation, maintenance, and verification of ground support systems and equipment. Instructions for assembly and disassembly, checkout, servicing, verification, handling, and transportation of the space vehicle and components including payload systems, subsystems, and experiments during prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch operations are also provided.
- b. Category II TOP: Provides engineering instructions, authorizes work, establishes work control methods, in order to accommodate special tests or authorize temporary installations, removals, or replacements. Category II procedures shall not be used to change or replace Category I procedures.
- 140. <u>Temporary equipment (PV/S)</u> (PV/S) non government owned equipment that is not required to meet the certification (or recertification) requirements of NPD 8710.5, NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems or NASA-STD-8719.17, NASA Requirements for Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems (PV/S). Temporary equipment is subject to all applicable laws, regulations, NASA safety requirements, OSHA requirements, and appropriate NCS. This typically includes contractor supplied rental equipment leased from an offsite location.
- 141. <u>Test Article PV/S</u>: (PVS) A PV/S object(s) being tested for the sole purpose of obtaining data (other than integrity data) on the object(s).
- 142. <u>Test Specific PV/S</u>: (PV/S) PV/S used to perform testing of a specific test article. PVS used on a permanent or repeated basis, or built up of components used repeatedly for testing different hardware or configurations are not part of this category.
- 143. <u>Threshold Limit Value-Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA)</u>: The time weighted average concentration for a normal 8 hour workday and a 40 hour workweek, to which workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect.
- 144. <u>Trained Inspector</u>: (COPV) A person trained specifically in the detection of visual damage of COPVs and familiarized with the NDE methods and results that could be used to aid in the interpretation of visual damage. JSC White Sands Test Facility typically conducts this training.
- 145. <u>Type A Mishap</u>: A mishap causing death, permanent total disability, hospitalization (within a 30 day period from the mishap) of three or more persons for other than observation, and/or damage to equipment or property and/or mission failure resulting in loss equal to greater than \$1 million. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in which the damage was unexpected or unplanned.
- 146. **Type B Mishap:** A mishap resulting in permanent partial disability to one or more persons, in-patient hospitalization of 2 or less personnel, damage to equipment or property and/or mission failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than \$250,000, but less than \$1 million. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in which the damage was unexpected or unplanned.

- 147. **Type C Mishap:** A mishap resulting in damage to equipment or property, or mission failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than \$25,000, but less than \$250,000, and/or causing occupational injury or illness that results in a case involving day(s) away from work or restricted duty. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in which the damage was unexpected or unplanned.
- 148. **Type D Mishap:** A mishap consisting of personal injury requiring medical treatment greater than first aid but without any lost time or restricted duty and/or property damage or mission failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than \$1000, but less than \$25,000. Permanent occupational
- 149. <u>Unprotected Heights</u>: Personnel exposure to within 6-feet of an unprotected-leading edge from which there is a drop of more than 4-feet (6-feet for construction)
- 150. <u>Unsafe Vessels or Systems:</u> (PV) These are vessels or systems, which have been determined to be unsafe for service.
- 151. <u>Vacuum System</u>: (PV) An assembly of components under vacuum (internal pressure less than that of the surrounding atmosphere) including vessels, piping, valves, relief devices, pumps, expansion joints, and gages.
- 152. **Vacuum Vessel**: (PV) A vessel in which the internal pressure has been reduced to a level less than that of the surrounding atmosphere.
- 153. <u>Variance</u>: Documented and approved permission to perform some act or operation contrary to established requirements. The two types of variances are Deviations and Waivers.
- 154. <u>Visible damage</u>: (COPV) Anomalies that are visible to the naked eye under not less than 15-foot candles at a distance no greater than 24 inches and no less than a 30 degree angle. Lighting up to 50-foot candles may be used for the detection or study of small anomalies.
- 155. <u>Waiver</u>: A documented variance that authorizes departure from a specific S&MA requirement, where an increased level of risk has been documented and accepted.
- 156. **Warning**: A notation which if not adhered to or observed could result in loss of life, personal injury, or exposure.
- 157. **Workday**: Any day a person reports to work, regardless of the amount of time spent on the job. The workday begins when a person reports to work and ends when he or she leaves.
- 158. **Workweek**: Any 7 day period beginning on Sunday and ending on Saturday, or other 7 day period, as specified and documented by an organization for accounting purposes.

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APPENDIX B - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

 AC ACGIH AFGE AFMAN AFMC AHJ ANSI AP APS APU ARCS ARF ASME 	Alternating Current American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists American Federation of Government Employees Air Force Manual Air Force Material Command Authority Having Jurisdiction American National Standards Institute Ammonium Perchlorate Aft Propulsion System Auxiliary Power Unit Aft Reaction Control System Assembly and Refurbishment Facility American Society of Mechanical Engineers
14. BDA 15. BEU 16. BSM	Blast Danger Area Breathing Escape Unit Booster Separation Motor
17. c/o 18. Cat. 19. CAP 20. CAPPS 21. CCAFS 22. CCB 23. CCF 24. CD 25. CDE 26. CDDT 27. CDF 28. CFR 29. CGA 30. CIL 31. COPV 32. COTS 33. CPS 34. CT	Check-Out Category Corrective Action Plan Checkout Assembly & Payload Processing Services Contract Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Change Control Board Converter Compressor Facility Center Director Center Declared Emergency Countdown Demonstration Test Confined Detonating Fuse Code of Federal Regulations Compressed Gas Association Critical Items List Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel Commercial Off The Shelf Chemical Protection Suit Crawler Transporter
35. DBP 36. DC 37. DCR 38. DMES 39. DO 40. DOD 41. DOT 42. DRA	Design Burst Pressure Direct Current Document Change Recommendation Dimethylethoxsilane Duty Officer Department of Defense Department of Transportation Document Release Authorization
43. ECS 44. EDO 45. EED	Environmental Control System Extended Duration Orbiter Electroexplosive Device

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.	ELSA EMU EOM EPD ERP ESP ET ETA ETE ETVAS EWR	Emergency Life Support Apparatus Electro-Mechanical Extravehicular Mobility Unit End of Mission Emergency Procedures Document Emergency Response Plan Engine Service Platform External Tank Explosive Transfer Assembly Explosives Test Equipment External Tank Vent Arm System Eastern Western Range
59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 70.	FDS FIV FJAF FM FMEA FOS FRCS FRF FRSI FSI FSM FSS FTA	Fluid Distribution System Fuel Isolation Valve Field Joint Assembly Fixture Factory Mutual Frequency Modulation Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Factor of Safety Forward Reactant Control System Flight Readiness Firing Felt Reusable Surface Insulation Factor of Safety Fuel Supply Module Fixed Service Structure Fault Tree Analysis
73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.	GHe GH ₂ GO ₂ GOAL GOX Gr/Ep GSE GUCP	Gaseous Helium Gaseous Hydrogen Gaseous Oxygen Ground Operations Aerospace Language Gaseous Oxygen Graphite Epoxy Ground Support Equipment Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate
81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.	H ₂ HB HDP HGDS HMF HP HPU HPWF HVDS HVES	Hydrogen High Bay Hold Down Post Hazardous Gas Detection System Hypergol Maintenance Facility High Pressure Hydraulic Power Unit High Pressure Wash Facility Hypergol Vapor Detection System Hypergolic Vent Exhaust System
90. 91. 92.		Independent Assessment Identification Incident Reporting and Investigation System

93. ISI 94. ISS 95. IT	Inservice Inspection International Space Station Intertank
96. JSC 97. JBOSC	Johnson Space Center (NASA, Houston, Texas) Joint Base Operations Support Contract
98. KCA 99. KNPD 100. KNPR 101. KPD 102. KSC 103. kV 104. kW	Kennedy Customer Agreement Kennedy NASA Policy Directive Kennedy NASA Procedural Requirements KSC Program Directive Kennedy Space Center (NASA, KSC, Florida) Kilovolt Kilowatt
105. lb/in 106. LC 107. LD 108. LDA 109. LDEM 110. LEL 111. LH 112. LH ₂ 113. LLIS 114. LOMS 115. LO ₂ 116. OX 117. LP 118. LSC 119. LSP	Pound per square inch Launch Complex Launch Director Launch Danger Area Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager Lower Explosive Limit Left Hand Liquid Hydrogen Lessons Learned Information System Left OMS Liquid Oxygen Liquid Oxygen Liquefied Propane Linear Shape Charge Launch Support Program
120. M&P 121. MAWP 122. MDD 123. MDMT 124. MDOP 125. MEC 126. MEOP 127. MIB 128. MIL 129. MLG 130. MLP 131. MMH 132. MOP 133. MOU 134. MPa 135. MR 136. MRB 137. MSD 138. MTB 139. mV	Materials and Processes Maximum Allowable Working Pressure Mate/Demate Device Minimum Design Material Temperature Maximum Design Operating Pressure Master Events Controller Maximum Expected Operating Pressure Mishap Investigation Board Military Main Landing Gear Mobile Launch Platform Monomethylhydrazine Maximum Operating Pressure Memorandum of Understanding MegaPascal Material Review Material Review Board Musculoskeletal Disorder Materials Testing Branch Millivolt

140	MVAK	Module Vertical Access Kit
	MWT	Maximum Work Time
4.40	N	
	N_2H_4	Hydrazine Nitragan Tatravida
143. 144.	N ₂ O ₄	Nitrogen Tetroxide
	NASA	Not Applicable National Aeronautics and Space Administration
	NCC	NASA Convoy Commander
	NCS	National Consensus Codes and Standards
	NDE	Nondestructive Evaluation
149.	NDI	Nondestructive Inspection
150.	NEC	National Electrical Code
	NEPO	NASA Emergency Preparedness Officer
	NFC	National Fire Code
	NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
	NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
	NPD NPG	NASA Policy Directive NASA Procedures and Guidelines
150.		Nonstock
	NSI	NASA Standard Initiator
	NSS	NASA Safety Standard
160.	NSTS	National Space Transportation System
161.	NTD	NASA Test Director
162.	O ₂	Oxygen
	O&C	Operations and Checkout
	O&M	Operations and Maintenance
165.	O&SHA	Operating and Support Hazard Analysis
	OAA	Orbiter Access Arm
	ODS	Orbiter Docking System
	ODMS	Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System
170.	OHF	Occupational Health Facility Orbiter Integration Clerk
170.		Operational Intercommunications System
		Orbiter Midbody Umbilical Unit
	OMD	Operations and Maintenance Documentation
174.	OME	Orbiter Main Engine
175.		Operations and Maintenance Instructions
		Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
	OMS	Orbiter Maneuvering Subsystem
	OPF	Orbiter Processing Facility Office of Primary Responsibility
	OPR OSF	Office of Primary Responsibility Ordnance Storage Facility
	OSH	Occupational Safety and Health
	OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
	OTC	Orbiter Test Conductor
	OTV	Operational Television
185.	PA	Public Affairs
	PAWS	Paging and Area Warning System
	DOD	• • •
187.	PCR	Payload Changeout Room

189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 299. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205.	PLB PM PNL ppm PRA PRSD psid psig PSM PTCR	Program Declared Emergency Permissible Exposure Level Payloads Ground Operations Contract Preliminary Hazard Analysis Propellant Handlers Ensemble Pyro Initiator Controller Payload Bay Preventive Maintenance Panel Parts per million Probabilistic Risk Assessment Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Pounds Per Square Inch Differential Pounds Per Square Inch Gage Pressure Systems Manager Pad Terminal Connection Room Pressure Vessel Pressure Volume Temperature
207.	QD	Quick Disconnect
209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219.		Reliability and Maintainability Reliability Block Diagram Analysis Reliability Centered Maintenance Reaction Control System Radio Frequency Relative Humidity Root-Mean-Square Right OMS Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility Risk Review Board Rotating Service Structure Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Return to Launch Site
222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 278. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234.	SAR SCAPE SCBA SCC SCFM SCO SFOC SFP SHA	Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Safety Control Center Standard Cubic Feet per Minute Space Craft Operator Space Flight Operations Contract Single Failure Point System Hazard Analysis Shuttle Landing Facility

236. SPF	Spray Paint Facility
	Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance
238. SRB	Solid Rocket Booster
239. SRE	Safety and Reliability Engineering
240. SRM	Solid Rocket Motor
241. SRIM&Q 242. SRSS	A Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Shuttle Range Safety System
242. SKSS 243. SSA	Software Safety Analysis
244. SSHA	Subsystem Hazard Analysis
245. SSME	Space Shuttle Main Engine
246. SSP	Space Shuttle Program
247. SSR	Safety Statistics Record
248. SSV	Space Shuttle Vehicle
249. STD	Standard
250. STS	Space Transportation System
152. SW	Switch
252. SW	Space Wing
253. TAL	Transatlantic Abort Landing
254. TC	Test Conductor
255. TCDT	Terminal Count-Down Test
256. TD	Test Director
257. TLV-TVV 258. TOP	'A Threshold Limit Value-Time Weighted Average
259. TSM	Technical Operating Procedure Tail Service Mast
260. TTL	Task Team Leader
261. TVC	Toxic Vapor Check
262. UHF	Ultra High Frequency
263. UL	Underwriters Laboratories
264. USAF	United States Air Force
265. UT	Ultrasonic
266. UTPA	Universal Throat Plug Assembly Ultrasonic Testing-Thickness
207. 01-11110	Olliasonic resultg-friickness
268. VAB	Vehicle Assembly Building
269. VAFB	Vandenberg Air Force Base
270. VE	Visual External
271. VHF	Very High Frequency
272. VPF	Vertical Processing Facility